Craig J. Allen

The appellant estate trustee appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision dismissing an application to terminate a tenancy for the purpose of demolishing the rental unit under s. 50(1)(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The LTB found the landlord lacked a genuine, crystallized intention to demolish the unit, as the landlord remained willing to sell the property with the house intact.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LTB reasonably interpreted s. 50(1)(a) as containing an implied good faith requirement for a genuine intention to demolish, and that the LTB's factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for damages and an accounting based on reciprocal profit-sharing agreements related to wind farm projects, alleging the defendants failed to remit his share of proceeds from a $30 million sale to China Longyuan.

The defendants opposed, arguing no payment obligation was triggered and that the action was statute-barred or prejudiced by delay.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding the record incomplete for quantum determination and corporate defendant liability.

However, the court also dismissed the defendants' request to dismiss the action, ruling that the profit-sharing obligations were triggered and rejecting the limitation period and prejudice arguments.

The case was ordered to proceed to trial with specific directions for discovery and mediation, and certain material facts were deemed undisputed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's affidavit filed in support of an upcoming summary judgment motion, arguing the statements were hearsay and failed to state the source of information and belief as required by Rule 39.01(4).

The plaintiff argued the sources were discernible from the exhibits attached to the affidavit.

The court declined to strike the statements, provided the plaintiff files a supplementary affidavit within 10 days explicitly stating the sources.

The defendants were awarded costs of $3,600 as the motion could have been avoided had the plaintiff provided the sources when requested.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent subcontractor $14,300 for extra work performed on a construction project.

The trial judge found that the developer and appellant had insisted on a material change in methodology that required the respondent to use more expensive motorized buggies instead of cement trucks to protect the substrate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, his conclusion that there was an implied agreement to pay for the extras, or his assessment of damages.

The appellants requested a reconsideration of a Fire Safety Commission decision that rescinded inspection orders but imposed additional fire safety measures on their student-occupied residential properties.

The appellants argued the Commission erred in fact and law, and breached procedural fairness, particularly regarding the requirement to install fire-rated bedroom doors without their consent.

The Commission dismissed the reconsideration request, finding that its authority to impose additional safety measures under section 26(6) of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act does not require the appellants' consent nor depend on the properties' Fire Code classification.

The appellants appealed inspection orders issued by Thunder Bay Fire Rescue requiring their student rental properties to comply with the Ontario Fire Code provisions for rooming houses.

The Fire Safety Commission found that the properties were occupied as single housekeeping dwelling units, not rooming houses, based on evidence of collective decision-making among the student tenants.

The Commission rescinded the inspection orders but, on consent, ordered additional fire safety measures under section 26(6) of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, given the unique risks of student housing.

The appellant appealed assessments for unremitted income tax source deductions and GST under the director's liability provisions of the Income Tax Act and Excise Tax Act.

The sole issue was whether the appellant had effectively resigned as a director more than two years prior to the assessments.

The appellant argued he resigned by handing a letter to his father, who managed the business.

The court held that under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, the resignation of a first director is not effective until a successor is elected or appointed.

Because no successor was appointed, and the deeming provisions for a managing person did not apply, the appellant remained a director.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action sought an extension of time for discoveries.

The defendant Dr. Tayfour cross-moved for dismissal for delay or a stay until costs were paid.

The court dismissed the defendant's motions, finding that the plaintiff's delays were not inordinate or inexcusable, and there was no substantial risk of an unfair trial.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, setting new timelines for discoveries and trial, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff costs of the motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance to purchase a property based on a right of first refusal agreement signed by her late husband and his brothers.

The defendant purchaser brought a cross-motion to dismiss the claim.

The court found that the agreement unambiguously granted the right of first refusal only to the 'parties' (the brothers), not to 'family members' like the plaintiff.

The court declined to admit parol evidence of intention and held that the doctrine of privity of contract precluded the plaintiff from enforcing the agreement.

The defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

This protracted litigation involved a family dispute over a commercial property, with plaintiffs (minority shareholders and creditors) alleging oppression and conspiracy against defendants (majority shareholders, directors, and related entities).

The plaintiffs claimed the defendants engaged in self-dealing and unlawful acts to deprive them of their beneficial ownership and profits.

The court dismissed both the oppression and conspiracy claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their reasonable expectations were violated or that an unlawful conspiracy occurred.

The court noted the plaintiffs' own conduct demonstrated a lack of regard for the corporation's welfare and a failure to protect their interests.

A counterclaim by one of the defendants was also dismissed.

The appellants were successful on an appeal from the Small Claims Court and sought costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The appellants relied on a Rule 14 offer to settle to claim double costs for the trial.

The court awarded trial costs of $2,258.60, reflecting a starting point of 7 percent of the damage award doubled due to the unaccepted offer, noting the appellants were represented by a paralegal at trial.

For the appeal, the court emphasized the principle of proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts of Justice Act, fixing appeal costs at $2,500 plus disbursements of $1,501.15.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to adjourn an eight‑week civil trial scheduled on the running list while appeals were pending concerning a refusal to amend the statement of claim and to admit late expert valuation reports.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, arguing the appeals would not materially affect the trial and proposing procedural alternatives such as hearing evidence and awaiting appellate outcomes or bifurcating liability and damages.

Applying the principles governing adjournments, including the objective of deciding matters on their substantive merits and considerations of prejudice and fairness, the court found the pending appeals could significantly affect the pleadings and expert evidence at trial.

The court concluded that proceeding before those issues were resolved risked inefficient and potentially unfair proceedings.

The trial was therefore adjourned pending the appellate process.

The plaintiffs contracted HIV from the defendant after he had unprotected sex with them without disclosing his status.

The plaintiffs sued the Windsor Health Unit and the Windsor Police for negligence, alleging they knew of the risk the defendant posed but failed to take steps to prevent it.

The health unit and police moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing they owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the issue of whether a duty of care existed was complex and required a full trial to determine proximity and policy considerations.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking removal of defence counsel on the basis that counsel’s spouse had previously conducted a counselling session with the plaintiff.

After learning of the litigation, the spouse transferred the file and destroyed correspondence from the plaintiff.

The court held there was no solicitor‑client relationship between the plaintiff and defence counsel and no evidence that confidential information had been improperly disclosed.

The evidence demonstrated that the spouse acted professionally and there was no breach of professional conduct rules.

Given the strong right of parties to retain counsel of their choice, the motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

The appellant, a licensed standardbred driver, was fined and suspended by the Ontario Racing Commission (ORC) for refusing to provide a urine sample and using abusive language.

After his appeals to the ORC and Divisional Court were dismissed, he sued the ORC and its investigator for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action based on issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the issues raised in the civil action were the same as those already decided by the ORC, and permitting the action to proceed would be an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding costs and the calculation of interest following its judgment on an appeal and cross-appeal.

The court clarified that interest on excessive management compensation should be calculated at the lower of the presumptive rate under the Courts of Justice Act or the prevailing chartered bank prime lending rate, using a floating rate for simple interest.

Due to divided success on the appeal and cross-appeal, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The appellants, majority shareholders of a family company, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for oppression and breach of trust against the minority shareholders.

The trial judge found they breached their fiduciary duties by purchasing their sisters' shares and by paying themselves excessive management compensation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding no breach of trust in the share purchase given the company's precarious financial position at the time and the minority's failure to complain.

However, the Court upheld the finding that the retroactive management compensation was oppressive and excessive.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part to award prejudgment interest on the excessive compensation.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to demonstrate the respondent would suffer no prejudice if the default judgment were set aside.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The respondent OPP officers brought a civil action against senior officers, alleging they were transferred as a form of disguised discipline.

The appellants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the matter was governed by the collective agreement and statutory scheme.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the Police Services Act and the Public Service Act form a complete code governing police discipline, leaving no residual jurisdiction for the civil courts.

The plaintiffs brought an action relating to their employment as police officers.

The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the action on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was covered by a collective agreement.

The defendants appealed the dismissal.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order dismissing a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 21.01(3)(a) is a final order because it finally disposes of the defendants' right to raise the jurisdictional defence.