Sarah Clarke

The children's aid society brought a motion within a status review application to vacate a previous statutory finding that a child in extended society care was not a First Nations child.

The society sought a new finding that the child is a First Nations child based on new evidence of the paternal aunt's self-identification as Indigenous.

The foster parents and maternal grandfather opposed the motion, arguing the previous finding could not be varied.

The court held that a child's identity is fluid and can be revisited on a status review application if new evidence arises and it is in the child's best interests.

The court accepted the paternal aunt's self-identification and declared the child a First Nations child under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The appellant mother took her three children from Kuwait to Canada without the respondent father's consent and claimed refugee status, alleging domestic violence.

The father applied for the children's return to Kuwait.

The application judge ordered the children returned, finding no risk of serious harm under s. 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by rejecting uncontradicted expert evidence that the children's fears of their father were independent and not influenced by the mother.

The Court also held that ordering the children's return before their refugee claims were determined violated the principle of non-refoulement.

The appeal was allowed and a custody hearing was ordered in Ontario.

The biological mother brought a motion to appoint the Office of the Children's Lawyer to represent her two biological children in her underlying application to set aside an adoption order.

The underlying application was based on the reliance on flawed Motherisk drug testing reports in the original Crown wardship proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society and the adoptive parents opposed the motion as premature.

The court granted the motion, finding that the children's rights to participate and be heard were paramount, and appointed the Children's Lawyer pursuant to section 89(3.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff First Nation, located in Quebec, commenced an action in Ontario against the federal Crown and two third-party managers for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation regarding the management of its funding.

The defendants moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The court applied the real and substantial connection test and section 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding that the substance of the claims arose in Quebec where the alleged failures and losses were experienced.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed.

The appellants appealed a decision ordering Crown wardship with access to the maternal grandmother for two Aboriginal children.

The children had been apprehended and placed with a non-Aboriginal foster family for several years.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the children's First Nations status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while Aboriginal heritage is an important consideration under the Child and Family Services Act, it does not override the paramount consideration of the children's best interests.

The court upheld the finding that removing the children from their established foster family would be damaging, and that their cultural connection could be maintained through access visits.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration of unjust enrichment and a constructive trust against properties owned by the defendants, after $750,000 was fraudulently obtained by one defendant and deposited into the corporate account of another.

The court considered whether the recipient defendant's knowledge of the fraud was relevant to the unjust enrichment claim.

The court held that while the plaintiff does not have to prove knowledge, the defendant's lack of knowledge is relevant evidence for the defence of juristic reason.

A mini-trial was ordered to determine the defendant's knowledge and whether a juristic reason existed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a gas contract dispute, arguing errors in the limitation period, mitigation, contract renewal, and costs.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the limitation period should not run due to fraudulent concealment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal on the substantive issues, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the limitation period, mitigation, or the validity of the renewal contract.

However, the court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award to partial indemnity.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as the issue of fraudulent concealment was not raised at trial.