Associate Judge Imran E. Kamal

The moving party sought leave to amend her statement of defence in a defamation action 15 years after it was commenced to specifically plead the limitation periods under sections 5 and 6 of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion, finding no presumption of non-compensable prejudice because the proposed amendment merely clarified a defence that was already generally pleaded.

The bankrupt sought a discharge from her second bankruptcy, which was materially contributed to by her struggles with addiction.

The court considered the rehabilitative purpose of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the bankrupt's ongoing recovery efforts.

The court ordered a conditional and suspended discharge, requiring the bankrupt to attend 12-step meetings, engage in counseling, and return to court annually for three years to demonstrate ongoing recovery.

At a case conference, the court considered whether three related actions arising from a construction project should be heard one after another and proceed on a common timetable.

The actions involved claims for construction management services, oppression remedies, and consulting services, with overlapping allegations of delay and cost overruns.

The court ordered the actions to proceed together under Rule 6.01(1), finding they shared common questions of fact and law, and that separate proceedings risked inconsistent findings.

An alternative request to sever counterclaims under Rule 6.1.01 was dismissed.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion to enforce a 2000 parenting order and compel the respondent mother to return their 32-year-old disabled son to his care.

The court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the Divorce Act definition of 'child of the marriage' did not apply because the parents were never married, and the Children's Law Reform Act only applies to minors.

The court directed the applicant to proceed under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The respondent father brought a motion for directions under s. 30(11) of the Children's Law Reform Act, seeking to provide a 60-page affidavit with 400 pages of exhibits to the court-appointed parenting assessor.

The applicant mother opposed, arguing the affidavit was an advocacy document drafted specifically to influence the assessor.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while independent records are appropriate, an advocacy affidavit drafted specifically for the assessor is unnecessary and risks priming or confirmation bias.

The court directed that the affidavit not be provided unless specifically requested by the assessor.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to vary, set aside, or suspend a previous costs order.

The plaintiff argued that the court failed to adjudicate material costs considerations and that fresh evidence warranted a redetermination.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no accidental slip or omission under Rule 59.06(1), and holding that the fresh evidence would not have changed the result and could have been obtained earlier under Rule 59.06(2)(a).

The court also declined to suspend the order, noting the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct and the prejudice to the defendants.

The applicant brought an urgent motion for various relief, including exclusive possession and sale of the matrimonial home, prior to a case conference.

The court modernized the application of the Rosen test for urgency to account for contemporary realities, including court delays and the dynamics of coercive control and intimate partner violence.

Finding that the applicant faced dire financial circumstances, including imminent mortgage default and utility shut-offs, and recognizing the risks posed by the respondent's alleged coercive conduct, the court concluded the test for urgency was met and set a timetable for the motion.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to properly name the defendants, who were previously identified as John Doe and James Doe, while seeking to use initials to protect their identities.

The defendants included a young person dealt with under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and his father.

The court held that section 110 of the YCJA applies to civil proceedings, prohibiting the publication of information that would identify a young person dealt with under the Act.

The court granted leave to amend the pleadings using initials for the young person and his father, and ordered that the unredacted motion materials be sealed from the public record.

The Ottawa Hospital requested leave at a case conference to bring a summary judgment motion to be heard alongside the University's scheduled anti-SLAPP and Rule 21 motions.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the request.

The court denied the hospital's request, finding that the proposed summary judgment motion was a 'step in the proceeding' and was therefore barred by the non-discretionary automatic stay under section 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also found that hearing the motions together would not improve efficiency and that the hospital would not suffer prejudice by waiting.

The respondent father brought a motion for DNA paternity testing under s. 17.2 of the Children's Law Reform Act, alleging the children may have been conceived through commercial sex work.

The applicant mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for child support.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that a paternity test was not in the best interests of the children, would serve no useful legal purpose as the father intended to continue acting as a parent regardless of the results, and appeared to be motivated by a desire to humiliate the mother.

The court ordered the father to pay table child support based on his recent income, rejecting his claim of undue hardship.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) that the plaintiffs had obtained ex parte on a property.

The plaintiffs had commenced an action alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation regarding a construction project, and subsequently discovered the defendants transferred the subject property to family members for nominal consideration before listing it for sale.

The court applied the Grefford test for CPLs in fraudulent conveyance actions and found a high probability of success in the main action, a triable issue regarding intent to defeat creditors, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the CPL.

The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the CPL should be discharged for material non-disclosure.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought an interim motion seeking primary residence, sole decision-making, and supervised parenting time for the respondent father, alleging substance abuse and relying on a CAS letter.

The father sought to maintain the status quo of a 2-2-3 equal parenting schedule, explaining that a medical incident was due to prescribed medication and that he had acted protectively by calling the paternal grandmother.

The court dismissed the mother's motion, finding insufficient evidence to justify the draconian measure of supervised parenting time or a departure from the status quo.

The equal parenting schedule was reinstated with specific safety conditions.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act for an order compelling the self-represented plaintiff to undergo a capacity assessment.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion seeking procedural accommodation for the plaintiff's participation to proceed exclusively in written and asynchronous formats due to severe disabilities.

The court found that the threshold requirements under s. 105(3) were met, as the plaintiff's own pleadings and conduct raised genuine concerns about litigation capacity.

The court further held that the requested accommodation of exclusively written and asynchronous participation would cause undue hardship by undermining procedural fairness, prejudicing the defendant's right to cross-examine, and straining court resources.

The defendant's motion was granted, and the accommodation request was dismissed without prejudice pending completion of the capacity assessment.

The respondent brought multiple motions in a family law proceeding involving equalization, trust claims, and spousal support.

The court addressed the jurisdiction of an Associate Judge, granted an order adding the respondent's parents as parties given their financial interest in a Cornwall property purchased with their funds but registered in the parties' names.

The court denied the respondent's request to deem apartment-related payments as interim spousal support, as no spousal support order or agreement existed.

Access to the matrimonial home for retrieval of personal belongings was granted, as was an order to confirm the contents of and close a joint safety deposit box.

The court also ordered the applicant to provide outstanding financial disclosure within 14 days, with trial scheduled for May 2026.

Costs endorsement following a successful motion by the plaintiff law firm regarding documentary production obligations.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $12,694, while the defendant argued $5,000 was reasonable given the novelty of the privilege issues.

The court found the defendant's pre-litigation conduct reprehensible, including depositing client funds into a personal account, soliciting cash payments, and making disparaging remarks about clients.

The defendant's blanket refusal to produce documents under the guise of solicitor-client privilege, despite the plaintiff's practical attempts to resolve the matter, further warranted elevated costs.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity basis in the full amount of $12,694.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for leave under section 17 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to proceed with claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and misfeasance in public office against the Crown.

The claims arose from her employment with the Ministry of the Attorney General and statements made to her long-term disability insurer.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable possibility of success, as there was no evidence that the Crown made false representations, knew they were false, or intended for the plaintiff to act upon them.

Leave was denied for all claims except operational negligence, for which the Crown waived the leave requirement.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion on a reference for sole signing authority to complete the court-ordered sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home, after the applicant failed to sign necessary closing documents and was unresponsive to the real estate agent and transaction lawyer.

The court granted sole signing authority to the moving party, directed distribution of net sale proceeds in accordance with a prior judicial order allocating 80% to the respondent and 20% to the applicant (less the applicant's share of mortgage payments and insurance premiums paid by the respondent since separation), and awarded costs of $5,610.45 on a substantial indemnity basis against the applicant for unreasonable conduct.

The Licensed Insolvency Trustee sought court approval of a Division I consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The debtor's assets were less than fifty cents on the dollar of his liabilities, engaging s. 173(1)(a) of the BIA.

The court found that the debtor's insolvency arose from his divorce and the failure of his brewing company due to the COVID-19 pandemic, circumstances for which he could not justly be held responsible.

The proposal met all requirements of s. 59(2), was unanimously approved by creditors, and provided better recovery than bankruptcy.

The court approved the proposal, finding no culpability or blameworthiness warranting a s. 173(a) finding.

The moving party, a self-represented defendant in a motor vehicle negligence action, brought a motion seeking an order that the insurer of the vehicle's owner had a duty to defend him and was required to appoint and fund independent defence counsel of his choosing.

The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the moving party operated the vehicle without the owner's consent, while simultaneously funding and directing the defence of the vehicle's owner, whose defence asserted that the moving party lacked consent.

The court held that the duty to defend is triggered by the mere possibility that a claim falls within the policy, and that the consent issue remained live and unresolved on the pleadings; extrinsic interview evidence relied upon by the insurer was inadmissible as premature.

The court further found a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest arising from the insurer's simultaneous denial of coverage to the moving party and defence of the co-defendant on an adverse theory.

The motion was granted in its entirety; the insurer was ordered to defend the moving party through independent counsel of his choosing at the insurer's expense.

The respondents brought a motion under Rule 1.08(8) seeking an order that cross-examinations on affidavits proceed in person rather than virtually, citing a history of surreptitious recording by the self-represented applicant.

The court found that the respondents failed to establish sufficient justification to depart from the originally agreed-upon virtual format.

Applying the factors in Rule 1.08(6) and principles from the case law, the court ordered that cross-examinations proceed virtually, with additional protective orders prohibiting any recording or publication of the transcripts by the parties.

The timetable was amended accordingly, while the hearing date remained unchanged.