Jonathan B. Schrieder

The court dismissed a motion to strike the jury notice following closing arguments in a negligence trial arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs objected to 19 statements made by defence counsel in his closing address, alleging they were inflammatory, invited improper reasoning, misstated the law, and appealed to emotion.

The court found some statements objectionable but determined that corrective jury instructions were sufficient to remedy any prejudice, making discharge of the jury unnecessary.

The jury subsequently found the defendants liable in negligence, apportioning liability at 93% to one defendant and 7% to the other.

Three consolidated civil actions arose from a motor vehicle accident on April 22, 2016, near Stouffville, Ontario, involving three vehicles.

The defendant Rae argued he owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs.

The court ruled on the duty of care issue at the close of the plaintiffs' case, finding that Rae owed a duty of care to all plaintiffs as a driver to other users of the roadway.

The court applied established jurisprudence recognizing the duty of care owed by drivers to other road users and rejected Rae's arguments based on the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, finding that driving is a heavily regulated activity and that the duty of care exists regardless of whether specific statutory obligations apply to the particular conduct alleged.

The applicant/appellant commenced a second application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) seeking damages and declaratory relief against her insurer and various non-insurer parties for alleged tortious conduct related to her statutory accident benefits (SABS) claims.

The LAT dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, noting it had no authority to award damages or make orders against non-insurers.

The applicant/appellant appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and subsequently dismissed the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the LAT lacks statutory jurisdiction to grant the requested relief and that the proceedings were an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final LAT decision.

The court considered a motion by the defendant to compel the plaintiff to attend two defence medicals and to permit late service of expert reports in a motor vehicle accident case.

The court found the defendant's explanation for delay unreasonable and dismissed the motion, except for allowing late service of a neurology report, as the plaintiff did not oppose that part.

The court emphasized the importance of timely expert report exchange and the consequences of litigation strategy that delays compliance with the rules.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination of catastrophic impairment based on mental or behavioural impairments, as well as ongoing income replacement benefits and medical/rehabilitation benefits.

The Tribunal found that the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8, as the accident exacerbated her pre-existing mental health issues, resulting in marked impairments in activities of daily living, concentration, persistence and pace, and adaptation.

The Tribunal also found the applicant entitled to a post-104-week income replacement benefit, concluding she suffered a complete inability to engage in suitable employment due to her psychological impairments.

Claims for social rehabilitation counselling and a separate file review fee for a catastrophic assessment were dismissed as not reasonable and necessary.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) declining to add a claim for punitive damages to a dispute over Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) claims.

Relying on its concurrent decision in Keulen v. Allstate Insurance Company, the Divisional Court held that the LAT does not have the authority to award punitive damages.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent insurer.

The applicant sought attendant care benefits and several treatment plans for psychological, chiropractic, and occupational therapy services following a motor vehicle accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to prove the benefits were reasonable and necessary.

The Tribunal preferred the respondent's insurer's examination reports over the applicant's medical evidence, noting significant contradictions between the applicant's own examination under oath testimony—where she reported being largely independent and emotionally well—and the severe impairments documented by her assessors.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her statement of claim to include a declaration of catastrophic impairment and claims for punitive, aggravated, and exemplary damages, and to compel the defendant to produce redacted adjuster's log notes with explanations.

The defendant opposed the amendments, arguing they were new claims barred by the April 1, 2016 amendment to the Insurance Act, which directs statutory accident benefit disputes to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

The court dismissed the request to amend the statement of claim, finding the proposed amendments constituted new claims not implicit in the original pleading.

However, the court granted the request for the production of redacted adjuster's log notes, along with explanations for each redaction, as the defendant had previously undertaken to produce them.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision dismissing his claim for a catastrophic impairment designation following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the LAT erred in law by failing to properly assess his mental and pain disorders and by ignoring key psychiatric evidence.

The LAT had subsequently issued a reconsideration decision that supplemented its original reasons and addressed these alleged errors, concluding that even if it had erred, the result would not change.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LAT acted within its jurisdiction under its reconsideration rules to review the evidence in light of alleged legal errors and confirm its original decision.

The applicant, common-law partner of the deceased, moved for summary judgment to set aside the deceased's 2017 Will and validate a 1991 Will, alleging the 2017 Will was signed under suspicious circumstances due to the deceased's severe dementia.

The respondent, the deceased's son, sought to propound the 2017 Will.

The court found overwhelming evidence of the deceased's incapacity at the time of execution, despite no finding of undue influence, and granted the applicant's motion, setting aside the 2017 Will and associated Powers of Attorney.

The appellant appealed two decisions regarding her claims for statutory accident benefits following a 2007 motor vehicle accident.

The first appeal challenged a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying certain attendant care benefits and setting the interest accrual date, which the Divisional Court dismissed as raising questions of fact rather than law.

The second appeal challenged a Financial Services Commission of Ontario decision finding it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for housekeeping benefits due to a 2011 consent order settling the issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding no errors of law and upholding the lower tribunals' decisions.

The appellant insurer sought to appeal and judicially review an interlocutory evidentiary ruling by the Licence and Appeal Tribunal (LAT) that excluded surveillance video evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and application for judicial review under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court held that the proceedings were premature, as interlocutory rulings in administrative proceedings should generally not be appealed or reviewed until a final decision is rendered, absent exceptional circumstances.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought an income replacement benefit (IRB) from the respondent.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding whether the motorcycle was insured at the time of the accident.

The Tribunal found that the motorcycle was not insured and that the applicant knew or ought reasonably to have known it was not insured, as he had previously secured insurance for another vehicle and failed to provide any evidence supporting his claim that he believed the vendor had arranged insurance.

The respondent was successful on the preliminary issue and is not required to pay an IRB.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision denying medical benefits for physiotherapy, a driver evaluation assessment, and a neuropsychological assessment.

The applicant argued the Tribunal made errors of fact and law, and breached procedural fairness by relying on the respondent's evidence and failing to reference specific medical reports.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding no error in the Tribunal's weighing of evidence or its procedural conduct, and noting that an adjudicator is not required to reference every piece of evidence.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following an alleged motor vehicle collision.

The respondent insurer denied the claim, arguing the collision did not occur as reported and the applicant was not involved in an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found significant inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence and accepted the respondent's expert accident reconstruction evidence, concluding the applicant failed to prove she was in an accident.

The Tribunal further found the applicant wilfully misrepresented material facts regarding the collision and her injuries.

Consequently, the respondent was entitled to terminate benefits and was awarded repayment of $1,757.24 in previously paid benefits, though costs were denied.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The respondent denied medical benefits on the basis that the policy limits were exhausted, leading the applicant to apply to the Licence Appeal Tribunal.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine optional medical and rehabilitation policy limits, characterizing it as a contractual dispute for the courts.

The Tribunal held that under section 280 of the Insurance Act, it has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes regarding entitlement to and the amount of statutory accident benefits, including optional benefits.

The Tribunal also determined the quantum of the applicant's income replacement benefits and found that the respondent was not entitled to recover alleged overpayments because its notices failed to comply with the requirements of section 52 of the Schedule.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought various medical, rehabilitation, and assessment benefits from the respondent insurer.

The respondent denied the benefits on the basis that they were not reasonable and necessary, relying on insurer examinations.

The adjudicator found that the applicant failed to meet his burden of proving the treatment and assessment plans were reasonable and necessary, noting a lack of objective medical evidence linking his current complaints to the accident and a lack of functional impairment.

Additionally, one claim for chiropractic treatment was found to be statute-barred as the appeal was filed past the two-year limitation period.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

The respondent initially placed the applicant in the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) but later removed her due to psychological issues.

The applicant claimed entitlement to physiotherapy services, a driver evaluation assessment, and a neuropsychological assessment.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding the physiotherapy claim was submitted in an incorrect format without the applicant's signature.

The Tribunal further held that the driver evaluation and neuropsychological assessments were not reasonable and necessary, as the applicant was already driving, had undergone multiple prior assessments, and lacked sufficient evidence of a head injury.

The plaintiff, Chantale Abbott-Keith, appealed a Certificate of Assessment of Costs issued by an Assessment Officer, which significantly reduced her claimed party-and-party costs from two settled motor vehicle accident actions and awarded costs of the assessment against her.

The appeal raised grounds including the Assessment Officer's failure to conduct a line-by-line analysis, breach of natural justice and procedural fairness by not properly considering the plaintiff's objections under Rule 58.10, and errors in applying proportionality and reducing disbursements.

The court found that the Assessment Officer erred in interpreting Rule 58.10(1) regarding the timing of objections and fundamentally misconstrued her role in the reconsideration process, thereby denying the plaintiff a fair hearing.

The appeal was granted, the Certificate of Assessment of Costs was quashed, and the matter was remitted back to the same Assessment Officer for a proper hearing of objections.

The appellant Economical Insurance appealed a motion judge's determination of the priority in which three insurance policies would respond to a motor vehicle accident claim.

The driver was covered under the vehicle owner's State Farm automobile policy, the owner's State Farm personal liability umbrella policy, and the driver's own Economical automobile policy.

The motion judge ordered that the State Farm auto policy respond first, followed by the Economical auto policy, and then the State Farm umbrella policy.

Economical argued that the umbrella policy was an owner's first loss policy under section 277(1) of the Insurance Act and should respond before the Economical policy, or alternatively, that both policies should respond rateably under section 277(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the umbrella policy was not an owner's first loss policy as defined by the Act and that section 277(2) did not apply to the Economical policy.