Maia L. Bent

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that denied several treatment plans and barred him from disputing a treatment plan for a Kubota tractor due to non-attendance at insurer's examinations.

The Tribunal dismissed the reconsideration request regarding the Kubota tractor, car repair devices, and an outstanding treatment plan balance, finding no errors of law or fact.

However, the Tribunal granted the reconsideration in part, finding it had erred by applying an unduly narrow interpretation of 'objective medical evidence' for a mattress and pillow, and by failing to consider all stated goals for a John Deere lawn mower.

The applicant was awarded entitlement to the mattress, pillow, and lawn mower treatment plans, with interest.

The appellant commercial garage owner appealed a jury verdict finding him 37% liable for catastrophic injuries suffered by a minor who, along with a friend, stole an unlocked car with the keys left inside from the garage lot.

The Court of Appeal conducted an Anns-Cooper analysis and upheld the finding that the garage owner owed a duty of care to the minors, as the risk of theft and joyriding by minors was reasonably foreseeable and the garage owner had a responsibility to secure the vehicles.

The court found no residual policy considerations to negate the duty, noting that the minor's illegal conduct was properly addressed through contributory negligence rather than denying a duty of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, a lawyer representing himself, moved for summary judgment to dismiss a solicitor's negligence claim brought by his former clients.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant failed to communicate court orders and allowed their underlying personal injury action to be administratively dismissed for delay.

The defendant argued the negligence claim was premature because the administrative dismissal could still be set aside.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding a genuine issue for trial existed because it was uncertain whether a motion to set aside the dismissal would succeed and the plaintiffs had alleged other acts of negligence.

The respondent successfully sued her mother for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to protect her from sexual abuse by her father during her childhood.

The mother appealed, arguing the action was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches due to the 42-year delay in bringing the claim, and that she was powerless to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no acquiescence by the respondent and that the mother failed to establish she was unable to protect her daughter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding damages, reducing the award for lost income from $100,000 to $20,000 due to a lack of evidentiary foundation for the higher amount.

A cross-appeal regarding trial costs was dismissed.

The appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle she co-owned with her father.

At the time of the accident, the vehicle was uninsured and the appellant was driving without her father's consent.

The trial judge found that both were owners under the Highway Traffic Act, but that the father and his insurer were not liable because the appellant drove without his consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 192(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, a co-owner in possession of the vehicle does not need the consent of the other co-owner for both to be held vicariously liable.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits from the insurer.

The insurer refused to pay benefits on the basis that the applicant provided late notice of his intention to claim benefits.

The applicant argued that his medical condition and reliance on counsel provided a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The arbitrator found that while the medical explanation was reasonable up until the time the applicant retained counsel, the simple reliance on counsel thereafter did not constitute a reasonable explanation.

The applicant was therefore precluded from proceeding to arbitration.

The insured person was injured in a motor vehicle accident and hospitalized.

His mother took a leave of absence from work to visit him daily, losing $3,966.43 in wages.

The insured claimed this amount as visitor's expenses under s. 21 of the SABS-1996.

The arbitrator allowed the claim, but the insurer appealed.

The Director of Arbitrations allowed the appeal, holding that lost income is not an 'expense incurred' within the meaning of s. 21, distinguishing it from attendant care benefits which explicitly cover lost income or the value of services.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for mileage and meal expenses incurred by his fiancée.

The parties attended mediation, and the mediator issued a report indicating all issues were resolved.

The applicant subsequently applied for arbitration, claiming a dispute over the time frame of the expenses.

The arbitrator dismissed the application, finding that the issues in dispute had been settled at mediation and therefore mediation had not failed, which is a statutory prerequisite for commencing arbitration under the Insurance Act.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and hospitalized for two months.

His mother stopped working to visit him daily and claimed her lost wages as a visitor expense under section 21 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing that lost wages are not an 'expense incurred' under the Schedule.

The arbitrator held that the mother's wage loss was the financial cost of her daily hospital visits and fell within the meaning of 'expenses incurred'.

The mother was entitled to recover her lost wages.

The appellant insurer sought to appeal an interim arbitration order that refused to order the respondent to produce his farm ledgers for 1997 and 1998.

The Director's Delegate rejected the appeal, noting that appeals from interim orders are generally not allowed under the Dispute Resolution Practice Code to avoid delay and minimize complexity.

The Delegate found that allowing the appeal would be an undue intrusion into the ongoing arbitration process, as the arbitrator was in a better position to evaluate the relative merits of the parties' positions regarding the necessity of the documents.