Emily Schatzker

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) reconsideration decision that applied the doctrine of issue estoppel to bar his claim for a catastrophic impairment assessment relating to physical and chronic pain injuries.

The appellant argued the initial LAT decision did not make a final finding on causation for those injuries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial LAT adjudicator had clearly and finally determined that the appellant's physical and chronic pain impairments were not caused by the accident.

The moving defendants sought an order requiring the plaintiff to post security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(b) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the plaintiff had another proceeding for the same relief pending in Ontario and that the action was frivolous and vexatious with insufficient assets to pay costs.

The court found that the plaintiff currently had sufficient assets to satisfy any costs award and dismissed the motion for security for costs.

The court also declined to consider the plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike portions of the affidavits and made no order as to costs.

The appellant insurer appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision finding the respondent eligible for funding for an attendant care benefit assessment.

The respondent suffered minor injuries in a motor vehicle accident but was removed from the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) due to a pre-existing medical condition.

The insurer argued that because the injuries were minor, the respondent was excluded from attendant care assessments under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The Divisional Court upheld the LAT's interpretation that once a claimant is removed from the MIG due to a pre-existing condition, they are no longer subject to the limits for minor injuries, and the test for services becomes what is reasonable and necessary.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought orders under sections 134 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, alleging various incidents and an ongoing failure by the respondents to reasonably respond to inquiries.

The appeal court was asked to overturn findings of fact made by the application judge.

The court found that all of the application judge's findings were reasonably open on the record and, therefore, dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The applicants, condominium unit owners, brought an application against the condominium corporation and its board of directors seeking an oppression remedy and compliance orders under the Condominium Act.

The applicants alleged the board acted oppressively by ignoring communications, mishandling an elevator malfunction, and copying the applicants' employers on a warning letter regarding harassment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the board acted reasonably and in good faith in response to the applicants' excessive communications.

The court also held that several of the applicants' claims were statute-barred by the two-year limitation period and that defamation claims could not be brought via application.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking 18 forms of relief, primarily an interlocutory injunction to stay the power of sale of her commercial condominium unit by the defendant condominium corporation.

The corporation had registered a lien and initiated power of sale proceedings due to the plaintiff's failure to pay common element fees.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction as no permanent injunction was sought in the underlying action.

Furthermore, the court held the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured an injunction, and dismissed her claims for Mareva and Mills injunctions, as well as her requests to strike the defendants' pleadings.

The plaintiff, who travelled from Ireland for a pre-trial conference regarding a motor vehicle accident, sought costs after the conference failed to result in a settlement.

The defendant maintained a 'no liability' position contrary to their stance at mediation, without communicating this change in advance.

The court found the defendant's behavior obdurate and the pre-trial conference substantially a waste of time.

Pursuant to Rule 50.12 and s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's out-of-pocket travel expenses and counsel fees, as well as the fees of the other defendants' counsel in the cause.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking various forms of relief, including advance legal costs, payment of living expenses, reimbursement of social services, waiver of Rules of Civil Procedure, ongoing accommodation, anonymization of proceedings, driver's license renewal, and a court investigation into systemic racism.

The court dismissed all aspects of the plaintiff's motion, finding that the claims for advance payments did not meet the Law v. Canada test for discrimination under the Charter, and the request for advance legal costs did not meet the British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band three-part test for interim costs in exceptional cases, particularly as contingent fee arrangements are available in personal injury litigation.

Mr. Gandhi sued Zev Investments Limited for injuries sustained after slipping on a liquid in his apartment building's stairwell.

Zev brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issue for trial existed, as Mr. Gandhi's theories about the hazard were inconsistent and refuted by their evidence.

Mr. Gandhi maintained he slipped on paint or paint oil spilled by Zev's contractor and argued Zev failed to maintain a proper inspection system.

The court dismissed Zev's motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the cause of the fall, Zev's vicarious liability, and the adequacy of its maintenance system, concluding that a summary judgment process would not be proportionate or efficient given the need for extensive witness testimony.

The respondent was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident in the United States Virgin Islands.

She applied to her insurer for statutory accident benefits and underinsurance coverage.

The insurer brought an application to deny coverage, arguing the accident occurred outside the territorial limits of the Insurance Act and the policy, which cover the 'United States of America'.

The court found the term ambiguous and applied the doctrine of contra proferentem, concluding that the term includes the United States Virgin Islands for the purposes of coverage.

The insurer's application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that on the undisputed facts, the respondent was entitled to summary judgment based on the authority of Finlayson v. GMAC Leaseco Ltd.