Matthew Furrow

The applicant sought costs following a successful application to pass over the respondents and himself as estate trustees.

The applicant claimed full indemnity costs of $76,212.67.

The court applied a blended approach to costs, ordering the self-represented respondent Peter Childs to pay partial indemnity costs of $45,950.22 due to his vexatious conduct and vitriolic attacks.

The balance of $30,262.45 was ordered payable to the applicant out of the Estate.

No costs were awarded against the other respondents.

In an estates application, a sibling sought to pass over all named executors and appoint a neutral estate trustee due to prolonged, high-conflict litigation, deadlock, and allegations of re-litigation of previously determined matters.

The court held that although testamentary choice is to be respected, clear necessity existed because entrenched animosity and mistrust risked compromising proper administration of the estate.

The court found the majority-rule clause did not resolve repeated 2-2 deadlocks, and also found a genuine conflict concern arising from substantial unpaid costs awards to be offset against certain beneficiaries’ shares.

The court ordered all four siblings passed over and appointed a professional trustee without bond, directed that the trustee need not pursue already adjudicated litigation issues, declined to determine standing objections in a separate passing-of-accounts proceeding, and gave directions regarding implementation and holdback of costs awards.

Costs were reserved pending written submissions.

The applicant brought a statutory guardianship application regarding his mother, which was rendered moot when she died before adjudication.

The applicant sought costs of the application.

The court found that the application had conferred a benefit on the mother prior to her death by prompting the parties to implement care and personal support worker agreements.

The court awarded the applicant fixed costs of $12,000 payable from the mother's estate, significantly reducing the amount claimed as the costs incurred after her death were unreasonable.

The respondent brought a motion to stay an application for dependent's support under the Succession Law Reform Act, arguing that the Ontario Superior Court lacks jurisdiction.

The applicants sought support from the estate of a deceased individual who was domiciled in Costa Rica at the time of death.

The court found that the deceased had established Costa Rica as his permanent domicile and that the presumptive connecting factors (existence of personal property and insurance trusts in Ontario) were insufficient to establish a real and substantial connection between the dispute and Ontario.

The application was permanently stayed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicants brought an unopposed application for a declaration that the deceased's will met the formalities of execution under s. 4(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The witnesses had initialed or signed every page except the last page and did not sign the attestation clause.

The court held that initials suffice as a subscription and that the witnesses' subscriptions do not need to be placed at the end of the will.

The application was granted and the will was declared valid.

The applicant sought to validate his deceased mother's will under section 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The will, drafted by a lawyer, was improperly executed due to a missing witness signature by the lawyer, despite the deceased believing all formalities were met.

The respondent, the deceased's sister and co-beneficiary, did not oppose the application.

The court found the will clearly expressed the deceased's testamentary intentions and was authentic, representing a textbook case for the application of the new curative provision.

The court ordered the will to be valid and fully effective as if it had been properly executed.

The applicants brought an application to resolve issues regarding the administration of the deceased's estate, specifically whether certain inter vivos payments made by the deceased to her children and grandchildren should be treated as advances on their inheritances.

The respondents, acting as estate trustees, argued the payments were advances based on ademption by advancement or a resulting trust.

The court held that the doctrine of ademption by advancement likely no longer applies in Ontario and was inapplicable on the facts.

Furthermore, the presumption of a resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of the deceased's intentions.

The court also found that a loan made to one of the applicants had been fully repaid and was statute-barred.

Metrolinx purchased a railway corridor from CN and requested that Enbridge relocate six gas pipelines crossing under the railway.

A dispute arose over who should bear the relocation costs.

The application judge found that under the historical agreements, Enbridge was responsible for the costs, and that CN had assigned these rights to Metrolinx.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Enbridge's appeal, holding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in interpreting the complex commercial agreements.

The landlord appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Landlord and Tenant Board order granting rent rebates to three tenants of cottage sites.

The landlord argued that applying the security of tenure provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act would extend the 20-year leases beyond 21 years, thereby contravening the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act and rendering the leases void.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was bound by its previous decision in Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp., which held that the rent control provisions of the RTA applied to similar land leases.

The court declined to address the potential conflict between the RTA and the Planning Act as the landlord had not sought to overrule Matthews or requested a five-judge panel.

The plaintiff moved to set aside the registrar’s automatic dismissal of an action alleging misappropriation of investment funds and to transfer the place of trial from Toronto to St. Catharines.

The dismissal was set aside on consent, as the motion had been brought before the dismissal order was issued and procedural steps had continued.

Applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court weighed convenience, trial scheduling, and access to justice considerations.

Despite several defendants and counsel being located in Toronto, the court found the plaintiff’s health issues and limited financial means were significant factors favouring transfer.

The action was therefore ordered transferred to St. Catharines in the Central South judicial district.

A public transit agency sought a declaration that a gas utility was contractually responsible for the cost of relocating pipelines where they crossed a rail corridor.

The pipelines had been installed pursuant to historical crossing agreements between the utility’s predecessor and a railway company, which were assigned to the transit agency when it purchased the rail corridor.

The utility argued the agreements did not apply where the pipelines ran along municipal road allowances and further contended the payment obligations were tied to federal railway regulation that did not apply to the transit agency.

The court held the crossing agreements were valid contractual obligations assigned to the transit agency and enforceable regardless of the regulatory status of the parties.

The utility was ordered to reimburse the transit agency for relocation costs exceeding $2.3 million plus interest.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering it to repay illegally collected rent, arguing the leases were void under s. 50(3) of the Planning Act because the Residential Tenancies Act's automatic renewal provisions effectively created leases exceeding 21 years.

The tenants cross-appealed the Board's decision to limit their repayment to a one-year period.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding that statutory renewal does not trigger the Planning Act's subdivision control provisions, estoppel cannot override the RTA's prohibition on illegal rent, and the Board reasonably applied the one-year limitation period for collecting illegal rent.

Following an earlier endorsement enforcing a settlement agreement for the purchase of shares, the court addressed costs and pre‑judgment interest.

The successful moving parties sought partial indemnity costs and opposed the respondent’s request for pre‑judgment interest on the settlement amount.

The court held that the settlement concerned an exchange of money for shares rather than payment of a debt, and therefore the rationale for pre‑judgment interest did not apply.

Because both sides had retained the benefit of their respective property—funds on one side and shares on the other—no interest award was warranted.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.

The defendant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the plaintiff $4,132.00 in unpaid commissions for recruiting international students.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge made palpable and overriding factual errors by ignoring clear evidence that the defendant required a formal, signed agency agreement before paying any commissions.

As the plaintiff placed students without such an agreement in place, there was no legal or equitable basis for the claim.

The judgment was set aside and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce a settlement agreement reached in 2005 but never implemented.

The responding party, acting through a litigation guardian, argued the settlement should not be enforced because the party lacked mental capacity at the time and the agreement was unfair.

The court found insufficient evidence that the party was under a disability in 2005 and held that Rule 7.08 did not apply because no litigation guardian existed at the time of settlement.

The court also found no persuasive evidence that the settlement was substantively unfair, noting the involvement of legal and accounting advice during negotiations.

The settlement was enforced and an order issued implementing its terms.

Two applications were brought to determine the beneficiary of approximately $264,000 in segregated funds and a RIF annuity (the Disputed Funds) left by the deceased.

The deceased had designated a charitable foundation as the beneficiary of the funds, but later executed a will containing a general insurance clause leaving all insurance proceeds to her nephew.

The charitable foundation sought to rectify the will or interpret it to exclude the Disputed Funds, arguing the deceased intended the funds to go to charity.

The court held that the Disputed Funds were insurance policies governed by the Insurance Act, and the will's insurance clause effectively re-designated the beneficiary to the nephew.

Applying Robinson Estate v. Robinson, the court refused to admit third-party extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear language of the will, which the deceased had reviewed and approved.

Two applications were brought to determine the beneficiary of approximately $264,000 in segregated funds and a RIF annuity (the Disputed Funds) left by the deceased.

The deceased had designated a charitable foundation as the beneficiary of the funds, but later executed a will containing a general insurance clause leaving all insurance proceeds to her nephew.

The charitable foundation sought to rectify the will or interpret it to exclude the Disputed Funds, arguing the deceased intended the funds to go to charity.

The court held that the Disputed Funds were insurance policies governed by the Insurance Act, and the will's insurance clause effectively re-designated the beneficiary to the nephew.

Applying Robinson Estate v. Robinson, the court refused to admit third-party extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear language of the will, which the deceased had reviewed and approved.