Jean-Claude Joseph Rioux

In a pre-hearing decision regarding a claim for statutory accident benefits, the insurer sought production of the applicant's bank statements from one year prior to the accident to date to verify post-accident income.

The arbitrator dismissed the request, finding that the amount of the weekly income replacement benefit was not in dispute and the insurer had no evidentiary basis to suspect the applicant was employed during the disputed period.

The arbitrator concluded that ordering production based on speculation alone would be unnecessarily intrusive and contrary to the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

The insurer brought a motion to compel the insured to attend an independent medical examination by a psychiatrist under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insured refused to attend, arguing the examination was for medical-legal purposes rather than determining entitlement to a benefit.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that arbitrators at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario lack jurisdiction to order an insured to attend a medical examination.

The arbitrator also noted that the insurer's delay in requesting the examination until the eve of the hearing would cause significant prejudice to the insured.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement benefits.

The insurer terminated the benefits and sought to compel the applicant to attend examinations by an orthopaedic surgeon, a physiatrist, and a psychologist.

The insurer argued the applicant was precluded from proceeding to arbitration for failing to attend.

The arbitrator held that the insurer's notice of examination was deficient because it listed benefits not in dispute, and thus could not be relied upon to preclude arbitration.

The arbitrator further held that examinations by an orthopaedic surgeon and a physiatrist were reasonable and necessary, but a psychological examination was not, given the passage of time since any psychological issues were reported.

The appellants, a bank and its assignee, appealed a trial judgment finding they improperly used the respondent developer's confidential business information during the assignment of a defaulted loan, causing a lost opportunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the bank had an unqualified right to assign the debt.

Furthermore, the Court found that the trial judge erred in awarding damages based on a 'lost opportunity' theory that was neither pleaded nor supported by the evidence.

The cross-appeal by the respondent was dismissed, and the action against the appellants was dismissed in its entirety.