S.A.Q. Akhtar

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for cases tried by indictment.

The court deducted a period of defence delay, bringing the net delay to 27 months.

The court found that the case did not take markedly longer than it should have, considering local conditions in the Toronto Region.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial on charges of carrying a concealed weapon and aggravated assault, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors.

The applicant had brandished a firearm during a domestic dispute, causing the complainant to flee down a staircase and break her ankle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge made no jurisdictional errors, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer the weapon had been concealed and that the applicant's actions were a significant contributing cause to the complainant's injuries with objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking cocaine, the accused brought an application to stay the verdict on the basis of entrapment.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's framework for dial-a-dope operations to determine if police had reasonable suspicion before providing the opportunity to commit the offence.

The court found that the undercover officer's initial exchange with the accused crystallized the requisite reasonable suspicion before the officer requested to purchase drugs.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 8 Charter application.

The appellant contended the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for his residence lacked sufficient grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the amplified record and found the trial judge made no error in concluding the ITO contained reasonable and probable grounds that an offence had been committed and that evidence would be found at the appellant's residence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving with excess blood alcohol and stunt driving.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, erroneously relied on the repealed presumption of identity under the Criminal Code, and erred in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no uneven scrutiny, holding that the presumption of identity continues to apply to transitional cases where the offence predated the legislative amendments, and concluding that the police fulfilled their informational and implementational duties under section 10(b) without steering the appellant toward duty counsel.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, applied for bail.

The Crown alleged the applicant acted as the getaway driver for the suspected shooter.

The applicant proposed a release plan involving house arrest, electronic monitoring, and supervision by his father and sister.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed sureties inadequate given the applicant's history of breaching bail conditions.

The court ordered detention on both the secondary ground (substantial likelihood of reoffending) and the tertiary ground (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice).

The applicants, alleged members of the 'Five Point Generals' criminal organization, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of Tracking Data Warrants, Transmission Data Recording Warrants, and Part VI wiretap authorizations.

Two applicants argued there were insufficient grounds to link them to specific phone numbers, while the others argued they should not have been named in the Information to Obtain (ITO) as the conditions under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code were not met.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds to believe the phone numbers were linked to the applicants and that there was sufficient evidence of association with the criminal organization to justify naming the other applicants in the ITO.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had excluded the refusal evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding multiple breaches of the respondent's rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) following his arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by misapprehending material evidence regarding the implementational component of s. 10(b), applying the wrong legal test to the strip search, failing to conduct the required temporal analysis for evidence obtained prior to a breach, and misapplying jurisprudence on the seriousness of a refusal offence.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused of first-degree murder and committing him only on second-degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by ignoring inferences favourable to the Crown and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court agreed, finding the preliminary inquiry judge erred by drawing an inference favourable to the accused regarding the interaction with the victim, and by failing to consider circumstantial evidence of planning, such as the accused's change of clothing and pre-arranged taxi escape.

The application was granted, the discharge quashed, and mandamus issued directing committal on first-degree murder.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking offences following a mass arrest operation, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of her ss. 7, 10(b), and 12 rights.

She claimed excessive force upon arrest, inhumane treatment during a lengthy wait in a police cruiser, and an unlawful strip search.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's testimony regarding pain and suffering to be fabricated and contradicted by video evidence.

The court held that the police conduct was reasonable under the circumstances of the mass arrests, and the strip search was justified as the applicant was entering the prison population.

The accused, a Brazilian national and refugee claimant, sought bail pending an extradition hearing to the United States on charges of human smuggling.

The Crown argued that the reverse onus provisions under s. 515(6) of the Criminal Code applied because the accused's prior criminal record in Brazil rendered him ineligible for refugee status, meaning he was not 'ordinarily resident in Canada'.

The court agreed that the reverse onus applied, but noted that even if it did not, the Crown had shown cause for detention.

The court found the accused posed a significant flight risk, a substantial likelihood of reoffending, and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The proposed surety was also deemed unreliable.

Bail was denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing ammunition while prohibited, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles of circumstantial evidence by failing to consider plausible alternative explanations for how bullets ended up in his jacket.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the appellant's alternative theories as speculative rather than reasonable possibilities based on the evidence.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof or provided insufficient reasons.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, brought an application under s. 8 of the Charter alleging that the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant for his mobile phone lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The phone was seized incident to arrest.

The reviewing judge applied the Garofoli standard and found that the ITO contained sufficient information, including the co-accused's extensive use of a mobile phone to facilitate the offences and the applicant's integral involvement, to provide reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found on the applicant's phone.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 32 months.

The central issue was whether a delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability following an adjournment necessitated by late Crown disclosure should be attributed to the defence.

The court held that the pre-Jordan principles in Godin no longer apply, and that periods where the court and Crown are ready but the defence is not must be deducted as defence delay.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of counselling to kidnap and extort his former lawyers, whom he blamed for financial losses.

He recruited an accomplice, purchased a shotgun and ammunition, and provided the accomplice with the lawyers' details and money.

The court found the targeting of justice system participants and the purchase of a firearm to be significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years and 8 months.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect.

The defence sought to call witnesses and introduce video surveillance to establish that another resident of the victim's building had animus, motive, and opportunity to commit the murder.

The court applied the McMillan test and found that the proposed evidence established a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime.

The application was granted, as the probative value of the evidence outweighed its slight prejudicial effect.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in an unprovoked and fatal beating of a stranger.

Patrick Smith was convicted of second degree murder and assault, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 12-year parole ineligibility period.

Matthew Moreira was convicted of manslaughter and robbery, and was sentenced to a total of 13 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the offenders' backgrounds, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, raising new s. 10(b) Charter arguments for the first time.

The Crown brought an application under s. 685 of the Criminal Code to summarily dismiss the appeal.

The court held that the Crown has jurisdiction to bring a s. 685 application in summary conviction appeals.

The court granted the application and dismissed the appeal, finding that allowing the new grounds would cause substantial prejudice to the Crown as there was no evidentiary record from the trial to evaluate the claims.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (a firearm and ammunition) found in his home, alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant based on confidential informant information and surveillance, dismissing the s. 9 claim.

While the court found the search warrant was validly issued, it held that the police breached s. 8 by entering and 'freezing' the applicant's residence without a warrant, as there were no exigent circumstances.

However, applying the Grant test under s. 24(2), the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable.

The offender was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and acquitted of carrying a concealed weapon after stabbing the victim during a bar fight.

The victim was the initial aggressor, punching the offender unprovoked, but the offender retaliated by drawing a knife and stabbing the fleeing victim in the back.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife belonged to the offender, despite the mixed verdict.

The court rejected arguments to artificially reduce the sentence to avoid deportation consequences or to grant enhanced credit for harsh jail conditions without evidence.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.