Dave Dhillon

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent denied the claims, asserting the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) and its $3,500 limit.

The applicant argued that pre-existing conditions, including age, cardiovascular illness, and prior accident injuries, as well as a psychological diagnosis, warranted removal from the MIG.

The Tribunal found insufficient compelling medical evidence to support removal from the MIG.

As the applicant remained subject to the MIG, the disputed treatment plans were not payable, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a 2018 motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found the applicant was not entitled to the proposed chiropractic treatment as it was not supported by the medical records.

However, the Tribunal granted entitlement to a vision therapy assessment and vision therapy sessions, finding them reasonable and necessary to treat the applicant's post-trauma vision syndrome symptoms.

Claims for an award for unreasonable delay and the respondent's request for costs were both dismissed.

The moving parties, Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Auto Canada Corp., sought leave to appeal the order of Barnes J. dated June 10, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded against each moving party, payable to the respondent within 30 days.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave to amend their statement of claim against Tarion Warranty Corporation and to add the Home Construction Regulatory Authority (HCRA) as a defendant.

The proposed amendments included new allegations regarding a 2007 provincial offences conviction, a 2016 refusal to register, and a 2019 notice of proposal.

The court granted the motion in part, allowing amendments that clarified existing claims or arose from the same factual matrix, but refusing amendments that introduced new, statute-barred causes of action or sought relief outside the court's jurisdiction.

The court also permitted the plaintiffs to add the HCRA as a defendant for a damages claim, but refused to allow a claim for a mandatory order against the regulator, holding that such relief must be sought by way of judicial review in the Divisional Court.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits for a chronic pain programme following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the benefit and requested an insurer's examination (IE) under s. 44 of the Schedule.

The applicant refused to attend, arguing that she had already undergone numerous IEs and that the request was unreasonable.

The Tribunal found that the IE request was reasonably necessary because the chronic pain programme constituted a new benefit claim.

As the applicant failed to provide a reasonable excuse for non-attendance, she was statute-barred under s. 55(1)2 from proceeding with her application for the chronic pain programme until she attended the IE.

The insurer's request for costs was denied.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The insurer denied the claims, arguing the injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The Tribunal found that while the applicant's soft tissue injuries were minor, she suffered from a chronic pain condition that removed her from the MIG.

The Tribunal also held the insurer liable to pay for four disputed treatment plans because it failed to provide proper notice under s. 38(8) of the Schedule.

However, the applicant's claims for non-earner benefits and visitor expenses were dismissed for lack of evidence.

The self-represented appellant appealed a final order enforcing a $35,000 settlement.

He argued the motion judge denied him procedural fairness by refusing to hear his arguments or receive his materials.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had heard and considered the appellant's arguments.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's factual determination that a settlement was reached and was not unconscionable.

The defendants moved to amend their Statement of Defence to plead a statutory bar under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 (WISA), asserting the plaintiff was a Schedule 1 worker.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the amendments were untenable and statute-barred.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the plaintiff would suffer uncompensable prejudice due to the defendants' unexplained delay (laches) and their prior conduct, which established an independent contractor relationship, giving rise to promissory estoppel.

The court emphasized the application of equitable principles in interpreting the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The statutory third party, Wawanesa, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence physiatry examination.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing that leave was required under Rule 48.04 and that the motion should be denied due to various defaults by the insured and Wawanesa.

The court found that leave was not required and that Wawanesa should not be prejudiced by its insured's defaults.

However, the motion for an immediate examination was dismissed due to Wawanesa's significant delay in requesting it, which would prejudice the plaintiff given the imminent trial date and the inability to obtain a timely expert response.

The court ordered Wawanesa to produce the insurance policy and fixed costs against Wawanesa, while also stating that the plaintiff would be required to attend the examination if the trial were adjourned.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer denied treatment plans for chiropractic care and a physiatry assessment on the basis that the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The Tribunal found that the applicant sustained predominantly soft tissue injuries and failed to establish any underlying neurological disorder that would warrant removal from the MIG.

As the injuries were minor, the applicant was limited to the $3,500 funding cap, and the Tribunal did not need to assess the reasonableness or necessity of the disputed treatment plans.