Paul Murray

The defendant insurer brought a Rule 2.1.01 application to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs' claims arose from a motor vehicle accident, subsequent denial of statutory accident benefits, and alleged improper surveillance.

The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutional validity of certain Insurance Act provisions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the constitutional challenge and the claims could not be properly assessed or struck out using the limited summary procedure under Rule 2.1.01, as it was not the clearest of cases.

The self-represented applicant brought an application for habeas corpus, claiming his arrest for failing to appear and subsequent detention were unlawful.

He advanced Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) concepts, rejecting his legal name and the court's jurisdiction over him as a 'living man'.

The court dismissed the application, finding no valid legal foundation or reasonable grounds for his complaint, and noting that such jurisdictional arguments have been repeatedly rejected by the courts.

The court also noted the applicant had not exhausted his legal avenues, such as seeking a bail review.

The applicant, Paul Michael Kuleba, sought a writ of habeas corpus for his immediate release from custody, arguing his arrest and detention were unlawful.

His argument was based on a distinction between himself as a "living man" and a "legal entity" claiming he was not required to attend court appearances without his consent.

The court dismissed the application, finding his arguments to be without merit and characteristic of Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Arguments (OPCA), which have been repeatedly rejected by courts.

The defendant, C.S., brought a motion to recuse the assigned Crown counsel, alleging her involvement in the drafting of a racially charged undercover advertisement used in the investigation, which formed the basis of a potential abuse of process application.

The court found that newly disclosed police notes suggested the Crown's involvement in the investigative planning, making her a material and necessary witness.

Given the unreliability of the police officer's testimony regarding the meeting, the court determined that the proper administration of justice required the Crown to be called as a witness, thus meeting the stringent preconditions for recusal.

At a preliminary inquiry into a shooting at the Pickering Ribfest on June 2, 2018, the court determined the admissibility of hearsay evidence, specifically police statements from three key witnesses who claimed memory loss at trial.

The Crown sought to introduce statements from Shamar John, Zachery Hamedi, and Vaughan Roberts under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found that the twin criteria of necessity and threshold reliability were satisfied for all three witnesses' statements.

The court also addressed the admissibility of a Snapchat video and the identification of the accused by the accused's brother.

The court committed the accused to stand trial on multiple charges related to the shooting.

The accused pleaded guilty to luring a minor online.

The court imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment (the mandatory minimum) followed by three years probation.

The judgment addresses the serious nature of child exploitation offences, the evolution of sentencing ranges, and the increasing maximum penalties Parliament has imposed.

The court imposed extensive probation conditions including restrictions on contact with minors, internet usage restrictions, a ten-year SOIRA order, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with impaired driving (by alcohol) and over 80 mg/100 mL of blood.

The trial involved multiple Charter applications including a section 11(b) unreasonable delay application, sections 8 and 9 arbitrary detention and unreasonable search applications, and a section 10(b) right to counsel breach arising from the inadvertent audiotaping of the accused's call with duty counsel.

The court found no breach of section 11(b) rights, no breach of sections 8 and 9 rights, but did find a breach of section 10(b) rights.

However, applying the section 24(2) analysis, the court admitted the breath test evidence.

The accused was convicted of impaired care or control but acquitted of the over 80 charge due to reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of the breath technician's evidence concerning the alcohol standard used to calibrate the Intoxilyzer.

The defendant was convicted of Public Mischief after falsely reporting to police that she was being extorted and threatened with death by the victim.

The defendant fabricated the allegations to explain missing casino funds.

Her false reports resulted in the victim's arrest and 42-day pre-trial detention, which caused significant harm to his business and livelihood.

At sentencing, the court balanced the defendant's difficult personal circumstances and lack of criminal history against the serious nature of the offence and its impact on the victim and the justice system.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 90 days followed by two years' probation, rejecting a conditional sentence despite the defendant's mitigating factors due to the need for denunciation of conduct that undermines the integrity of the justice system.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in a cold case dating back to 1974.

The police conducted a 'Mr. Big' undercover investigation, during which the accused confessed to the murder.

The accused brought an application to exclude the confession, arguing that the police conduct amounted to an abuse of process and breached his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the police tactics, which included forcing the accused to participate in a simulated body disposal, were excessively coercive and functionally detained the accused.

The court concluded that the investigation breached section 7 and constituted an abuse of process, ordering the exclusion of the confession under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Three defendants were charged with robbery with a firearm, break and enter, disguise with intent, possession of restricted firearms, and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on witness testimony, circumstantial evidence including proximity of time and place, vehicle identification, and the testimony of an accomplice.

The defence called a young person who had pleaded guilty to the same incident, whose testimony was found to be perjurious and unreliable.

The court convicted all three defendants on the remaining charges, finding that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt their involvement in the robbery and their prior knowledge that firearms would be used.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The defendant challenged the breath test results on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 9 (unreasonable search and seizure and arbitrary detention).

The court found that the officer reasonably relied on the defendant's statement that he had consumed alcohol 40 minutes earlier, despite the strong odour of alcohol on his breath.

The court also found that the officer was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act to stop and detain the defendant for a sobriety check, and that the detention was not arbitrary.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed and the defendant was found guilty.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder and assault causing bodily harm in relation to the death of his common-law partner's two-year-old son.

The child suffered extensive, repeated blunt force trauma while in the offender's care, culminating in fatal abdominal injuries.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment for second-degree murder with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the brutal breach of trust against a vulnerable infant.

A concurrent sentence of five years was imposed for the assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent in a family property dispute brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim on the basis that it was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The moving party argued the claim was commenced outside the limitation period.

The responding party contended that either the ten‑year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied, that no limitation period applied to the equitable claim, or that the issue required a trial.

The court held that the summary judgment motion could not be determined on the existing record because the application had not yet been formally amended to plead unjust enrichment and the responding party had not pleaded the limitation defence.

The motion was therefore dismissed and no costs were awarded.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit multiple statements made by the accused during police interviews and at the scene of a medical emergency involving a child.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a voir dire examining voluntariness under the confessions rule and the accused’s right to silence.

Some statements were admitted where the accused attended voluntarily and spoke without coercion, while other statements were excluded where police interrogation ignored repeated assertions of the right to remain silent or involved oppressive questioning.

The ruling provides a contextual analysis of voluntariness and the interaction between the confessions rule and Charter protections.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found that although the request for dismissal should have been made on notice, the outcome would not have been different.

The appellant failed to comply with two orders designed to expedite the case and failed to adequately explain the delay.

The respondent suffered prejudice due to a certificate of pending litigation and subsequent orders.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence provided by a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer's identification was supported by strong circumstantial evidence, specifically the appellant's presence in an industrial yard late at night.

The court concluded that the trial judge's instructions on eyewitness evidence were thorough and the verdict was reasonable.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits until they were terminated by the insurer.

She applied for ongoing weekly benefits under section 13 of the Schedule, claiming a substantial inability to perform her essential tasks as a student, parent, and homemaker due to soft tissue injuries, headaches, and depression.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant experienced a reduced level of functioning, she was able to resume her full-time studies and manage her household with some assistance, and therefore did not meet the test for substantial inability.

The claim for ongoing weekly benefits was dismissed, but the insurer was ordered to reimburse the applicant for chiropractic and medication expenses, and to provide further rehabilitation assistance.