Allison Pyper

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's post-offence conduct, including cutting his hair, removing identification from his apartment, and asking his girlfriend to change her police statement, as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the evidence lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial.

The court held that the evidence was highly probative, not inherently prejudicial, and admissible, leaving it to the jury to determine what reasonable inferences could be drawn.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause death to members of a jury during her second-degree murder trial.

Two police officers testified to hearing threatening statements directed at the jury members, though their recollections of the exact words differed.

The accused testified that she was stressed and frustrated but could not recall the specific words she uttered and denied intending to intimidate anyone.

The court found that while the actus reus of uttering a threat was established, the Crown failed to prove the mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on the basis that she was venting in frustration without intent to intimidate or be taken seriously.

The appellant, R.J.-B., sought to set aside the dismissal of his appeal against convictions for two counts of sexual assault and his sentence, which had been dismissed due to his counsel's delays.

The Superior Court of Justice, exercising its inherent jurisdiction to prevent a miscarriage of justice, reinstated the appeal solely regarding the sentence.

The court found that the appellant was not at fault for the delays and that the sentence appeal had arguable merit, particularly concerning unaddressed immigration consequences.

However, the appeal against convictions was not reinstated, as the arguments advanced were deemed devoid of merit.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the Crown's case.

The moving parties argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to directed verdict applications involving circumstantial evidence.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the test remains whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, which involves only a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity and murderous intent for both moving parties, the court dismissed the directed verdict applications.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The defendant, Sheldon Ranglin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a proposed application to exclude evidence related to a three-way phone call.

The defence challenged the validity of a production order for Maplehurst Correctional Facility phone records, opposed the introduction of July 3, 2015 phone records due to alleged inconsistencies with witness testimony, and sought an adjournment of cross-examination due to outstanding disclosure.

The court summarily dismissed the application, finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Maplehurst pay phone records and thus no standing to challenge their admission.

The other issues were deemed matters for cross-examination or future application.

The court ruled on the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement under s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act during a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence from a witness, Mr. Watts, that another witness, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, had previously identified the defendant as the shooter.

The court initially precluded this evidence during the Crown's examination-in-chief of Mr. Watts, finding that the precondition of s. 11, requiring the alleged statement to be squarely put to Mr. Moy-Lingomba during cross-examination, had not been met.

The ruling emphasized the rationale of s. 11 concerning trial economy, fairness to the adversary, and fairness to the witness, and also noted the limited probative value and substantial prejudicial value of the evidence in question.

The court ruled on whether to provide a Vetrovec caution to the jury for three witnesses (Mr. Borden, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, and Mr. Watts) in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected to cautions for Mr. Borden and Mr. Moy-Lingomba, arguing that such cautions are for the Defence's benefit and should be omitted if the Defence requests.

The Crown conceded that a caution was not needed for Mr. Watts.

The court determined that a trial judge's duty to ensure trial fairness and assist the jury supersedes a tactical decision by the Defence when a Vetrovec caution is necessary or mandatory.

Given Mr. Borden's overwhelming credibility issues and the centrality of his evidence to the Crown's case, a Vetrovec caution was deemed mandatory.

For Mr. Moy-Lingomba, who also had overwhelming credibility issues and whose evidence was critical to both the Crown (motive) and Defence (third-party suspect), a "mixed Vetrovec" caution was deemed mandatory to assist the jury in assessing inculpatory and exculpatory statements.

The Crown applied under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act for leave to cross-examine a reluctant witness, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, on prior inconsistent statements made to an undercover informant, Mr. Darren Watts, during a first-degree murder trial.

The witness had recanted his prior statements during examination-in-chief, claiming he was "high" and couldn't recall.

The defence opposed, arguing no material inconsistency and challenging the circumstances of the statements.

The court found material inconsistencies and granted leave, determining that the interests of justice favoured allowing cross-examination, as the statements were relevant to the identity of the shooter, the credibility of another witness, and the motive for the shooting, and their reliability was not fundamentally undermined by the witness's claims of impairment or the informant's conduct.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a child to be a child of the marriage and requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, as well as spousal support.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the child's status, his income, and the respondent's ability to contribute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or serious misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's income, noting it lacked cogency and that the trial order already provided a mechanism for adjusting support based on annual income tax returns.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing a motion to set aside a Consent Certificate of Assessment and Minutes of Settlement regarding $7,500 in legal fees owed to the respondent.

The respondent argued, and the appellant conceded, that the appeal lay to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 19(1.2)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order was for a single payment of not more than $50,000.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.