Genevieve McInnes

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's characterization of 216 days as defence delay, attributable to the appellant's failure to raise the delay issue despite knowing trial dates were set beyond the Jordan ceiling.

Net delay fell well below the 18-month ceiling, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted of possession of proceeds of crime after over $1.2 million in cash was excluded from his criminal trial under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown subsequently applied for forfeiture of the cash under s. 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, admitted the evidence, and ordered forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant argued that his acquittal created an issue estoppel preventing the trial judge from finding his possession was unlawful or conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal did not logically necessitate a finding of lawful possession, and that a s. 24(2) analysis in a forfeiture proceeding involves different considerations than in a criminal trial.

The applicant brought a private prosecution against his wife's employer and her superiors, alleging criminal harassment, obstruction of justice, intimidation, and retaliation.

Following a pre-enquete hearing, the Justice of the Peace refused to issue process on six counts due to insufficient evidence, and the Crown Attorney stayed the remaining count.

The applicant sought certiorari and mandamus to quash the refusal and review the stay.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error by the Justice of the Peace and confirming the Crown Attorney's absolute discretion to stay the charge.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault and theft under $5,000, and pled guilty to failing to comply with a SOIRA order.

The offences occurred when the offender followed an intoxicated victim into her apartment building and sexually assaulted her in the stairwell, subsequently stealing her bank cards.

At the time of the offences, the offender was on probation for a prior sexual assault conviction.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 4 years and 2 months in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation and ancillary orders.

The applicants, charged with driving offences following a dirt bike collision, brought a Charter motion to exclude blood samples and medical records seized by police.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to establish the affiant's subjective belief in reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the affiant only possessed a reasonable suspicion, rendering the search warrant and production order invalid and in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), citing the overbroad production order, careless drafting, and the issuing justice's apparent failure to properly review the materials.

The accused, Liban Gure and Daniel Jean-Charles, were charged with manslaughter and aggravated assault following the death of an 18-year-old who fell from a 16th-floor balcony.

The Crown alleged the victim was beaten over a drug debt and fled to the balcony in fear for his life.

The court found that Gure initiated the assault and participated in the confinement and beating that caused the victim's fatal flight, rendering him guilty of manslaughter as a co-principal.

However, due to the unreliability of the Crown's key witnesses, the court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding Jean-Charles's participation and acquitted him.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and criminal harassment, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 23 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court found only 28 days of defence delay and rejected the Crown's arguments that the defence implicitly waived delay or engaged in illegitimate conduct regarding disclosure and scheduling.

The court also rejected the Crown's argument that the case was complex.

Finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the net delay of nearly 22 months, the court ordered a stay of proceedings.

The applicants, charged with manslaughter, brought an O'Connor application seeking the production of mental health and medical records of a key Crown eyewitness.

The witness suffered from cognitive deficiencies and mental illnesses, which the applicants argued affected her reliability and credibility.

The court found that the applicants met the 'likely relevance' threshold at the first stage of the O'Connor regime, relying on evidence from the preliminary inquiry regarding the witness's mental health challenges.

The court ordered the production of specific medical and psychiatric records to the court for review.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy and drug trafficking offences following a complex police investigation, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 60 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework and transitional provisions, deducting periods of defence waiver and delay caused by discrete exceptional events, including a mistrial and a change of lead counsel.

The court concluded that the remaining delay was justified by the exceptional complexity of the case and the parties' reasonable reliance on the previous Morin framework.

The application was dismissed.

During a murder trial, the defence brought an application to exclude newly disclosed expert evidence relating to histological slide analysis conducted by a forensic pathologist the day before testifying.

The defence argued the late disclosure breached the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter because cross-examinations of earlier forensic witnesses had already been conducted based on the absence of such evidence.

Applying the framework in R. v. Bijelland, the court considered whether exclusion was necessary or whether lesser remedies could cure the prejudice.

The court found that admitting the evidence at the end of the Crown’s case would materially prejudice the defence strategy and that an adjournment or recall of witnesses would not remedy the unfairness.

The evidence derived from the late histological review was therefore excluded.

The Crown sought direction regarding the admissibility of evidence from a physician who recalled observing “rope marks” on a child during a visit in 1992 and being told by the child’s mother that the injuries were caused by a sibling who had since died.

The Crown argued the evidence formed part of a pattern of abusive conduct and was relevant to aggravated assault allegations within the charged timeframe.

The court held that linking the injuries to the accused required introducing evidence surrounding the sibling’s death, which had already been ruled inadmissible as prior discreditable conduct.

The probative value of the physician’s testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, particularly the risk of propensity reasoning.

The evidence was therefore ruled inadmissible.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct and hearsay ante-mortem statements of his deceased children in a trial for first-degree murder and other offences.

The accused cross-applied to sever an obstruct justice count relating to the earlier death of his son.

The court granted the severance application, finding the evidence surrounding the son's death highly prejudicial.

The court admitted some prior discreditable conduct evidence, including physical abuse and threats, as vital narrative and to show a pattern of abusive control.

Certain ante-mortem statements were also admitted under the state of mind hearsay exception, while others were excluded.

The accused applied for permission to sit at counsel table during a jury trial rather than in the prisoner’s dock, arguing that seating in the dock could undermine the presumption of innocence and hinder communication with counsel.

The court reviewed competing authorities concerning the placement of an accused in the courtroom and emphasized that the traditional position is the prisoner’s dock, subject to the trial judge’s discretion.

The court held that removal from the dock should occur only in exceptional circumstances where necessary to permit full answer and defence and where no security concerns exist.

As no such exceptional circumstances were demonstrated and the courtroom configuration would obscure the accused from the jury if seated behind counsel, the application was refused.

The accused applied during jury selection for an order excluding unsworn prospective jurors from the courtroom while challenge-for-cause questions concerning potential racial bias were asked.

The defence argued that exclusion was necessary to prevent prospective jurors from becoming "schooled" by hearing repeated challenges and tailoring their responses.

The court considered the interaction between the inherent jurisdiction to exclude jurors and the statutory regime in s. 640(2.1) and s. 640(2.2) of the Criminal Code, as interpreted in prior decisions.

Finding that the defence concern related to juror schooling rather than preserving impartiality between the Crown and the accused, the court followed the approach in Sandham and exercised its discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while permitting rotating triers.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his daughter, brought a pre-trial application to exclude expert opinion evidence suggesting starvation as a possible cause of death.

The accused argued the Crown provided late notice of this theory and that the underlying estimates of the victim's pre-death weight lacked scientific validity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that late notice did not warrant exclusion given the time remaining before trial, and that the experts' estimates, based on specialized experience rather than strict scientific testing, met the threshold reliability required for admissibility.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police during his transport and subsequent interview regarding the death of his daughter.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 7 and 10(b) Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice found the transport utterances inadmissible because the accused was not informed he was a murder suspect, vitiating his right to make an informed choice to remain silent.

While the station interview did not violate s. 10(b), the court excluded it under its residual discretion, finding its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value due to the accused's repeated requests for counsel and the lack of inculpatory responses to police theorizing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge's presiding over both his bail hearing and trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the jury charge contained errors regarding post-offence conduct, intent, and lacked balance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and concluding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in principle given the brutal, drug-related nature of the planned robbery and killing.