Jamie K. Trimble

The court issued supplementary reasons following the dismissal of Elena Albergaria's motion to change a prior judgment, addressing outstanding issues of child and spousal support, including overpayments/underpayments, and Section 7 expenses.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction to issue these reasons before a formal order was perfected, correcting an oversight.

It determined Elena was entitled to spousal support for an additional two years, calculated future support amounts based on the parties' incomes and prior agreements, and adjusted for Daniel's significant overpayments in both spousal and child support.

Future Section 7 expenses were also allocated.

The plaintiff, Darren John, brought an undefended action against Steve Kiefer and Wee Rent It for assault and other claims.

The defendants had never defended the action.

The court found Mr. Kiefer liable for assault based on deemed admissions under Rule 19.06 and the plaintiff's oral evidence.

All other causes of action against Mr. Kiefer and the entire action against Wee Rent It were dismissed due to insufficient pleading or lack of evidence.

The plaintiff was awarded $100 in general damages for the assault and $780 in special damages for lost wages immediately following the incident.

Claims for damages related to subsequent criminal charges against the plaintiff (legal fees, lost wages for trial attendance, anxiety from charges) were dismissed as they did not arise from Kiefer's assault and were not substantiated or properly pleaded as malicious prosecution.

Following a high-conflict separation involving allegations of domestic violence, the mother sought sole custody and table child support, while the father sought joint custody and 50/50 access.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother and ordered the father's access to remain supervised due to his inability to regulate his emotions and his inappropriate conduct during visits.

The court also imputed income to the father for the purpose of calculating child support and arrears, finding that he failed to provide financial disclosure or evidence of reasonable efforts to find employment.

The wife brought a motion for interim spousal support and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The parties had a marriage contract that the wife sought to set aside, but relied upon for interim support purposes.

Due to conflicting evidence regarding the husband's complex income, the court imputed his income at $400,000 and ordered interim spousal support of $7,500 per month.

The court also granted the wife interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home after balancing the factors under section 24(3) of the Family Law Act, noting the children's residence, the husband's greater financial resources, and the wife's title to the property.

The defendant bank brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' action under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs had previously sued the bank in a separate action arising from a mortgage dispute, which was dismissed.

In this new action, the plaintiffs claimed damages for abuse of process, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the bank's conduct in the prior litigation.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding the new action was an abuse of process and an attempt to relitigate issues that were or should have been raised in the previous proceeding.

The court also held that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the stress of litigation is not independently compensable.

The plaintiff sued a reporter and newspaper for libel over an article published online and in print.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(1)(a) for failure to comply with the notice and limitation periods in the Libel and Slander Act.

The court held that the Act applies to electronic editions of newspapers.

The court found the plaintiff failed to provide proper notice within six weeks and failed to commence the action within the three-month limitation period.

The action was dismissed as statute-barred.

Following a judgment discharging both siblings as trustees of their late mother's estate and appointing a new trustee, both parties sought costs against the other.

The court found that neither party was successful in any significant way, as both were removed as trustees.

Considering the divided success, the failure of offers to settle to trigger Rule 49 consequences, and the poor conduct of both parties, the court made no order as to costs.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail on charges of importing cocaine, trafficking oxycodone, and conspiring to import firearms.

The reviewing judge applied the deferential standard of review from St. Cloud, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not make any clearly inappropriate decisions in weighing the evidence, including wiretaps, flight risk, and the proposed release plan.

The court also refused to admit fresh evidence from the applicant's ex-wife, as no due diligence was shown.

The application for bail review was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to remain in custody.

The plaintiffs moved for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order regarding undertakings and refusals on discovery, and the subsequent costs order.

The plaintiffs argued the motion judge erred in applying the principle of proportionality to limit discovery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions on the issue of law and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court also noted the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding factum length and motion record contents.

The applicant brought a motion to change the spousal and child support provisions of a 2012 consent order that incorporated a separation agreement.

She argued that the respondent's receipt of a retroactive lump sum payment following a firefighter arbitration constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no legal basis to set aside the agreement and holding that the possibility of a retroactive wage increase was known or ought to have been known when the agreement was signed, thus failing to meet the threshold for a material change.

In a high-conflict family law trial, the applicant father sought sole custody of the parties' three children, alleging severe parental alienation by the respondent mother.

The court found overwhelming evidence that the mother had alienated the eldest child and that the younger children were at risk.

The court granted sole custody to the father and ordered the immediate implementation of a Phase II reunification program, which included a 90-day no-contact period between the children and the mother.

The father was also permitted to relocate with the children to Toronto.

Additionally, the court imputed an income of $40,000 to the mother for support purposes, ordered her to pay child support, ordered the father to pay spousal support, and resolved various net family property issues, including the valuation and treatment of a jointly leased cottage.

The plaintiffs brought an action claiming ownership of a strip of the defendants' land through adverse possession.

The dispute arose after the defendants demanded the plaintiffs move their fence, asserting it was on the defendants' property.

The court found that a chain link fence had existed on the defendants' property for over ten years prior to the property's conversion to Land Titles, and that previous owners of both properties operated under a mutual mistake that the fence marked the boundary.

The court concluded the plaintiffs established open, notorious, and continuous adverse possession for the requisite ten-year period and granted a declaration of ownership, along with nominal damages.

During a family law trial, the respondent sought to qualify a social worker as an expert in family therapy and parental alienation.

The court refused to qualify the proposed expert, finding she failed to meet the threshold requirements of admissibility under the Mohan framework and lacked the requisite independence and impartiality required by the White Burgess test.

The court noted the proposed expert viewed herself as an advocate for the children, failed to comply with the Family Law Rules regarding expert duties, and demonstrated bias in her report.

However, the court admitted video interviews of the children conducted by the proposed expert, subject to later submissions on their weight.

In a high‑conflict custody dispute, the father brought an emergency motion seeking a declaration that the Superior Court custody trial should proceed notwithstanding a child protection application commenced in the Ontario Court of Justice by a child through counsel.

The mother cross‑moved seeking adjournment, involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, and consideration of the children’s wishes.

The court found the protection proceeding appeared to be a tactical attempt to delay the scheduled custody trial and concluded the best interests of the children required prompt resolution of the family dispute.

The court held the protection application did not automatically stay the custody trial and declined to adjourn the trial.

However, the court declined to stay the protection proceeding itself, leaving that determination to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The applicant sought a second bail review after his initial release was revoked by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant argued the reviewing judge erred in law by giving insufficient weight to the proposed plan of release under the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, and by denying natural justice.

The court dismissed the application, finding no errors of law or inappropriate weighing of factors by the reviewing judge, who had properly concluded the applicant posed a substantial risk of reoffending and would not abide by any plan of release.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $1,837,500 for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the defendants sought to deduct Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) previously settled by the plaintiff.

The court held that the defendants met the strict burden of proving subject-matter and temporal matching between the jury's future care awards and the SABs settlement categories.

However, the court ruled that the deductible SABs amounts must be reduced by a pro-rata share of the legal fees the plaintiff incurred to obtain the SABs settlement, preventing the tortfeasors from unfairly benefiting from the plaintiff's expense.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $1,837,500 for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the court determined whether the defendants could deduct a prior $1,423,323.49 Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) settlement from the tort award.

The court found that the defendants met their burden to show subject matter and temporal matching between the SABs settlement and the jury's awards for future medical/rehabilitation and attendant care needs.

However, the court held that the deductible SABs amounts must be reduced by the legal fees incurred by the plaintiff to obtain the SABs settlement, as well as certain quantifiable expenses incurred after the settlement.

The appellant challenged a family law decision awarding sole custody, a defined access schedule, and retroactive child support.

The appeal was confined to access and retroactive support.

The court held that the trial judge applied the correct best-interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, was entitled to reject the OCL report as unreliable, and provided reasons that satisfied the appellate standard for adequacy.

The court further held that the trial judge properly applied the D.B.S. framework holistically and made no reviewable error in awarding retroactive child support to the child’s birth based on blameworthy conduct and the recipient’s delay explanations.

The appeal was dismissed, the trust funds were applied against arrears, and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

On an interim family motion, the father sought permission to have the parties' adult disabled child move to Pennsylvania to live with him, together with interim support.

The court held that, despite presumptions of adulthood and capacity, there was sufficient evidence to justify treating the child on an interim basis as remaining subject to the court's jurisdiction pending trial on whether he remained a child of the marriage or lacked capacity.

The court refused the proposed relocation because the record did not establish adequate medical coverage, social supports, housing, employment, or assurance of return to Ontario, and because relocation risked loss of ODSP and OHIP benefits.

Instead, the court ordered that the child reside temporarily with a third party in Ontario, that ODSP benefits be reinstated and redirected for his benefit, and that both parents commence guardianship-related steps under the Substitute Decisions Act.

On a summary judgment motion by a municipality against a developer's crossclaim arising from a winter slip-and-fall, the court held the matter could be fairly and justly resolved without a trial.

The record established on a balance of probabilities that the plaintiff fell on a private driveway rather than on the municipal sidewalk.

In any event, the municipality had not assumed the subdivision roads by by-law at the material time, so no statutory duty or liability under the Municipal Act had attached.

Contractual, nuisance, implied assumption, and by-law based arguments were rejected, and the crossclaim was dismissed.