Daniel Brisebois

The applicant sought release pending trial on a charge of second degree murder under s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered detention under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds in s. 515(10) following a reverse-onus bail application under s. 522.

Evidence included the applicant’s extensive criminal record for breaches, her presence at the homicide scene, forensic evidence linking her footwear and clothing to the victim’s blood, and her conduct before and after the alleged offence.

The proposed release plan involved residence at a supervised disability facility with her brother acting as surety.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to discharge her onus on all three grounds, finding a significant risk of non-attendance, public safety concerns, and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offence and strength of the evidence.

Sentencing decision involving an Aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to participating as the final courier in a human smuggling operation involving a family of five, together with related Customs Act and Criminal Code offences arising from a dangerous flight from police.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as central given the offender's callous treatment of vulnerable migrants, the profit motive, and the risk created to adults and children, but also gave substantial weight to rehabilitation, recovery from OxyContin addiction, Gladue principles, and the availability of strict community supervision.

Applying the Gladue and Proulx frameworks, the court held that a sentence of less than two years was fit, community safety would not be endangered, and a conditional sentence could satisfy punitive and restorative objectives.

A consecutive sentence totalling 24 months less one day was imposed to be served in the community, followed by two years' probation and ancillary orders.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to breach of trust by a public officer and fraud over $5,000 arising from a municipal treasurer’s misappropriation of public funds.

Over a six‑year period the offender diverted more than $113,000 in cash payments received from residents for municipal taxes, permits, and other services.

The court considered significant aggravating factors including prolonged conduct, abuse of a position of trust, and the impact on municipal employees and taxpayers.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s guilty plea, lack of criminal record, cooperation with investigators, and gambling addiction.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence in large‑scale breach‑of‑trust frauds, the court imposed a custodial sentence with probation and restitution.

A young person pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was to be sentenced under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The principal issue was the appropriate credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The Crown sought reduced credit prior to the guilty plea while the defence sought one‑for‑one credit for all time served.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances youth courts should not reduce credit below one‑for‑one and found none present in the case.

The court imposed the statutory maximum youth sentence for second degree murder, with one‑for‑one credit for pre‑sentence custody, followed by conditional supervision.

The appellant appealed a six‑month custodial sentence imposed after pleading guilty to possession of unstamped tobacco under the Excise Act and possession of tobacco while not permitted under the Tobacco Tax Act.

He argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit, violated the parity principle, and that the sentencing judge failed to properly consider a conditional sentence under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected arguments that the jail term was disproportionate or inconsistent with parity, noting the seriousness of tobacco smuggling and the prevalence of custodial sentences in the region.

However, the sentencing judge erred in principle by focusing solely on parity when assessing the availability of a conditional sentence and failing to comprehensively consider the objectives and principles of sentencing under ss. 718–718.2.

The appellate court intervened and concluded that a conditional sentence served in the community with stringent conditions could adequately achieve denunciation and deterrence.

Sentencing decision following a guilty plea to failing to provide the necessaries of life to a child under s. 215(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved prolonged and severe neglect of a vulnerable child who was confined to a room for months, malnourished, and developmentally delayed when apprehended by child protection authorities.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the child and the parental position of trust, and mitigating factors including the offender’s lack of criminal record, intellectual limitations, and demonstrated rehabilitation following release from pre-trial custody.

Relying on the principles governing credit for pre‑sentence custody, the court granted enhanced credit for 8.5 months of remand.

The offender was deemed to have served a 12‑month sentence and was placed on two years’ probation with strict rehabilitative and protective conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessaries of life and criminal negligence causing bodily harm in relation to her young child.

The child was discovered severely malnourished, developmentally delayed, and confined to a room covered in feces.

The court considered the accused's mental health issues, including depression and drug dependency, as well as the abusive control exerted by her partner.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the prolonged and severe neglect, the court sentenced the accused to 12 months of incarceration followed by 24 months of probation.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence for assault contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code following a physical confrontation arising from an attempt to remove a disputed vehicle from the complainant’s possession.

The appellant argued the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient and unclear as to whether the conviction relied on the “deemed assault” provision in s. 38(2) or on findings arising from a physical struggle.

The appeal court held the reasons were adequate and demonstrated that the conviction rested on findings that the accused intentionally applied force without consent after deliberately provoking a confrontation.

The court further confirmed that even a person claiming property rights cannot use force to recover chattels where doing so breaches the peace.

The sentence of a suspended sentence with 18 months’ probation was also upheld as not demonstrably unfit.