Lawrence Greenspon

The plaintiff, a member of the university's men's varsity hockey team, brought a proposed class action against the university and its president after the entire team was suspended following sexual assault allegations against two players.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and misfeasance in public office under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court dismissed the motion to strike the negligence claim, finding a recognized duty of care between the university and its students.

However, the court struck the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and misfeasance in public office, as the university had multiple competing interests to balance and there were no facts pleaded to support bad faith or dishonesty.

The defendant employer brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claims of vicarious liability and negligence arising from an alleged sexual assault by a co-worker at an unsupervised staff party.

The court struck the claim for the independent tort of sexual harassment, as it is ousted by the Human Rights Code.

However, the court declined to strike the claims for vicarious liability and negligence, finding it was not plain and obvious that they had no reasonable prospect of success given the employer's role in hosting the party and providing alcohol.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml under the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that the first breath sample was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, which permitted reliance on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that discrepancies between officers’ recorded times created a reasonable doubt about whether the sample was taken within the required period and that the trial judge failed to apply the proper burden of proof or provide sufficient reasons.

The court held that the reliable evidence, including video and intoxilyzer timestamps, established that the sample was taken within two hours.

The alleged evidentiary “stream” of timing discrepancies lacked evidentiary support, and the trial judge’s reasons were adequate for appellate review.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault under s. 271(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapplied the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on a prior statement to police, and failed to recuse himself due to an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge’s credibility findings and determined that although the trial judge made minor factual errors in describing certain circumstances, those errors were not overriding and did not undermine the conviction.

The court found that the trial judge properly used inconsistencies in the appellant’s prior statement only to assess credibility and correctly applied the Browne v. Dunn rule and the reasoning in R. v. Truong when drawing inferences about new allegations raised in the appellant’s testimony.

The court also held that the W.(D.) framework had not been misapplied and that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the complainant’s spouse having previously served as a judicial colleague of the trial judge.

The conviction was upheld.

During a jury trial concerning an alleged agreement to share proceeds of a winning Lotto 6/49 ticket, the defendant moved for a non-suit after the plaintiff closed her case.

The court considered whether the plaintiff’s evidence could support a breach of contract claim for a one-third share of lottery winnings based on an alleged oral agreement involving the defendant and a third party.

The court held there was no evidence of a “meeting of the minds” with the third party and no agency relationship allowing the defendant to bind that party to a contract.

As a result, no reasonable jury could find a valid contract existed.

The non-suit motion on the breach of contract claim was granted, the jury was dismissed, and the remaining equitable trust claims were left to be determined by the judge.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the Crown brought a Mohan application seeking to qualify a forensic psychiatrist as an expert to give opinion evidence regarding automatism.

The defence argued that the proposed expert’s methodology lacked reliability and that prior judicial criticism of his opinions should preclude qualification.

The court reviewed the admissibility criteria for expert evidence set out in R. v. Mohan, including relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule, and proper qualification.

While acknowledging some concerns about the expert’s prior reports and methodology, the court found that he possessed sufficient expertise in forensic psychiatry and that automatism is primarily a legal concept closely related to dissociative states recognized in psychiatry.

The expert was therefore qualified to give opinion evidence in forensic psychiatry, including on the issue of automatism.

In this criminal appeal concerning terrorism convictions under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of key terrorism provisions, the fairness of the trial after appellate restoration of the motive clause, the reasonableness of the verdicts, and the sentence imposed on appeal.

The Court held that the challenged participation provision was not overbroad under s. 7 and that the legislative scheme did not establish a breach of expressive freedom on the record before it.

It further held that re-insertion of the motive clause caused no trial unfairness, the armed conflict exception did not apply on the evidence, and the convictions were reasonable.

On sentence, the Court affirmed correction of errors in principle and upheld the substituted life term with consecutive terms and extended parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application challenging the arresting officer’s reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer improperly relied on an unidentified bystander’s identification and that evidence obtained after the arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances, including dispatch information, the accident scene, the bystander identification, and the appellant’s signs of impairment.

The court found no Charter breach and concluded the trial judge properly applied governing jurisprudence.

Alternatively, even if a breach existed, exclusion of the breath samples and statements would not have been justified under the Grant framework.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to exclude the defendant police officers from being present during each other's examinations for discovery.

The Superior Court of Justice determined that the standard of review for this mixed question of fact and law was palpable and overriding error.

Finding that the Master thoroughly reviewed the applicable law and that the plaintiffs' affidavit evidence failed to set out reasons for exclusion, the court found no palpable or overriding error and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was sentenced following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking involving 111.85 kilograms of cocaine.

The court considered the extraordinary quantity, high purity, and multi‑million‑dollar value of the drugs, as well as the accused’s prior conviction for a similar offence involving multi‑kilogram quantities.

Although the court found the accused’s role was limited to that of a courier, the circumstances demonstrated a high level of organization, planning, and trusted involvement in a large trafficking enterprise.

Emphasis was placed on denunciation and both general and specific deterrence.

A penitentiary sentence of 15 years was imposed with credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.