Eric Kay

The Ontario Land Tribunal issued a procedural order to govern the hearing of appeals regarding a proposed zoning by-law amendment and site plan for a livestock trailer washing facility.

The order sets out the issues list, order of evidence, and procedural dates leading up to a 15-day hearing scheduled to commence in April 2027.

The appellants appealed an application judge's order granting an oppression remedy to the minority shareholder respondents.

The application judge found that the majority shareholder's exercise of a drag-along right to force the sale of the respondents' shares was oppressive because the sale price was below fair market value, and ordered a valuation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that while the application judge did not err in finding a reasonable expectation that the drag-along right required a sale at fair market value, he erred in concluding the sale was below fair market value without evidence.

The court varied the order to make the valuation an interim step before determining if oppression occurred.

The Plaintiff moved to remove the Defendants' solicitors of record, Dickinson Wright LLP, on grounds of conflict of interest.

The Plaintiff argued that one of the firm's partners, Douglas A. Hendler, was a defendant and a crucial witness whose credibility was likely to be an issue, compromising counsel's independence.

The Defendants contended the motion was tactical and that law firms can represent themselves in fee disputes.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the conflict did not raise a serious concern given the nature of the dispute being essentially over fees, and that it would not prejudice the Plaintiff.

Costs were awarded to the Defendants.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s administrative order dismissing the action for failure to set the matter down for trial within the required time.

Applying the factors outlined in Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that the delay resulted from inadvertence, that the plaintiff acted promptly after learning of the dismissal, and that the action had not been abandoned.

Although the defendants argued the claim was statute‑barred and that presumptive prejudice arose from the expiry of the limitation period, the court held the limitation issue could not be determined definitively at this stage and that no substantial prejudice would arise from allowing the action to proceed.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside.

A long‑serving employee dismissed after 38 years sued several related corporations for wrongful dismissal, asserting they operated as a common employer and that a successor entity continued the same business.

The court applied the common employer doctrine and found the companies functioned as an integrated enterprise using the same business name, premises, and personnel.

The newly operating entity that continued the business could not avoid liability merely through corporate restructuring.

The court also upheld a decades‑old retirement compensation agreement, finding it remained valid because the employee’s duties and employment relationship had not fundamentally changed.

All defendants were held jointly and severally liable for wrongful dismissal damages and retirement compensation.

The appellant guarantor appealed a summary judgment enforcing a demand guarantee in favour of the respondent bank.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, asserting the limitation period began either when the principal debtor defaulted or when the bank sent an initial courtesy letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a demand guarantee requires a clear and unequivocal demand before it is enforceable, and the limitation period does not commence until such demand is made.

The court found the bank's initial letter was not a demand, and the action was commenced within the two-year limitation period following the actual demand.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the motion judge's conclusion that the parties never reached a meeting of the minds on an arbitration clause or a choice of laws provision.

The Court also agreed that the transfer motion was premature because the statement of defence had not yet been filed and the witnesses were unknown, making it impossible to determine the most convenient venue.