Timothy G. Price

The applicant mother and respondent father separated after a five-year relationship.

The mother sought sole decision-making responsibility, a change to the children's surnames, child support, and spousal support.

The court granted the mother final decision-making responsibility after a required consultation process, citing the parties' inability to communicate effectively.

The request to change the children's surnames was dismissed as not being in their best interests.

The father was ordered to pay ongoing child support, child support arrears, and non-compensatory spousal support for a fixed duration.

The moving party sought to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations, arguing that the responding party had achieved economic self-sufficiency due to an increase in her employment income.

The court found that the responding party's increased income constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, considering the compensatory nature of the original support order and the economic hardship the responding party suffered from the marriage breakdown, the court declined to terminate support.

Instead, the court reduced the monthly spousal support amount retroactively and prospectively based on the parties' updated incomes.

The applicant mother, who had sole custody of the parties' 15-year-old daughter, brought a motion under Family Law Rule 1(8) seeking relief against the respondent father for failing to comply with custody orders.

The child had refused to return to the mother's home and began residing with the father.

The court found that the father breached the orders by failing to take reasonable steps to compel the child's return and by failing to participate in court-ordered family reconciliation therapy.

The court ordered the immediate return of the child, suspended the father's parenting time for 60 days, and prohibited him from proceeding with his own motions until he complied with the orders.

The Applicant brought a motion for an interim parenting order.

The Respondent challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction, asserting that British Columbia was the proper forum after she moved there with the children.

The court determined that the children's habitual residence remained in Ontario at the commencement of the application, as their removal was without the Applicant's consent or acquiescence, and there was no undue delay in commencing proceedings.

The court rejected the Respondent's argument that a British Columbia protection order established habitual residence there.

Applying the balance of convenience test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court concluded that Ontario was the more appropriate forum to exercise jurisdiction.

The applicant brought a motion to change a 1978 divorce order to claim retroactive child support and post-secondary expenses from the estate of her deceased ex-husband, 41 years after the original order.

The respondent estate trustee brought a motion to dismiss the claim on a question of law.

The court held that under the Divorce Act, a support obligation ends upon the payor's death unless the order explicitly provides that it binds the estate.

Because the original order contained no such provision, it died with the payor and could not be retroactively varied post-death.

The applicant's motion to change was dismissed.

The applicant sought an urgent restraining order against the respondent, alleging fear for her safety based on past criminal harassment, alleged violence in Peru, and a recent attempt by the respondent to serve court documents at her home.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to establish reasonable grounds for fear for her safety under section 46(1) of the Family Law Act, as the older incidents were too dated and the recent event did not objectively support a reasonable fear.

The court also noted that the statutory protection does not extend to pets or property, and the children were adults, thus not in lawful custody.