Genevieve Madill

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision to rectify his mother's will by adding a remainderman clause that gifted two properties to his niece and nephew upon the termination of his father's life interest.

The drafting solicitor admitted to accidentally omitting the clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not exceed his jurisdiction as a court of construction, as the will could be interpreted to achieve the same result without adding words.

The Court also held that the application judge did not err in his application of the corroboration requirement under s. 13 of the Evidence Act or in his reliance on admissions against interest as extrinsic evidence of the testator's intentions.

The cross-appeal challenging the remedy and costs was also dismissed.

The plaintiff Hollywood brought a motion for directions regarding the trial scheduling of two related actions arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The court considered the recent amendments to Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding bifurcation.

To avoid inconsistent results, the court ordered that the issue of liability be heard in a joint trial.

However, considering the lack of common witnesses for damages, the potential savings in costs, and the practical challenges of scheduling a lengthy joint jury trial, the court directed that the issues of damages proceed in separate trials.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims arising from their mother's holograph will.

The plaintiff argued the will created a testamentary trust in his favour and claimed dependent support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court found the will's language was precatory and did not create a binding trust.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence that the deceased was providing support to the plaintiff immediately before her death.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff's action was dismissed in its entirety.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal concerning the interpretation of a will provision granting an option to purchase a townhouse.

The court upheld the application judge’s finding that the option was properly exercised within the required time and that the will’s terms were sufficiently certain.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the necessity of a separate agreement of purchase and sale and the relevance of the parties’ subsequent conduct.

Costs were awarded as agreed.

The applicant sought production of the deceased’s lawyer’s estate planning file to search for documents that might support a claim under section 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act, which allows a court to validate documents as wills even if not properly executed.

The court held that the “wills exception” to solicitor-client privilege does not extend to such fishing expeditions for near-will documents, and that privilege is not waived unless there is evidence of a fixed and final testamentary intention.

The motion for production was dismissed, but other relief was granted on consent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment setting aside her mother's 2016 will and a related property transfer on the grounds of diminished capacity and undue influence.

The trial judge had found that the appellant exerted undue influence over her mother and failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence regarding the property transfer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the legal principles or her application of those principles to the factual findings, which were fully supported by the record.

The appellant was a passenger in a vehicle at a fast-food drive-through when a cup of hot coffee spilled on her, causing severe burns.

The insurer denied her claim for statutory accident benefits on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the SABS.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal upheld the denial, finding that an improperly secured lid was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the Tribunal's decision, holding that an inadvertent spill of hot coffee purchased from a drive-through is a normal incident of the risk created by the use of a vehicle, and the appellant's inability to take evasive action due to being seated in the vehicle was a direct cause of her impairments.

The applicant challenged the validity of her mother's 2016 Will and an inter vivos transfer of the mother's home to the respondent sister, alleging lack of capacity and undue influence.

The mother had a history of cognitive decline and was highly dependent on the respondent, who isolated her from the applicant.

The court found that the mother lacked testamentary capacity at the time the documents were executed and was subjected to undue influence by the respondent.

The 2016 Will and the property transfer were set aside, and the mother's prior 2007 Will was reinstated.

The applicant, acting as estate trustee and former attorney for property for her late mother, brought an application to pass accounts.

The objector, her sister, challenged numerous expenses and withdrawals, including a $50,000 alleged gift.

The court found the applicant's fiduciary duties crystallized in March 2016 when a bank power of attorney was signed.

Due to deficient record-keeping and failure to prove the $50,000 gift, the court ordered the applicant to repay $62,500 to the estate.

The applicant was awarded reduced compensation of $6,000 and partial reimbursement for expenses.

The applicant sought enhanced statutory accident benefits, claiming he sustained a catastrophic impairment from a motor vehicle accident.

He argued the accident caused or exacerbated conditions leading to a fall and seizure weeks later.

The Tribunal found the applicant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his present impairments, including a traumatic brain injury and psychological issues, were caused by the accident rather than his extensive pre-existing medical conditions, such as diabetic neuropathy and a history of syncope.

As the applicant did not meet the catastrophic impairment threshold and his standard policy limits were exhausted, all claims for medical, rehabilitation, attendant care, and housekeeping benefits were dismissed, along with claims for interest and a special award.

The applicant brought a motion seeking further particulars regarding a statement made by the respondent's claims representative and seeking to exclude the claims representative from the motion on the basis that she was providing legal services without a license.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for particulars, finding it was a factual issue to be determined at the hearing.

The Tribunal found the request to exclude the representative was moot as counsel had been retained, but noted that unlicensed representatives risk exclusion under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Law Society Act.