John Joseph Corelli

The Crown brought an application to remove the appellant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The counsel had previously provided an opinion letter for a third party, whom the appellant now sought to implicate in the murder of the victim via fresh evidence on appeal.

The parties reached a resolution wherein independent counsel would handle the fresh evidence application and related grounds of appeal, ensuring no breach of duty to the former client while preserving the appellant's right to counsel of choice for the remainder of the appeal.

The Crown's application was withdrawn.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge gave an insufficient Vetrovec warning regarding an unsavoury witness and erred by leaving party liability under s. 21 of the Criminal Code with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's warning was sufficient and that there was ample evidence to support leaving the alternative theory of party liability to the jury.

The appellant bank appealed a forfeiture order over a U.S. dollar account used in connection with a fraudulent telemarketing gemstone scheme.

The court held that the fraudster's interest in victim funds was voidable, not void ab initio, so the bank's security interest could attach and constituted a valid interest under s. 462.41 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge erred by treating the proceeds of crime as incapable of being given as security and by failing to consider the discretionary relief available to an innocent secured creditor.

On appeal, the court exercised that discretion only in part, ordering forfeiture of the identifiable proceeds of six victims and return of the remaining balance to the bank.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction and sentence, relying on fresh recantation evidence from a key civilian witness and an inmate informant, as well as new DNA testing undermining aspects of the Crown's theory.

The court rejected the civilian witness recantation as incredible, but admitted the inmate recantation and the DNA evidence under the Palmer framework.

Although the fresh evidence significantly weakened the Crown case and impaired important inculpatory evidence, the court held it was not so conclusive as to justify an acquittal and the verdict was not shown to be unreasonable under the governing standard.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered on second degree murder.

Leave to appeal the counselling sentence was granted and that sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and received a mandatory firearms prohibition under the Criminal Code.

Before his appeal was heard, the Criminal Code was amended to make the prohibition discretionary.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'adjudged' in section 44(e) of the Interpretation Act includes appellate review of a sentence.

Therefore, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment provided by the amended legislation.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the included offence of manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that the jury, by convicting of murder, must have found subjective foresight of death, and it was impossible to conclude they did so merely because they were unable to find subjective foresight of bodily harm for manslaughter.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for perjury to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding no merit in any of the grounds of appeal.