P. Quilty

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing or refusing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge due to a reasonable doubt about whether the delay between the initial breath demand and the arrival of the ASD was reasonably necessary, rendering the demand unlawful.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge erred by focusing on the initial demand rather than a second demand made when the ASD arrived, and by applying the immediacy requirement too rigidly.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial demand occasioned the detention and was the correct focus of the analysis, and that the trial judge made no error in concluding the Crown failed to prove the delay was reasonably necessary.

The young person was charged with impaired operation causing death and criminal negligence causing death following a fatal single-vehicle accident.

The court found multiple serious breaches of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights, including an officer surreptitiously listening to a medical assessment, making a breath demand without reasonable grounds, and providing misleading information to obtain a search warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath and blood sample evidence under s. 24(2).

Without this evidence, the Crown could not prove the elements of the offences, resulting in acquittals on all charges.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay drinking and driving charges against the respondent due to a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in failing to attribute certain scheduling delays—specifically the time taken to schedule a Crown pre-trial and a judicial pre-trial—to the defence.

When these periods of defence delay were deducted from the total delay, the remaining time fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him, and in failing to exclude evidence after finding a breach of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment were entitled to deference.

The court further held that the trial judge actually erred in finding a s. 10(b) breach, as the police properly offered duty counsel when the appellant's counsel of choice was unavailable, and that police observations made during the hold-off period are admissible.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a breath demand.

The trial judge had found the approved screening device (ASD) demand unlawful, concluding the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and failed to make the demand immediately.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the defence's concession on reasonable suspicion without explanation and by ignoring objective facts such as the odour of alcohol and the respondent's admission to drinking.

The appeal court also held the trial judge erred by interpreting 'immediately' as 'instantaneously', finding the two-to-four minute delay was reasonably necessary.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, the accused testified and provided an alibi involving a visit to his doctor's office on the morning of the stabbing.

The Crown applied to call reply evidence to rebut this testimony.

The accused objected, arguing it amounted to the Crown splitting its case and that the doctor's visit was a collateral fact.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the accused's whereabouts prior to the stabbing related to an integral and essential issue, and the Crown could not have reasonably anticipated the specific alibi evidence.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, the Crown applied to admit a statement made by the victim to a bystander shortly after being stabbed.

The victim, bleeding and seeking help, told the bystander that his assailant was his girlfriend's boyfriend.

The court found the statement met the criteria for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, as it was made contemporaneously with the startling event and before there was time to fabricate.

The application was granted and the statement was admitted into evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had ruled that the qualified technician's viva voce evidence regarding the certification of the alcohol standard solution was hearsay and inadmissible without a Certificate of Analyst.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law.

The court held that the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code can be proven by the viva voce evidence of an intoxilizer technician without the need to tender a certificate of an analyst.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The accused was charged with robbery following a home invasion where three individuals stole electronics and a wallet.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically a single partial fingerprint found on a solarium door frame that matched the accused.

None of the victims or co-accused could identify the accused.

Applying the principles of circumstantial evidence, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the fingerprint during the robbery, as there were other plausible explanations for its presence.

The accused was found not guilty.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a Justice of the Peace's order that quashed an information charging the respondent with speeding.

The information contained an obvious typographical error regarding the year of the offence.

The Justice of the Peace quashed the information on his own motion at the first appearance, without allowing the Crown to make submissions or considering the mandatory amendment provisions under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace exceeded his jurisdiction by failing to observe natural justice and mandatory statutory provisions.

The court granted the certiorari application, extended the time for service, and issued mandamus remitting the matter back to the Provincial Offences Court.

Following a traffic stop for an unilluminated rear light, the accused brought a Charter application challenging their arrests, searches, and the seizure of firearms.

The court held that the driver was unlawfully arrested for breach of probation because the probation order plainly permitted him to be out during curfew while with the mother of his child, and the officers had reviewed that order.

The court further found the asserted marijuana-based grounds for arresting the passenger were not established, rendering that arrest a pretext and unlawful.

Applying the Grant framework, the court characterized the police conduct as very serious, found significant impact on the accuseds’ liberty and privacy interests, and excluded the two firearms as against the driver and the firearm found on the passenger.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, errors in credibility findings, and a violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to introduce medical evidence.

The court also held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing credibility, and confirmed that there is no right to counsel prior to complying with a forthwith roadside screening demand.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample at trial.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The accused argued the verdicts were inconsistent and the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the synergistic effects of Ativan and alcohol.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by finding the accused lacked the mens rea for impaired driving due to the unanticipated effects of combining alcohol and prescription medication.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no inconsistency in the verdicts, no material misapprehension of evidence, and holding that the presumption of voluntariness for impaired driving can be rebutted where impairment results from the unforeseeable combined effect of alcohol and drugs.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a flower bed with the engine running.

He was charged with impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter application under ss. 10(a) and 10(b), finding he was not detained prior to his formal arrest.

The court also found the accused had care and control of the vehicle, as the vehicle was operable despite being temporarily immoveable, triggering the statutory presumption.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge but acquitted of impaired driving due to a lack of expert evidence linking his blood alcohol level to impairment.