Moiz M. Karimjee

The appellant appealed his sentence for mischief under $5000 after pleading guilty to vandalizing an 87-year-old woman's vehicle.

The sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months of probation, rejecting the appellant's request for a conditional discharge.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge failed to apply the principle of restraint.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was fit and within the judge's discretion given the need for denunciation.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the Ontario Court of Justice under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The respondent was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample, and the trial was scheduled in a 'reservoir court' resulting in a total delay of 19.5 months.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in calculating defence delay and discrete events.

The Superior Court found that while the trial judge erred in not attributing a 31-day period as defence delay, she correctly declined to deduct a 45-day period where the Crown offered earlier dates only after the Charter application was filed.

The net delay of 18.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay of 56 months from the date charges were laid exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court deducted 559 days of appellate delay related to a Crown certiorari application and appeal, as well as periods of defence delay and waiver.

The net delay was calculated at 28.5 months, which fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the defence failed to meet its onus to demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable, noting that the defence's conduct contributed to the delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that a 19-minute delay between his detention by a transit officer and the administration of an approved screening device (ASD) test by a dispatched police officer violated the immediacy requirement of s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code and his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was reasonably necessary given the unusual circumstance that transit officers do not carry ASDs.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant had no realistic opportunity to consult counsel at the roadside and would not have done so even if properly advised.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample.

He was found asleep in his overturned truck by a passing driver, and later arrested at his home after police smelled alcohol on his breath.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he had care and control of the vehicle, misapprehended evidence regarding post-driving alcohol consumption, and that the breath demand was unlawful.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand.

The appellant was convicted of cruelty to animals after dropping a pet rabbit from a 10th-floor balcony to its death in front of an eight-year-old child.

He appealed his nine-month sentence, arguing it was harsh and excessive, and that the trial judge erred in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit, proportionate, and properly prioritized denunciation and deterrence given the appellant's history and lack of insight.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.) and improperly restricted cross‑examination concerning alleged exculpatory statements made during the incident.

The appeal court held that although the trial judge’s articulation of the second branch of the W.(D.) test differed slightly from the classic formulation, the reasons as a whole demonstrated that the correct burden of proof was applied and the accused’s evidence was rejected in its entirety on credibility grounds.

The court also found no miscarriage of justice arising from the trial judge’s intervention regarding prior exculpatory statements and the requirement for assurance that the accused would testify.

Any potential confusion was addressed during the trial and did not prejudice the defence.

The convictions were therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed her conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence, rendered an unreasonable verdict, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were clear, logical, and demonstrated an awareness of the frailties of eyewitness evidence.

The court concluded the identification evidence, supported by circumstantial factors such as the driver's physical description and a distinct limp, reasonably supported the conviction.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml under the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that the first breath sample was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, which permitted reliance on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that discrepancies between officers’ recorded times created a reasonable doubt about whether the sample was taken within the required period and that the trial judge failed to apply the proper burden of proof or provide sufficient reasons.

The court held that the reliable evidence, including video and intoxilyzer timestamps, established that the sample was taken within two hours.

The alleged evidentiary “stream” of timing discrepancies lacked evidentiary support, and the trial judge’s reasons were adequate for appellate review.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault, arguing that the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination of the complainant regarding a reconciliation letter, thereby denying the right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant submitted that the proposed questioning was relevant to credibility and supported by the principles governing cross-examination and the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The respondent argued the questioning concerned a collateral issue and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion to limit it.

The court held the proposed line of questioning was collateral and that, even if limiting it was erroneous, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The conviction was upheld.