Jamie K. Trimble

Following a multi-day family law trial concerning parenting decision-making, primary residence, and relocation, the court found the mother had persistently obstructed the children’s relationship with the father and failed to promote their best interests under the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The court granted the father sole decision-making responsibility, primary care and control, and authorized relocation of the children to Saudi Arabia, with structured parenting time, travel, communication, and document-control terms.

The court also imposed enforcement mechanisms including police enforcement under s. 36 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, mirror-order requirements, and financial security due to relocation to a non-Hague jurisdiction.

Claims for spousal support, retroactive support, and property/equalization relief were dismissed, and no present child support order was made against the mother under s. 10(2)(b) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The defendant brought a pre-trial motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for non-pecuniary general damages and healthcare expenses arising from a motor vehicle accident, on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to adduce the evidence required by s. 4.3(1) to (5) of O. Reg. 461/96 to establish the statutory threshold of permanent serious impairment.

The court found that no single medical report, nor the totality of the medical records proffered, satisfied the regulation's requirements for qualified physician evidence addressing the nature, permanence, and importance of the alleged impairment.

The motion was granted and the claims for non-pecuniary general damages and healthcare expenses were struck.

The insurer of a Hindu temple moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it owes no duty to defend the temple in a claim brought by a plaintiff alleging sexual abuse by a temple employee.

The insurer argued that the loss was excluded from coverage under Common Exclusion 7 (sexual abuse exclusion) and that the temple breached its obligation to report the claim, resulting in irreparable prejudice.

The court granted the motion, finding that Common Exclusion 7 applied to exclude the loss in its entirety, making the other issues moot.

The court addressed a motion for directions in an estates dispute.

The motion did not proceed due to both parties' non-compliance with the Central West Practice Direction regarding electronic document uploading to Case Centre.

The judge highlighted significant issues with unbookmarked and unhyperlinked materials, which impeded the court's ability to prepare efficiently.

The motion was adjourned, and revised materials were ordered, with costs of the day fixed at $1,500.00 in the cause.

The judge emphasized that counsel's failure to comply with electronic filing requirements should not be charged to clients.

This endorsement concerns costs following an 18-day jury trial where the action was dismissed.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, citing the plaintiff's refusal of multiple settlement offers, 14 years of litigation delay, and egregious conduct, including threats made by his agent.

The self-represented plaintiff argued unfamiliarity with court processes.

The court awarded the defendant $120,927.02 in costs, applying a partial indemnity scale up to January 5, 2024, and a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The judge found the plaintiff's conduct, including rationalizing threats, causing excessive and unexplained delays, and failing to prepare for trial despite ample opportunity, warranted the higher scale of costs, emphasizing the need to correct behaviour and discourage ill-founded litigation.

The offender, Alan Kumar, sought to reopen his application to stay his conviction or reduce his sentence, alleging excessive force by the arresting officer and a subsequent police cover-up during a 2018 home invasion arrest.

The original application was dismissed by Barnes J. in 2020.

Kumar based his request on newly disclosed McNeil Reports concerning Constable Osborne, the officer in charge, revealing disciplinary actions including a guilty plea to assault and resignation.

The court, Trimble J., dismissed the application to reopen, finding that the new evidence regarding Officer Osborne's misconduct would not have reasonably affected Barnes J.'s original conclusions regarding the use of excessive force or the alleged police collusion, as there was no evidence Osborne was present during the arrest or influenced the arresting officer's actions.

The Estate sought a declaration of ownership and return of a 1967 Mustang Cobra Convertible from the respondent, who claimed the deceased had sold him the car.

The court found that the respondent failed to corroborate his claim of payment as required by s. 13 of the Evidence Act, and that the purported contract was vague and lacked essential terms.

The court also found that the indicia of ownership did not support a transfer to the respondent.

The application was allowed, and the respondent was ordered to return the car and parts to the Estate.

Gough Lewis brought an urgent motion seeking a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against his mother's home, which his sister, Clarissa Lewis, was selling under a Power of Attorney.

Gough claimed an interest in the property based on constructive trust, unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit, alleging he provided extensive care for his mother, Wendy Lewis, and maintained the property for 16 years, with an understanding that the house would eventually be his.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Gough failed to establish a triable issue for an interest in the property.

The judge found Gough's evidence lacked candour and was vague, particularly regarding his contributions and the property's condition, which was contradicted by Clarissa's evidence and photographs.

The court concluded that damages would be an adequate remedy and that the balance of prejudice weighed heavily against issuing the CPL, as it would prevent the sale necessary to cover Wendy's significant nursing home and property expenses.

The net proceeds of the sale were ordered to be held in trust, with provisions for monthly payments to Wendy for her care.

The defendant, Jonathan Williams, was found guilty by a jury of harbouring a person to facilitate the sale of sexual services (s. 286.3 Criminal Code) and receiving financial benefit from the commission of such an offence (s. 286.2 Criminal Code).

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defendant requested an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence in human trafficking cases, which are considered inherently violent and exploitative.

The judge imposed a concurrent sentence of 28 months for harbouring and 20 months for receiving financial benefit, along with a three-year no-contact order and a DNA order.

The court considered mitigating factors such as the defendant being a first-time offender with strong community support and low risk of re-offending, but found the aggravating factors, including exploitation of trust and control over the victim's sexual services, to be more compelling.

This ruling addresses three requests by the plaintiffs for specific jury instructions during a civil trial concerning a motor vehicle accident.

The court granted the request for a standard instruction on rear-end collisions, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to consider it.

The request for a mandatory adverse inference against the defendant for failing to testify was granted in principle, but the court clarified that such an inference can only be drawn if the plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case.

The request for a mandatory adverse inference against the defence for not calling a psychiatric expert was denied, with the court distinguishing the applicable law in Ontario from British Columbia and emphasizing that both parties had the power to call the expert.

This trial ruling addresses the admissibility and content of Ms. Pollard's summary charts for future care costs in two personal injury actions.

The court clarified the scope of Ms. Pollard's expert qualifications, limiting her opinions to unit costs and excluding recommendations on specific treatments, dosages, or frequencies unless supported by qualified medical evidence.

The ruling provides guidance on what items can be included in the summary charts for jury consideration, emphasizing the need for "reasonable evidence" and distinguishing between expert opinion and jury common sense.

This ruling addresses jury questions in two consolidated personal injury actions.

The court clarified the distinct concepts of future loss of income, loss of earning capacity, and loss of competitive advantage, explaining how they relate to claims for future income loss depending on the plaintiff's ability to return to work.

It also confirmed the retention of questions regarding past and future housekeeping and future healthcare costs for jury deliberation, while removing past health care costs by consent.

The court issued a ruling on the formulation of jury questions in a civil trial involving a motor vehicle accident.

The judge addressed disagreements between the plaintiff and defendant counsel regarding the wording and inclusion of specific questions.

Key determinations included the necessity of separate questions for past versus future losses and different damage types, the appropriateness of using the term "negligent" rather than "liable," the requirement for a distinct causation question, and the decision to exclude a question asking for particulars of negligence, given the straightforward nature of the rear-end collision case.

In a personal injury trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude the evidence of the plaintiffs' future care expert, Yvonne Pollard.

The defendants argued that Ms. Pollard's reports lacked factual foundation because they relied heavily on opinions from medical experts whom the plaintiffs had previously elected not to call, following a prior ruling limiting the number of duplicative experts.

The plaintiff, Kenisha Desmond, argued that Ms. Pollard's reports had an admissible factual basis and that her evidence was crucial for future care costs.

The court denied the defendants' motion, finding that sufficient evidentiary foundation existed from other called experts and potentially from future witnesses.

However, the court clarified that the plaintiff could not introduce reports from the uncalled, duplicative experts through Ms. Pollard, as they would constitute inadmissible hearsay.

The applicant Father sought costs on a full indemnity basis after successfully obtaining an order for the return of the children from Lebanon.

The respondent Mother opposed, arguing for no costs or a reduced amount.

The court found the Mother acted in bad faith by activating Lebanese court proceedings and obtaining a travel ban without notice to the Father, justifying substantial indemnity costs.

However, the Father's claimed costs of $62,661.31 were deemed unreasonable due to overstaffing, excessive hours, and insufficient detail for foreign counsel fees.

The court awarded the Father $25,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

This ruling addresses the plaintiffs' motion for leave to call more than three medical experts in a personal injury trial, as permitted under Section 12 of the Evidence Act.

The court reviewed the proposed experts for both plaintiffs, Kenisha Desmond and Shian Henry, and found significant overlap and duplication in their anticipated testimony, particularly among medical specialists.

Applying the criteria for granting leave and emphasizing the court's gatekeeping function to prevent unnecessary trial length and disproportionate costs, the judge granted leave to call only one expert from each identified group of duplicative specialists for both plaintiffs, while allowing economic and occupational therapy experts.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion seeking an order for substituted service of the Statement of Claim on the defendant driver by serving his automobile liability insurer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to locate the defendant and that an insurer is not, by default, an agent for service of its insured.

The decision clarifies the proper circumstances and methods for involving an automobile liability insurer in orders for substituted service or dispensing with service.

The accused, Mr. Verma, was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the complainant, JB, consented to sexual activity, specifically focusing on her capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant, another witness (Ms. Morriseau), and the accused.

The court found that the complainant was too intoxicated to have the capacity to consent to sexual activity, rejecting the accused's version of events.

While some alleged sexual touchings were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to the complainant's fragmented memory, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused inserted his penis into the complainant's mouth to achieve an erection and engaged in vaginal intercourse, despite her lack of capacity to consent.

The accused was found guilty.

Mr. Williams, convicted of sex trade-related offenses, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of s. 286.1(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7 (security of the person) and 2(b) (freedom of expression) of the Charter.

He contended the provision was overbroad and grossly disproportionate, exacerbating safety risks for sex workers by inhibiting communication.

The Crown argued the provision was constitutional, citing the secondary nature of safety concerns in the PCEPA amendments and the pressing objectives of reducing demand for prostitution.

The court found that s. 286.1(1) did not offend s. 7 but did offend s. 2(b) of the Charter.

However, the court concluded that the infringement of s. 2(b) was saved by section 1 of the Charter, as the objectives were pressing and substantial, the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and the benefits outweighed the harms.

The application was dismissed.

This case involved an undefended trial of the applicant's motion to change a final order and a motion to relocate with the children.

The court found a material change in circumstances, primarily due to the children's increased age, the respondent's employment changes, and his inconsistent exercise of parenting time.

The applicant was granted leave to relocate with the children from Mississauga to Cambridge, retroactively.

The court adjusted the respondent's parenting time and imputed income to him for child support purposes, ordering significant arrears and ongoing monthly support.

The applicant's request for a vesting order against the respondent's home to secure support obligations was denied, as the respondent's conduct was not deemed extreme enough to warrant such an intrusive enforcement mechanism.