J.D. Walters

The children's aid society sought a temporary order placing a four-year-old Indigenous and Black child in the care of his father, removing him from the white kinship caregivers who had raised him since birth.

The society had executed a warrant to remove the child from the kin after verifying emotional harm, citing the kin's escalating pattern of alienating the child from the father and failing to support the child's Black heritage.

The kin and the mother opposed the change in placement, arguing the removal was unlawful and the child should remain in the only home he had known.

The court found the removal was lawful and that the child's best interests, viewed through the lens of the CYFSA and the federal FNIM legislation, required a change in placement to the father.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a 14-year-old child was in need of protection, placement of the child with the father under a six-month supervision order, and access to the mother at the Society's discretion.

The mother opposed the protection finding and the access terms but failed to file responding materials.

The court applied the principles of summary judgment in child protection cases and found no genuine issue for trial.

The child was found in need of protection due to the mother's inability to meet his needs and manage his behavioural issues.

The court ordered the child placed with the father and granted access to the mother at the Society's discretion.

The applicant mother brought a motion to set aside Minutes of Settlement she had signed, alleging mistake, lack of independent legal advice, and duress.

The court found that the mother understood the agreement, had explicitly waived independent legal advice, and was not subjected to duress or coercion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the mother simply changed her mind, and ordered a final judgment in accordance with the Minutes of Settlement.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to place two children in extended society care, with a minimum of three face-to-face access visits per year for the parents.

The parents consented to the extended society care order but the father sought more frequent access.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issue for trial, and ordered extended society care with a minimum of three face-to-face visits per year for both parents, balancing the children's need for stability with their desire to maintain contact with their parents.

Following the settlement of a child protection proceeding, the respondent mother sought costs of $352,066.02 from the respondent father.

The mother argued the father acted unreasonably, necessitating an urgent motion mid-trial to enforce a parenting order after he failed to return the children.

The court noted that while costs are rarely awarded between parents in child protection matters, the father's breach of the court order justified a costs award for the urgent motion.

The court awarded the mother $15,000 in costs for the motion but declined to award costs for the entire proceeding, as the trial was not completed and there was insufficient evidence of bad faith to justify full costs.

The applicant society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to place the child in extended Society care.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the child under a supervision order.

Relying on expert evidence that the mother lacked the capacity to safely parent the child full-time due to a psychological disorder, the court found no genuine issue for trial.

The court granted the summary judgment, placing the child in extended Society care, but ordered that the mother, sibling, and maternal grandparents have a right of access to the child.

The children's aid society brought a motion within a status review application to vacate a previous statutory finding that a child in extended society care was not a First Nations child.

The society sought a new finding that the child is a First Nations child based on new evidence of the paternal aunt's self-identification as Indigenous.

The foster parents and maternal grandfather opposed the motion, arguing the previous finding could not be varied.

The court held that a child's identity is fluid and can be revisited on a status review application if new evidence arises and it is in the child's best interests.

The court accepted the paternal aunt's self-identification and declared the child a First Nations child under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a five-month-old infant from the mother's care and subsequently brought a motion to place the child in the father's care under a supervision order.

Both the mother and the father sought to have the child placed in their respective care.

The court reviewed the mother's history of child protection involvement, intellectual limitations, and failure to follow safety plans, concluding the child could not be safely returned to her.

The court also reviewed the father's history, including recent missed access visits and lack of problem-solving skills, concluding the child could not be adequately protected by a supervision order in his care.

The Society's motion to place the child with the father was dismissed, and the child remained in temporary Society care.

The parties separated in May 2018 and have one child together, born prematurely with significant medical needs.

The applicant mother sought sole custody and primary residence, while the respondent father sought joint custody and equal parenting time.

The court found that both parents were fit and capable, and that the mother had unreasonably denied the father access post-separation.

Applying the maximum contact principle and the best interests of the child factors, the court ordered joint custody and an equal shared parenting schedule.