Joseph Falconeri

The applicant, who sustained catastrophic impairments after being struck by a vehicle as a pedestrian, sought various statutory accident benefits including transportation, food, taxi expenses, nursing services, assistive devices, and internet services.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant was entitled to $588.00 for internet services, as she required it to connect with community supports following the accident.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the remaining claims, finding that the applicant failed to meet her onus to demonstrate that the other expenses were reasonable and necessary medical or rehabilitation expenses.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike a jury notice due to court availability issues in Kingston, while the defendant brought a motion to adjourn the trial so it could be heard together with a separate action arising from a subsequent 2018 motor vehicle accident.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, noting that criminal trials take priority and a civil jury trial was unlikely to proceed as scheduled.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion to adjourn, finding that delaying a 2012 accident claim by several more years to allow the 2018 action to catch up would cause significant prejudice to the plaintiffs.

Following a personal injury trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages but found 25% contributorily negligent, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought over $817,000 in costs and disbursements, arguing for substantial indemnity costs from the date of a Rule 49 offer.

The defendants argued for an award of $380,000 inclusive of disbursements.

The court rejected the application of substantial indemnity costs, finding the trial result was not a 'near miss' to the plaintiff's offer.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs at $500,000 all-inclusive on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff suffered a severe quadriceps rupture after slipping and falling on a poorly lit, defectively designed stairway at a Sandals resort in Saint Lucia.

The court applied Saint Lucian law to determine liability, finding the resort breached its duty of care as an occupier.

The plaintiff was found 25% contributorily negligent for descending the stairs in the dark.

Applying Ontario law for the quantification of damages, the court awarded general damages, future care costs, and special damages, rejecting the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff's pre-existing osteoarthritis or a subsequent re-injury broke the chain of causation.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, specifically claiming entitlement to dental services and psychological services.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application.

The Tribunal found the applicant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his dental issues were caused by the accident, preferring the respondent's dental assessment over the applicant's dental surgeon's letter.

The Tribunal also denied the unapproved portion of a treatment plan for psychological services, finding the respondent's approved hourly rate of $100 for a psychotherapist was reasonable and the applicant failed to justify a higher rate or the necessity of additional administrative fees.

Claims for an award and interest were consequently dismissed.

The insurer brought a motion for the production of documents and information relating to the applicant's prior motor vehicle accident in 2000, arguing it was relevant to assessing her claims arising from a subsequent 2007 accident.

The insurer also sought clarification regarding the applicant's capacity and her substitute decision-maker.

The arbitrator found that the capacity issue had been resolved by the applicant filing the necessary documentation.

The arbitrator ordered the applicant to provide the names and details of her caretakers from two years prior to the 2007 accident to the present, as well as the Settlement Disclosure Notice from the 2000 accident, finding them relevant to her pre-accident condition and needs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages for injuries suffered when he was struck as a pedestrian by an unidentified motor vehicle.

The trial judge found the accident occurred in a vacant parking lot, not on a public highway, and therefore the reverse onus provision under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act did not apply.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant failed to prove the accident happened on a highway and that negligence could not be inferred from the injuries alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed an order that dismissed its motion for summary judgment and set aside a settlement agreement with the respondent.

The insurer conceded there were deficiencies in the notice provided under the settlement regulation but argued they were immaterial.

The Court of Appeal held that the materiality of the deficiencies could not be determined on the motion record.

However, the court found the motion judge erred by setting aside the settlement instead of merely dismissing the summary judgment motion.

The appeal was allowed in part to substitute an order dismissing the motion for summary judgment.

The Applicant sought to withdraw his Application for Arbitration for statutory accident benefits after realizing he had missed the two-year limitation period, intending instead to pursue a court action against his former solicitor for negligence and an alternate claim for benefits.

The Arbitrator permitted the withdrawal but found that commencing and then withdrawing the arbitration to pursue a better forum constituted an abuse of process.

Consequently, the Applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's $2,000 assessment fee, and prohibited from commencing another arbitration for the same benefits until the fee is paid.

The applicant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle insured by State Farm.

She claimed statutory accident benefits.

The issue was whether she was the spouse of the owner of another vehicle, insured by Allstate, at the time of the accident.

The arbitrator found that the applicant and the Allstate insured, who were the natural parents of a child and had resumed a relationship including weekend cohabitation prior to the accident, met the extended definition of 'spouse' under the Insurance Act.

Consequently, Allstate was held liable to pay the applicant's accident benefits.