Thomas J. Hanrahan

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Lococo J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable forthwith to the plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a failed motion by the defendants to have their trial costs paid by various litigation loan providers, the loan providers sought their costs of the motion.

The court declined to award costs to the loan providers, finding that the defendants' motion raised a novel issue regarding the enforcement of a costs award against a litigation loan provider and the requirement for court approval of litigation loan agreements.

Given the novelty of the issue, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

Following a lengthy trial where the plaintiff was awarded $50,000 but the defendants obtained a costs award of over $3.4 million, the defendants moved to recover those costs from four non-party litigation loan providers who had advanced funds to the plaintiff.

The court declined to order costs against the non-parties, finding that while the loans carried exorbitant interest rates, providing them did not amount to an abuse of process under the 'person of straw' test or the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The court also noted that while litigation loans should be approved by the court in class proceedings, the statutory requirement to do so did not exist at the time the loans were made.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for negligent misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs alleged that during a settlement meeting for a fire loss claim, the insurer misrepresented that the plaintiffs could sue their former insurance broker for the shortfall in coverage, inducing them to sign a release and settle for less than they were entitled to.

The insurer argued the action was barred by the release and the limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the misrepresentation was made, whether reliance was reasonable, and when the limitation period commenced.

The plaintiff sought costs following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to transfer the proceeding.

The court found that the transfer motion was unnecessary, inappropriate, and brought for improper purposes such as judge-shopping and causing delay.

The defendant also inappropriately communicated with the court, breaching Rule 1.09.

Consequently, the court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,100.

The plaintiff school board commenced an application in Brampton to appoint an arbitrator for a business dispute arising from a fire.

The defendant objected to the arbitration and brought a motion to transfer the venue of the application to Toronto, arguing the dispute had no connection to Brampton.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the question of who arbitrates has no natural connection to any venue and that transferring the matter would cause unnecessary delay and waste judicial resources.

The infant plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling from a balcony.

The plaintiffs moved to extend the time to set the action down for trial, and the defendant cross-moved to bifurcate the trial on liability and damages.

The Master granted the bifurcation over the plaintiffs' objections, which was upheld by the Superior Court and Divisional Court on the basis that the court retained inherent jurisdiction to bifurcate non-jury trials without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly requires the consent of the parties to bifurcate any proceeding, whether jury or non-jury, thereby ousting the court's inherent jurisdiction to do so without consent.

The moving party, a class member in a train derailment class action, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing his appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal order, noting the moving party had an intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to obtaining issued and entered orders, and demonstrated an arguable case on the merits.

The court found that truncating the appeal based on a procedural irregularity would be contrary to the interests of justice.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order was set aside, and an extension of time was granted.

The appellant, a class member in a train derailment class action who had an individual trial for damages, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay and to extend the time to perfect the appeal.

The court applied the test for setting aside a dismissal for delay, noting that the appellant had a continuous intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay related to difficulties in settling the trial judge's orders, and that the respondents suffered no prejudice.

Crucially, the court found that the appellant had an arguable case on appeal regarding the trial judge's credibility assessments and evidentiary rulings.

The motion was granted, the dismissal was set aside, and the appellant was granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order bifurcating the liability and damages issues in a non-jury personal injury trial without their consent.

The infant plaintiff suffered a severe head injury, and damages could not be assessed for several years.

The court held that the Master had inherent jurisdiction to order bifurcation in exceptional circumstances, finding that the obiter in Bondy-Rafael abolishing such jurisdiction in non-jury trials was not binding.

Alternatively, applying the Carter test, the court found that Hryniak represented a fundamental shift in civil litigation justifying a departure from precedent.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of a motion by a non-party insurer to intervene and compel the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim, the plaintiffs and defendants sought costs against the insurer.

The insurer did not deliver written submissions opposing the costs requests.

The court awarded costs of $18,550 to the plaintiffs and $17,181 to the defendants, payable by the insurer.

Following a prior declaration that the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify under a comprehensive homeowners policy, the court determined the quantum of costs and reimbursement payable.

The applicants were entitled to full reimbursement of solicitor's accounts for defending the underlying action, subject to deductions for work performed before they became potential personal defendants and for apportionment issues involving another family member.

The court also fixed partial indemnity costs of the insurance application after reducing the hours claimed.

A total award of $20,138.94 was ordered payable within 10 days.

Parents sought a declaration that their homeowner’s insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify them in an action alleging they negligently failed to prevent or address bullying committed by their minor child.

The insurer denied coverage relying on policy exclusions for intentional acts and for failure to prevent abuse or harassment.

The court held that the negligence claims against the parents were distinct from the intentional tort allegations against the child and were not merely derivative.

Applying principles governing duty to defend and interpreting exclusion clauses narrowly, the court found the policy language did not clearly exclude negligent failure to prevent harassment.

The insurer was therefore obligated to defend and indemnify the parents.

The applicant, an absentee landlord living in Qatar, sought to reverse clean-up costs assessed against his property by the respondent municipality after a clandestine drug lab operated by his tenants caused a fire.

The municipality relied on a by-law prohibiting the use of property for the manufacture of controlled substances.

The court held that the by-law is a strict liability public welfare provision that does not require the owner to have actual knowledge of the prohibited activity.

The court found the municipality's decision to assess costs against the applicant was reasonable and that failing to do so would result in the applicant's unjust enrichment.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding that it owed a duty to defend the respondents.

The insurer argued that coverage was excluded under a clause for claims arising from damage to property the insured owns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion clause was written in the present tense and did not apply to property that the respondents formerly owned but no longer owned at the time of the claim.

The respondents were awarded costs on a full indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action on a summary judgment motion, which he did not attend.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the basis that a claim for negligent investigation could not possibly succeed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in law, as the viability of a negligent investigation claim remains an open question in Ontario.

The Court set aside the dismissal of the action, allowing it to proceed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his insurance company and broker following a house fire.

The trial judge found that the appellant had a financial motive to set the fires, misrepresented his insurance history to the broker, and had the best opportunity to commit the arson.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, motive, opportunity, or the overwhelming evidence of arson.

The applicant, a retired 63-year-old, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received non-income weekly benefits until the insurer terminated them.

The applicant sought ongoing benefits under section 13 of the No-Fault Benefits Schedule, arguing he suffered a substantial inability to perform his essential tasks.

The arbitrator defined 'essential tasks' as activities connected to the ongoing business of living, excluding casual social activities and informal volunteering.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant's physical abilities were significantly modified initially, his condition had improved by October 6, 1992, such that he was no longer substantially disabled.

The applicant was awarded benefits for the closed period from November 11, 1991, to October 6, 1992, along with interest and arbitration expenses.