David G. Boghosian

The infant plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling from a balcony.

The plaintiffs moved to extend the time to set the action down for trial, and the defendant cross-moved to bifurcate the trial on liability and damages.

The Master granted the bifurcation over the plaintiffs' objections, which was upheld by the Superior Court and Divisional Court on the basis that the court retained inherent jurisdiction to bifurcate non-jury trials without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly requires the consent of the parties to bifurcate any proceeding, whether jury or non-jury, thereby ousting the court's inherent jurisdiction to do so without consent.

The plaintiff developer built stacked townhouses and applied for a condominium exemption under the Condominium Act to bypass Planning Act requirements.

The City granted the exemption but imposed a condition prohibiting the units from being used as boarding or rooming houses.

The developer sued, arguing the City lacked authority to impose conditions and challenging barrier-free accessibility requirements.

The motion judge struck the condition but upheld the accessibility requirements.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the City had broad authority under the Condominium Act and Municipal Act to impose conditions on exemption approvals to protect health and safety.

The developer's cross-appeal regarding accessibility requirements was dismissed as moot.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a head-on collision with a propane tanker on a snow-covered municipal road.

The plaintiffs sued the driver of the tanker and the municipalities responsible for winter road maintenance.

The court found that the road was in a state of non-repair that contributed to the accident, and the municipality failed to prove it took reasonable steps to maintain the road.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the municipal defendants, 33% to the tanker driver, and 17% to the plaintiff for contributory negligence.

The City of Markham brought an application seeking a declaration that AIG had a duty to defend it in an underlying personal injury action, and that the City was entitled to appoint independent counsel at AIG's expense due to a conflict of interest.

AIG conceded the duty to defend but disputed the right to independent counsel, pre-tender costs, and argued Lloyd's should share defence costs.

The court found a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest, entitling the City to independent counsel.

The court denied pre-tender costs based on policy wording and held AIG responsible for all defence costs, including uncovered claims, subject to a right of reimbursement from Lloyd's.

The City of Markham brought an application seeking a declaration that AIG had a duty to defend it in an underlying personal injury action, and that the City was entitled to appoint independent counsel at AIG's expense due to a conflict of interest.

AIG conceded the duty to defend but disputed the right to independent counsel, pre-tender costs, and argued Lloyd's should share defence costs.

The court found a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest, entitling the City to independent counsel.

The court denied pre-tender costs based on policy wording and held AIG responsible for all defence costs, including uncovered claims, subject to a right of reimbursement from Lloyd's.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a single motor vehicle collision when the vehicle, driven by the defendant driver, lost control after traversing a dip in a rural road.

The plaintiff sued the driver and the municipality, alleging the road was in a state of non-repair.

The plaintiff and the driver entered into a Mary Carter agreement and jointly pursued the municipality for liability.

The court found that the dip in the road did not constitute a state of non-repair, as it did not pose an unreasonable risk to an ordinary reasonable driver.

The court concluded the collision was caused by the driver's excessive speed and distraction from opening a beverage bottle.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued the municipality for a slip and fall.

The municipality claimed contribution and indemnity from its winter maintenance contractor and the contractor's insurer.

The insurer appointed a single law firm to represent both the contractor and the municipality.

When the insurer later attempted to remove itself from representing the municipality, the municipality brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement for full defence and indemnity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appointment of joint counsel necessarily implied an agreement to both defend and indemnify the municipality, as any other interpretation would have placed counsel in an untenable conflict of interest.

The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action.

The parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendant sought costs of $88,332.37 payable immediately, while the plaintiff argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court held that because the plaintiff was unemployed and the motion materials would be useful at trial, ordering immediate payment of significant costs would impede access to justice.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the trial judge.

The Regional Municipality of Durham appealed the dismissal of its motion requiring Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. to defend it in an automobile negligence action.

Durham was an additional insured under a policy held by its winter maintenance contractor.

The statement of claim included allegations related to the contractor's work as well as other allegations against Durham.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the insurer has an unqualified duty to defend the entire action where pleadings allege facts that trigger coverage, even if the defence furthers the defence of uncovered claims.

The insurer was ordered to provide Durham with independent counsel at its expense, subject to a potential apportionment of costs at the end of the proceedings.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a head-on collision after losing control of her vehicle on a snow-covered and slippery municipal road.

The plaintiffs sued the municipality for negligence in its winter road maintenance.

The court found that the road was in a state of non-repair due to a 'refreeze' of brine, which caused the accident.

The municipality failed to meet its own maintenance quality standards by leaving the road untreated for over three hours during a winter storm.

The court held the municipality liable for the agreed damages of $12 million and found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

A municipal councillor brought a defamation action against the mayor and several councillors arising from a public council statement and related legal opinion criticizing the councillor’s blog posts about senior municipal staff.

The court held the statements were not defamatory and were substantially true in substance, as the plaintiff’s blogs contained disparaging criticism of staff contrary to the municipal code of conduct.

Even if defamatory, the publications were protected by qualified privilege because they were a measured response to the plaintiff’s public letter to the editor and were made to correct the public record.

The court found no evidence of malice and noted the defendants relied in good faith on legal advice before publishing the statement.

The action was dismissed.

Following dismissal of the main action and the third party claim, the court determined costs among the parties.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s costs should be reduced due to inadequate documentary production and the calling of allegedly irrelevant witnesses.

The court rejected most of these objections but applied modest deductions for fairness.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and considering the complexity of the expert engineering evidence, the court applied a 65% partial indemnity factor rather than the typical 60%.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to both the defendant and the third party.

Following an 18‑day personal injury trial and subsequent judgment, the court issued supplementary reasons addressing calculation of net past income loss damages and the costs award.

The court interpreted ss. 267.3, 267.5, and 267.8 of the Insurance Act together with s. 3 of the Negligence Act and held that statutory accident benefits deductions must be applied after apportionment of liability and contributory negligence.

After accounting for accident benefit credits and the plaintiff’s 10% contributory negligence, the municipal defendants’ liability for past income loss was fixed at $50,292.50 plus prejudgment interest.

The court also determined the scope of recoverable costs following a prior appeal that set aside the first trial, permitting recovery of preparation costs for the first trial but excluding the trial costs themselves.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded from the date following a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiff sued the defendant municipality for damages after a retaining wall on the plaintiff's property collapsed.

The plaintiff alleged the municipality negligently approved the wall's design and failed to follow a third-party engineer's recommendation to conduct a complete visual inspection.

The court dismissed the action, finding the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of an agreement that would create a duty of care regarding the wall's design.

Furthermore, the municipality's prior inspection and repair of the wall constituted a gratuitous undertaking, and there was no detrimental reliance by the plaintiff to ground liability.

The defendant municipality brought a motion seeking an order that the third-party insurer defend it against all claims made by the plaintiffs arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident during a snowstorm.

The municipality argued the claims pertained to winter maintenance, for which it was an additional insured under the contractor's policy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs pleaded independent claims against the municipality, such as negligent road design, which fell outside the scope of the insurance policy.

The insurer was only required to defend the municipality with respect to claims insured for the contractor.

Multiple motions arising from five civil proceedings related to the Algo Centre Mall collapse sought transfer of a certified class action to Sault Ste.

Marie, trial together or common case management of related actions, and appointment of a single motions judge.

The court held that opt-out plaintiffs in separate proceedings lacked standing under rule 13.1.02 to seek transfer of the class action, and in any event failed to show that Sault Ste.

Marie was a significantly better venue than Toronto in the interest of justice.

The court further declined relief under s. 107(1) of the Courts of Justice Act because any transfer necessary to enable common case management or trial together would impose substantial cost and inefficiency, particularly given the existing class action case management structure.

Appointment of a rule 37.15 judge was also refused.

Following a new trial ordered after settlement with some defendants, the court considered municipal highway non-repair liability arising from a winter collision on a snow-covered S-curve involving a passenger vehicle and a propane truck.

Applying s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001, the court held the roadway at Rankins Corner was in a state of non-repair and that the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to address a known winter maintenance hot spot.

The court also found negligence in the truck driver’s operation and contributory negligence by the injured driver, apportioning fault 60% to the municipal defendants, 30% to the truck defendants, and 10% to the injured driver.

Damages were assessed at $300,000 general damages, $130,000 under the Family Law Act, $408,886 in future care excluding attendant care, $2,000,000 in future attendant care, $300,000 past income loss subject to IRB credit, and $1,260,000 future income loss.

Borrowers brought an application seeking a declaration that a lender’s $19,000 administrative fee charged under a mortgage commitment letter contravened the contract because only one draw of $150,000 had been advanced rather than the full $475,000 facility.

The applicants argued the fee should have been limited to 4% of the funds actually advanced.

The court held that the mortgage commitment letter unambiguously established a fixed administrative fee payable for the loan facility, not a percentage tied to individual advances.

Interpreting the contract according to its plain wording, the court rejected reliance on subjective understanding or subsequent documents.

The application was dismissed and the lender was awarded substantial indemnity costs.

Following a motion in which the defendants sought to dismiss a negligence action against a firefighter as statute‑barred and for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the court dismissed the defendants’ motion and granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim.

The plaintiffs subsequently sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs should not recover costs because they could have avoided expense by not opposing the motion.

The court rejected this submission, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to resist the motion and defend their right to challenge the statutory defence.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs with reductions for excessive disbursements and to align with reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

In a personal injury action arising from a bicycle and motor vehicle collision allegedly caused in part by unlit streetlights on a boundary bridge, a municipal defendant appealed summary judgment dismissing its crossclaim and the action against a co-defendant utility contractor.

The appeal court held that the servicing agreement and the evidence about responsibility for identifying and maintaining boundary-road streetlights were ambiguous and contradictory.

The motion judge erred by treating the parties' common understanding as determinative despite live disputes over contractual allocation of responsibility.

The claims against the contractor were restored for trial.