John Douglas Ewart

The applicants sought to quash two municipal by-laws (2020.16 and 2020.57) enacted by the Township of Ramara concerning shorewall construction and maintenance in Lagoon City.

The applicants argued the by-laws were ultra vires, contrary to provincial statute (the Mara Act), and enacted in bad faith, primarily due to mandatory aesthetic concrete requirements that increased costs and the transfer of appeal powers from the Lagoon City Parks & Waterway Commission to the Township.

The court found the by-laws illegal as they were inconsistent with the Mara Act by removing cost considerations and appeal rights, and were enacted for a collateral purpose (imposing a concrete aesthetic and circumventing existing permit applications).

The court also found sufficient indicia of bad faith, including collusion, interference with municipal officers, and lack of proper public notice.

The by-laws were quashed, and the Township was ordered to grant the applicants' permit applications under the previous by-law.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their remaining claims for damages arising from the respondent municipality's enactment of a fill permit by-law and its unsuccessful prosecution of the appellants for breach of that by-law.

The appellants claimed malicious prosecution, misfeasance and abuse of public office, and damages from the invalid fee provisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issues requiring trial on any of the claims.

The respondent had reasonable and probable cause to initiate and continue the prosecution, and there was no evidence of bad faith or unlawful conduct in enacting the by-law.

The plaintiff, a 43-year-old grader operator with 15 years of service, moved for summary judgment on a wrongful dismissal claim against the Township.

The court determined a reasonable notice period of 15 months, rejecting the defendant's argument of inadequate mitigation efforts due to insufficient evidence.

The plaintiff's claim for general damages for bad faith dismissal was dismissed, as the Township's failure to continue benefits was not deemed bad faith, and an employee's defamatory statement was outside the scope of employment and lacked proven reputational harm.

Damages were calculated for lost wages, overtime, benefits, and pension, but not for lost vacation pay.

The appellant township disqualified the respondent's tender for failing to include the company name and return address on the outside of the sealed envelope, as required by the tender process.

The respondent sued for breach of contract.

The trial judge found the respondent's tender was in substantial compliance with tender requirements and that the omission was a mere irregularity.

The trial judge awarded damages representing the respondent's lost profit, finding it had submitted the lowest bid and would have been awarded the contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought an action against the municipality, which included claims of malicious prosecution, misfeasance/abuse of public office, and damages related to the municipality's Fill By-Law.

The municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss all remaining claims.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial for any of the plaintiffs' claims.

Specifically, the court found that the municipality had reasonable and probable cause to initiate and continue Provincial Offences Act proceedings, did not act with malice, and did not act in bad faith in enacting or enforcing the Fill By-Law, including its fee provisions (which were previously found ultra vires but did not give rise to damages due to the plaintiffs' failure to complete permit applications).

The appellant, a farm property owner, sought to terminate a three-year farm lease with the respondents after the first crop season, claiming the respondents failed to provide chemical fertilizer application rates in the form she contended was required by the lease.

The trial judge found the appellant was not entitled to terminate the lease and awarded the respondents damages of $64,051.02 for lost profits from the 2013 and 2014 crop seasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision, finding that the lease did not contain a provision permitting early termination for this alleged breach, and that the respondents' handwritten disclosure of application rates was adequate performance.

The appellants owned vacant land in the Township of Havelock-Belmont-Methuen and placed a recreational motor home on their property.

The Township sought a declaration that this was a non-permitted use under its Comprehensive Zoning By-Law and an injunction prohibiting the placement of any vehicle for human habitation.

The application judge granted the Township's application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in interpreting the by-law to include recreational motor homes, which were not expressly prohibited.

The court also found that providing electrical power to the motor home was insufficient evidence of intended habitation without actual habitation, and that the injunction was overly broad as it prohibited all vehicles, including cars.

The Plaintiffs sought costs after successfully obtaining partial summary judgment, which found a municipal by-law's fee schedule for fill material to be ultra vires.

The Defendant argued for no costs due to divided success or a reduction in quantum.

The court found that success was not divided, as the Plaintiffs succeeded in striking down the fee structure, and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, after reviewing and deducting certain legal fees and disbursements.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment to determine if a municipal by-law prescribing permit fees for the importation of fill material was, in substance, an ultra vires tax.

The court found that the defendant municipality failed to establish a nexus between the fees charged and the actual or estimated cost of administering the regulatory scheme, despite being given an additional opportunity to provide evidence.

Consequently, the fee schedule was declared ultra vires as an unauthorized tax and was severed from the by-law, with the remainder of the by-law remaining in full force and effect.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful six-day trial where they recovered over $292,000 in damages and interest from the defendant municipality.

The plaintiffs had made three formal offers to settle, all of which were exceeded at trial.

They requested partial indemnity costs until their first offer, and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $235,418.99.

The defendant opposed the requested hourly rates and argued for lower costs based on proportionality and the public significance of the issues.

The court found the plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates reasonable, noting the defendant's "high-handed and dismissive" conduct prolonged the litigation.

The court held that the principle of indemnity substantially outweighed proportionality and the public interest argument, awarding the plaintiffs the full amount of costs requested.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial in which the plaintiff recovered damages against the municipal employer but failed against several individual defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

Applying Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of his settlement offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter because the judgment exceeded the offer.

The court assessed reasonable hourly rates for counsel and reduced excessive paralegal time and rates while disallowing law clerk administrative costs.

The successful individual defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs for their defence.

A Sanderson order was granted requiring the municipal defendant to pay the costs of the successful individual defendants given the unusual and confusing factual circumstances that justified joining all defendants in the action.