Edward Koke

The accused was charged with sexual assault and two counts of breaching a recognizance.

The trial focused on the issue of consent, with conflicting accounts from the complainant and the accused.

The Crown's application to admit similar fact evidence was dismissed, as its probative value was deemed outweighed by its prejudicial effect due to generic similarities and a key factual distinction.

Prior consistent statements by the complainant were also excluded as there was no evidence of recent fabrication.

The court found both parties generally credible, but the complainant's testimony regarding her actions and candor raised questions.

Ultimately, the accused's evidence created a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all charges.

This appeal concerned the trial judge's decision to appoint two amici curiae in a highly contentious and complex family law trial involving interjurisdictional issues.

The applicant mother was self-represented and exhibited emotional instability, while the respondent father's counsel was removed due to lack of funds.

The Attorney General of Ontario, as intervenor, moved to set aside the amici orders, arguing they constituted a de facto appointment of state-funded counsel.

The trial judge dismissed that motion, and this court upheld that decision.

The court found the appointment of amici was essential for the judge to discharge judicial functions, stabilize proceedings, and ensure a fair trial, consistent with established legal principles.

The amici's roles were distinct from traditional counsel, as they could not be dismissed by the parties and were not obligated to follow their instructions, primarily serving the court's needs.

The accused, Leonard Borne, applied for an order permitting a challenge for cause in his jury trial for sexual assault charges, alleging potential juror impartiality due to the #MeToo movement and its "believe the victim" slogan.

The court dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence of widespread bias that would prevent jurors from setting aside prejudice despite proper judicial instructions and existing trial safeguards.

This decision addresses costs following a motion to change custody, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The applicant father was substantially successful in the underlying proceeding, being awarded custody of the child.

The court considered factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including time spent, result achieved, complexity, and proportionality, as well as principles from Boucher and Davies.

The court awarded the applicant costs in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of HST, plus disbursements of $805.40, finding no compelling reason for substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, Diana Lynn Monk, sued her insurer (Farmers’ Mutual) and broker (Muskoka Insurance) for property damage to her log home caused by a contractor's negligent restoration work.

The court found that while the damage was covered under the "all-risk" homeowner's policy, the plaintiff failed to provide timely notice of the loss as required by Statutory Condition No. 6.

Despite the court's finding that the breach was imperfect compliance rather than non-compliance, the plaintiff's conduct was deemed unreasonable, and the insurer suffered significant prejudice due to the delay.

Consequently, the court denied relief from forfeiture and dismissed the claims against both the insurer and the broker.

Heather Noganosh pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing two deaths and one bodily harm.

The court considered aggravating factors (deliberate passing, exceeding speed, obstructed view, novice driver, pregnant) and significant mitigating factors (first offender, remorse, strong community support, primary caregiver for disabled parents, Aboriginal heritage requiring Gladue considerations).

The Crown sought 42 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a minimal or suspended sentence.

The court rejected a fixed sentencing range for dangerous driving causing death, emphasizing individual factors and moral blameworthiness.

A 12-month concurrent sentence for the deaths and 3 months concurrent for bodily harm was imposed, along with two years probation and a five-year driving prohibition, considering her unique circumstances as an Aboriginal offender and the detrimental effect of a longer incarceration.

The self-represented defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim, Betty Hagey and Kevin Hagey, brought an urgent motion seeking a permanent injunction to prevent The Toronto-Dominion Bank from taking possession of their mortgaged properties and to set aside a prior decision by Justice Gordon.

The motion alleged Planning Act violations, fraudulent misrepresentations by the Bank, and gross injustice.

The court denied the motion, finding no substantial difference from a previous motion brought by the Hageys that was also dismissed.

The court reiterated that the Hageys failed to satisfy the two-part test from Scott v. Cook for introducing new evidence and were attempting to re-litigate issues already decided.

This case involves a divorce trial addressing spousal support, child support, business valuation, equalization of family property, and various financial adjustments.

The parties separated after 18.5 years of marriage.

The court granted the divorce, imputed an income of $35,000 per annum to the Applicant for spousal support calculations, and ordered spousal support to continue for a limited period, with a portion payable as a lump sum.

Child support obligations were adjusted based on the children's enrollment status and residency.

The court valued the parties' HVAC business at $104,000, accepting the Respondent's expert's valuation due to local market risks and post-separation business volatility.

After equalization and numerous financial adjustments for overpayments, joint debts, and shareholder loans, the Applicant was found to owe the Respondent $114,298.22.

The defendant, Panolam Industries Ltd., brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Robert John Kuiack, to produce a further and better affidavit of documents, including relevant documents from a prior disability claim against Manulife.

The plaintiff had sued Panolam for wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, and Human Rights Code violations after his long-term disability benefits were terminated and his employment was deemed frustrated.

Panolam argued that the plaintiff's prior disability claim and associated medical evidence were relevant to defend against the current action, particularly regarding the plaintiff's health status and intent to return to work.

The court largely granted the defendant's motion, ordering the production of the Manulife disability claims file, settlement documents, pleadings, undertakings/refusals, and clinical notes and records from specific physicians up to the end of 2013.

This case involved an application and cross-application concerning easement and right-of-way issues over a property.

The applicants sought orders to rectify title deeds to confirm their right to park on and have unrestricted access to a right-of-way.

The cross-applicant sought to limit the right-of-way's terminus and deny parking rights.

The court found that the applicants had an unrestricted means of access and egress from and to the right-of-way at any point along its northerly boundary, based on the original grant and the mutual intention of the parties who created it.

The court also confirmed the applicants' right to park four vehicles on the right-of-way.

The respondent William Alfred King was noted in default.

Arthur John Blackwood was convicted of production of marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of ammunition while prohibited.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior criminal record for similar offences, and mitigating factors such as cooperation with police and remorse.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of 402 days (after credit for pre-trial custody) and ordered forfeiture of offence-related property, including the net proceeds from the sale of his home, finding the forfeiture not disproportionate given the nature and gravity of the offences and his criminal record.

The Attorney General of Ontario (AG) brought a motion to set aside the court's appointment of two amici curiae for an appeal, arguing that the court exceeded its jurisdiction and that the AG's policy of paying only legal aid rates should apply.

The court denied the AG's motion, finding that the AG's refusal to negotiate reasonable compensation with the appointed amici undermined the court's judicial role and appointment power.

The court emphasized the need for a flexible approach to amicus remuneration, especially given the unique qualifications and prior involvement of the appointed amici in this complex constitutional and jurisdictional appeal.

The underlying appeal was stayed until the AG and amici could agree on compensation.

The defendants (Hageys) brought a motion seeking to set aside or vary a previous summary judgment, introduce new evidence, and obtain a stay of a writ of possession and costs awards.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Hageys failed to satisfy the two-part test from `Scott v. Cook` for admitting new evidence and that the issues regarding a stay had been previously determined.

The court also noted that a request for an accounting related to a separate action was not properly brought in the current proceeding.

The previous order granting summary judgment remained in force.

Arthur John Blackwood was charged with multiple offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Criminal Code.

He pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana (Count 3) and was deemed to have pleaded guilty to production of marijuana (Count 1).

The trial proceeded on charges of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking (Count 2), possession of ammunition while prohibited (Count 5), and possession of proceeds of crime (Count 6).

The court found Blackwood guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking based on his statements, lack of conventional income, and the large quantity of marijuana and plants.

He was found not guilty of possession of proceeds of crime due to insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

He was found guilty of possession of ammunition, as his ownership of the residence and knowledge of the ammunition constituted "control" despite his argument that he did not bring it into the house.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful six-day trial where they recovered over $292,000 in damages and interest from the defendant municipality.

The plaintiffs had made three formal offers to settle, all of which were exceeded at trial.

They requested partial indemnity costs until their first offer, and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $235,418.99.

The defendant opposed the requested hourly rates and argued for lower costs based on proportionality and the public significance of the issues.

The court found the plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates reasonable, noting the defendant's "high-handed and dismissive" conduct prolonged the litigation.

The court held that the principle of indemnity substantially outweighed proportionality and the public interest argument, awarding the plaintiffs the full amount of costs requested.

The accused, Devyn Barclay, was detained by police based on a confidential informant's tip after disembarking a train with two large black suitcases.

Despite officers not detecting a marijuana odour, a police dog later indicated positively on the suitcases, leading to Barclay's arrest and the discovery of 33 pounds of marijuana.

Barclay challenged his investigative detention, the warrantless search, and arrest as violations of his Charter rights (sections 7, 8, and 9).

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity based on the compelling, credible, and corroborated informant's tip, justifying the detention and canine search.

The subsequent arrest and search incidental to arrest were also deemed lawful.

Barclay was found guilty of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and breaching a probation order.