Noah Schachter

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upholding her dismissal for discreditable conduct and insubordination.

The charges stemmed from her failure to attend internal investigations and her use of a personal Twitter account to make inappropriate comments about the Chief of Police and others.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness and accommodation for her post-traumatic stress disorder, and that her dismissal infringed her Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the hearing officer reasonably accommodated her and properly proceeded in her absence.

The Court also upheld the Commission's finding that sections 7 and 15 of the Charter were not engaged, and that her dismissal was a proportionate limit on her freedom of expression under section 2(b).

The appellant, a police officer on leave with PTSD, was found guilty of insubordination and discreditable conduct for refusing to attend interviews, harassing another officer, and making numerous offensive and derogatory posts about the police service on Twitter.

The Hearing Officer ordered her dismissal.

On appeal, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the Hearing Officer's decisions to deny the appellant's requests for an indefinite adjournment and to proceed in absentia.

The Commission found no procedural unfairness and upheld the findings of misconduct and the penalty of dismissal.

The Commission also conducted a Doré analysis and concluded that the disciplinary action was a proportionate limit on the appellant's Charter right to freedom of expression.

The public complainant sought leave to appeal a Hearing Officer's decision dismissing misconduct charges against a police officer due to noncompliance with the six-month delay provision in s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent officer objected to the Independent Police Review Director participating in the leave application.

The Commission held that the Director has standing to participate in pre-hearing steps, including leave applications.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the interplay between the Director's oversight powers and the Police Services Board's obligations regarding delay raises issues of significant importance to the policing profession and the community.

This appeal concerned the applicability of the third-party records regime under sections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code to a former police officer's anticipated testimony and a draft statement of claim in a criminal trial.

The appellants, J.R. (the former officer) and Toronto Police Service, sought to overturn a subpoena requiring J.R. to testify and to prevent the use of the draft statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the third-party records regime did not apply to oral statements made by J.R. and, in the specific circumstances, did not apply to the draft statement of claim.

Furthermore, even if the regime applied to the draft statement, its production was deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and an interim stay was set aside, making the lower court's unsealing and set aside orders effective.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle stop at 2:40 a.m. outside a drinking establishment.

The Crown proved the charge through roadside screening device and qualified technician breath samples.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the initial demand and alleged violations of his right to counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected both challenges, finding reasonable grounds for the initial demand and that police made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice before offering duty counsel.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The trial judge found that the constable's demand for a breath sample violated section 8 of the Charter because the constable had not followed three procedures in the OPP manual for the Drager Alcotest 6810 device, and therefore could not have reasonably believed the device was functioning properly.

The trial judge excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no objective basis for the constable's belief that the device was functioning properly, and that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence under section 24(2).