Kim Twohig

The applicant union sought judicial review of a decision by the Local Health Integration Network (LHIN) to approve a Service Accountability Agreement with a hospital, which included a plan to consolidate mental health services to eliminate a budget deficit.

The applicant argued the LHIN failed to engage in required public consultation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the LHIN's funding decision did not constitute an 'integration decision' under the Local Health System Integration Act that would trigger statutory consultation requirements.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness or legitimate expectations.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of two orders by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of total dollar figures for legal services rendered to other ministries.

The Ministry argued the information was protected by solicitor-client privilege under s. 19 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the IPC correctly applied the rebuttable presumption of privilege test from Maranda v. Richer and reasonably concluded the presumption was rebutted because disclosing the aggregate amounts would not reveal privileged communications.

The appellant ministry appealed a lower court order dismissing its applications for judicial review of two orders by the commissioner.

The commissioner had ordered the disclosure of records relating to funding applications, finding they did not fall under the 'advice or recommendations' exemption in s. 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The appellate court held that the standard of review for the commissioner's interpretation of s. 13(1) is reasonableness, and found the commissioner's interpretation and application to the records to be reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ministry of Northern Development and Mines sought judicial review of two orders by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of project evaluation reports.

The Ministry argued that the Commissioner misinterpreted the 'advice or recommendations' exemption under section 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation—that 'advice' and 'recommendations' have similar meanings and require a suggested course of action—was reasonable.

The applications for judicial review were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for malicious prosecution against a Crown Attorney.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that there was no evidence of malice.

The court noted that the Crown Attorney chose not to call an unsavoury witness to prevent a wrongful conviction, which demonstrated an absence of malice, and that malice could not be inferred merely from a possible absence of reasonable and probable grounds.

The Township of Dymond brought an application for judicial review to set aside a municipal restructuring order made by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing that amalgamated it with two other towns.

The applicant argued that the Minister lacked jurisdiction under the former Municipal Act, breached natural justice by not holding a hearing, and violated the spirit of the legislation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory pre-conditions for the 'double majority' rule were met, rights had accrued before the new Act came into force, and there was no requirement for a hearing before the Minister issued the order.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment and dismissing the claim against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's analysis that there was no genuine issue for trial on the question of malice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police applied for judicial review to quash a penalty imposed on a police officer by a retired superintendent following a disciplinary hearing.

The Commissioner argued that while the superintendent had delegated authority to conduct the hearing, he lacked jurisdiction to impose the penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Police Services Act contemplates the person conducting the hearing also imposing the penalty.

Furthermore, the court exercised its discretion to refuse judicial review because the Commissioner had fully participated in the penalty hearing and invited the superintendent to exercise the very jurisdiction she later challenged.

The respondent, a police officer, was forced to retire at age 60 pursuant to a mandatory retirement policy in the collective agreement.

He filed a human rights complaint alleging age discrimination.

The Board of Inquiry found the policy was not a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) because the employer lacked a sincerely held belief in its necessity at the time of adoption, and because individual accommodation was possible.

The Divisional Court and Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the subjective element of the BFOR test can be satisfied where a policy is adopted in good faith through collective bargaining without ulterior motives.

The Court also held that the objective element does not require individual accommodation where a general rule is reasonably necessary and individual testing is impractical.

The mandatory retirement policy was justified as a BFOR.