Farah Malik

The respondents brought motions to quash the appellant's appeal from an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions and quashed the appeal, finding that the appellant had appealed to the wrong court.

The proper appeal route was to a panel of the Divisional Court on a motion under section 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The self-represented appellant purported to appeal a costs-only order following the dismissal of his underlying action.

The Court of Appeal held that there is no right of appeal from a costs order and that leave is required.

Treating the materials as an application for leave to appeal costs, the Court refused leave and awarded costs of $1,000 to each of the four responding groups.

The moving party sought to set aside three orders made by the Deputy Registrar dismissing his appeals for failing to perfect them.

The underlying orders had struck out the moving party's claims against various defendants, including the Ontario Human Rights Commission, former employers, and their lawyers, for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions, finding that the moving party's delay contributed to the failure to perfect and that the proposed appeals had no reasonable prospect of success, as the OHRC cannot be sued, responses to OHRC complaints are protected by absolute privilege, and the pleadings failed to disclose known causes of action.

The applicants, children attending private faith-based schools, challenged Ontario's failure to provide them with special education benefits available in public schools.

They argued this exclusion violated their freedom of religion and equality rights under the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court's decision in Adler v. Ontario foreclosed the freedom of religion claim.

The court also held that the challenged regulation, O. Reg. 386/99, which provides some health services to private school students, is an ameliorative program under s. 15(2) of the Charter and does not discriminate on the basis of disability.

A secondary claim seeking language therapy under the regulation was also dismissed, with the court finding a rational basis for the province's distinction between speech and language disorders.

The appellant's son was killed when his bicycle collided with the respondents' motor vehicle.

At trial, the jury dismissed the action, finding no negligence on the part of the respondents.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the reverse onus under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's instructions on the onus of proof were contradictory and confusing, which constituted a substantial wrong.