Jennifer Alexis Gibb Savini

The applicant, an incorporated association managing a recreational park, applied to vacate a 1997 court order that established a two-manager governance system.

Three respondent members brought a counter-application challenging the applicant's corporate standing and seeking an external financial audit.

The court found that the applicant lacked standing because the park's constitution was never properly amended to authorize incorporation.

The court partially vacated the 1997 order, removing provisions related to the defunct two-manager system but leaving other substantive provisions intact.

The request for an external audit was dismissed for failing to meet the statutory threshold under the Corporations Act and lacking majority member support.

The applicant sought clarification on the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to issue a restraining order under subsection 36(7) of the Building Code Act, 1992, following a conviction for failing to comply with a property standards order.

The court confirmed that failure to comply with a property standards order constitutes a contravention of subsection 15.3(7) of the Act, thereby granting the justice of the peace jurisdiction under clause 36(1)(c) to issue the restraining order.

The applicant was permitted to proceed with its contempt application.

The applicant appealed two Property Standards Orders issued by the City of Quinte West concerning deficiencies in his commercial building.

The appeal from the 2011 Order was dismissed as being out of time, as the court found no jurisdiction to extend the statutory 14-day appeal period.

The appeal from the 2014 Order, which largely reiterated the 2011 Order and added further requirements, was dismissed on its merits.

The court confirmed all items of the 2014 Order, finding the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence of compliance or to persuade the court that the orders were unreasonable.

The court also discussed the standard of review for such appeals, concluding it is a de novo hearing where the judge makes their own assessment, with limited deference to the Property Standards Committee due to its composition and lack of detailed reasons.

Costs were fixed at $40,000.00 in favour of the respondent.

Following a successful motion for leave to appeal, the defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs agreed the amounts were reasonable but argued payment would create a tremendous financial burden due to their impecuniosity.

The court fixed the costs as requested but, exercising its discretion under Rule 57.03(1), ordered that the costs be payable following the final resolution of the matter by the Divisional Court.

The appellant was convicted of a provincial offence for failing to comply with an order to remedy building code deficiencies and fined $12,000.

He appealed to the Ontario Court of Justice but failed to order all transcripts and requested an adjournment on the hearing date.

The appeal judge refused the adjournment and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the appeal judge had inherent jurisdiction to control the court's process and deny the adjournment due to the appellant's manifest delay.

The Court also confirmed that a decision to refuse an adjournment and dismiss an appeal is a 'judgment' that may be appealed to the Court of Appeal with leave under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application regarding the maintenance of a private drive, the successful respondent sought costs of $14,161.93.

The respondent relied on an offer to settle that would have provided the applicants with more than they achieved at the hearing.

The applicants argued the offer was not sufficiently certain to trigger Rule 49.

The court found the offer was valid and should be considered.

Applying the principle of reasonableness, the court fixed costs payable by the applicants to the respondent at $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court order that dismissed his appeal of a Property Standards Order and an Order to Comply requiring him to remove structures and debris from his property.

The Divisional Court held it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the Property Standards Order, as the lower court's decision was final under the Building Code Act.

The court dismissed the appeal of the Order to Comply, rejecting the appellant's argument that a Crown Patent exempted his land from provincial and municipal regulation.

The applicants, property owners on a lakefront, sought a declaration that a private road leading to their properties had become a municipal roadway through the doctrine of dedication and acceptance.

The municipality had performed casual winter maintenance on the road pursuant to historical agreements that explicitly stated the road remained private.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the road was on Crown land, was not dedicated to public use, and that the municipality's maintenance work did not constitute a clear and unequivocal intention to assume responsibility for the road.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his appeal of a provincial offence conviction for failing to remedy building code deficiencies.

The appeal judge had dismissed the appeal for failure to perfect due to missing transcripts.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal on two questions of law: whether an appeal can be dismissed for failure to perfect in circumstances not explicitly authorized by the Provincial Offences Act or its Rules, and whether such a dismissal can be appealed to the Court of Appeal under s. 131 of the Act.

Leave to appeal on factual grounds was denied.