Kathryn Podrebarac

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order allowing the respondent bank to amend its third-party claim.

The amendment asserted a novel tortious duty of care owed by the drawer of a cheque to a collecting bank.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's decision that the novel claim was not certain to fail and should be determined on a full factual record at trial.

The appellant brought a motion to the Divisional Court to appeal a Master's decision striking out certain particulars of a negligence claim against the respondent.

The court determined that the Master's decision was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the proper appeal route was to a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice under s. 17(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also ruled that the appellant's counsel was not precluded from arguing the subsequent appeal despite having sworn an uncontested affidavit in the proceedings below.

Costs of the day were fixed at $3,000 to be borne by the ultimate losing party.

The appellants brought an appeal of an order by Master Haberman to the Divisional Court.

The court determined that the Master's order was interlocutory and, pursuant to section 17(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal properly lies to the Superior Court of Justice, not the Divisional Court.

Costs for the appearance were fixed at $3,000, payable by the ultimate losing party on the appeal.

The appellant pharmaceutical company sued the respondents for defamation arising from radio and internet broadcasts, as well as statements made in the House of Commons.

The appellant failed to serve a notice of defamation prior to commencing the action, as required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the defamation claims, confirming that the notice requirement applies to non-media defendants and that failure to provide notice is an absolute bar to the action.

The Court also upheld the striking of claims based on statements made in Parliament due to absolute parliamentary privilege.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motions to strike portions of the plaintiff's statements of claim in two related defamation actions.

The primary issue was whether the plaintiff could salvage a defamation claim regarding radio broadcasts by commencing a second action after failing to provide the required Section 5 notice under the Libel and Slander Act prior to the first action.

The court granted leave to appeal the refusal to strike the paragraphs in the second action relating to the radio broadcasts, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and noting the issue's importance to the administration of justice.

Leave to appeal was denied on the other grounds.