Jamie G. Walker

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board dated October 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal, subject to the quantum of costs being fixed at the agreed amount of $2,500 all inclusive.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal from a Divisional Court order that had allowed appeals from a Superior Court order.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court's reasoning and conclusions, dismissing the appeal.

The parties also agreed on an all-inclusive costs award of $35,000 payable by the appellant to the respondents, covering all levels of court proceedings, including the motion for leave to appeal.

This motion arose from a contentious landlord-tenant relationship, addressing the proper calculation of realty taxes and occupancy expenses, and costs, following a prior application.

The court found the Landlord improperly used inconsistent methods to calculate the Tenant's realty tax allocation.

While declining to rule on occupancy expenses in this motion, the court remained seized of the issue.

Critically, the Landlord was ordered to pay the Tenant substantial indemnity costs for both the original application and this motion, totaling $709,017.39, due to the Landlord's "reprehensible" conduct, including attempting to evict the tenant for an ulterior motive (a better offer from another party) and engaging in vexatious litigation tactics.

The City of Toronto and the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision holding that 'Air Parcels'—stratified parcels starting above the ground—are not 'land' under the Assessment Act until fixed to the ground.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that at common law, real property includes the air space above the ground.

The court held that the statutory definition of 'land' in the Assessment Act expanded upon, rather than restricted, the common law definition.

Consequently, the severed air parcels qualify as 'land' and are subject to assessment and taxation even before any structures are built.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the valuation of a residential property.

The Board had found that MPAC failed to meet its burden of proving the property's current value and, as a result, fixed the assessment at the last uncontested value rather than determining the current value.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's approach was contrary to the Assessment Act, which strictly requires the Board to determine the current value of the property.

The matter was remitted back to the Board.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying thirty-two natural gas gate station properties as Industrial Property Class rather than Commercial Property Class.

The Board found that adding a legally required odorant to natural gas constituted 'processing' because it changed the product's character and made it more marketable.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable that a legal requirement to add an odorant to permit the gas to be legally sold renders the gas more marketable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying 32 of its natural gas gate stations as industrial rather than commercial properties.

The Board had found that adding odourant to natural gas constituted 'processing' under the Assessment Act regulations.

The Divisional Court clarified that the test for leave to appeal where the standard of review is reasonableness is whether there is reason to doubt the reasonableness of the decision, rather than its correctness.

Finding that there was reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Board's interpretation of 'processing' and that the issue was of sufficient importance, the Court granted leave to appeal.

The applicant church sought a declaration that its single-building complex, which housed both a place of worship and a religious school, was exempt from property taxation under the Assessment Act.

The respondent assessment corporation argued that the school portions were taxable because the school was operated by a separately incorporated entity.

The court found that the church and the school formed a single patrimony, with the church controlling and dominating the school's operations.

The court held that the exemptions for a place of worship and a non-profit educational seminary applied to the school-use areas, granting the application.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board changing the tax class of its property from farm land to vacant commercial land.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review because the applicant bypassed the statutory leave to appeal process.

The application was dismissed.