Jamie G. Walker

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying 32 of its natural gas gate stations as industrial rather than commercial properties.

The Board had found that adding odourant to natural gas constituted 'processing' under the Assessment Act regulations.

The Divisional Court clarified that the test for leave to appeal where the standard of review is reasonableness is whether there is reason to doubt the reasonableness of the decision, rather than its correctness.

Finding that there was reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Board's interpretation of 'processing' and that the issue was of sufficient importance, the Court granted leave to appeal.

The applicant church sought a declaration that its single-building complex, which housed both a place of worship and a religious school, was exempt from property taxation under the Assessment Act.

The respondent assessment corporation argued that the school portions were taxable because the school was operated by a separately incorporated entity.

The court found that the church and the school formed a single patrimony, with the church controlling and dominating the school's operations.

The court held that the exemptions for a place of worship and a non-profit educational seminary applied to the school-use areas, granting the application.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board changing the tax class of its property from farm land to vacant commercial land.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review because the applicant bypassed the statutory leave to appeal process.

The application was dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion requesting the Assessment Review Board state a case to the Divisional Court under section 43(1) of the Assessment Act.

The proposed question asked whether the market value of rights associated with an Environmental Compliance Approval should be reflected in the current value of a landfill site.

The Board dismissed the motion, finding that the question was either a mixed question of fact and law or a question of law that would attract deference on a reasonableness standard.

The Board concluded that specialized tribunals should not bypass their statutory role by referring questions to the court that the tribunal is expected to answer itself, even when all parties consent.