James Douglas Foord

The appellant appealed his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon (a pellet gun) contrary to s. 90(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had concluded the pellet gun was a firearm and therefore a weapon.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to first consider whether the pellet gun was a weapon before finding it was a firearm.

Given the evidence that it was a spring-mechanism 'toy pellet gun' and no evidence it was used for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, a finding that it was a weapon was not available.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaching a curfew condition of his recognizance.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based on a police officer's testimony that a jacket found in the appellant's bedroom at 11:30 p.m. was moist and warm, suggesting it had just been worn.

The Court of Appeal held that this evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was outside his residence after his 10:00 p.m. curfew.

The court concluded the verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon contrary to s. 90(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant on the basis that the pellet gun seized was a firearm, and therefore a weapon.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to first consider whether the pellet gun was a weapon before concluding it was a firearm.

Given the evidence that it was a spring-discharged 'toy pellet gun' and the lack of evidence it was used for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, a finding that it was a weapon was not available.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal substituted.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years and four days for sexual touching and three counts of breach of recognizance.

The offences involved touching a young boy over his clothes, committed while the appellant was subject to an order prohibiting him from being alone with children.

The trial judge had considered a medical report indicating a likelihood of future abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that while a significant sentence was necessary for public protection, the total sentence was excessive given the low gravity of the specific offence and the fact that the medical report was not filed as an exhibit.

The court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence for sexual touching from three years to two years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, which arose from an allegedly unsafe lane change in front of a transport truck.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to articulate and apply the modified objective test for dangerous driving and misapprehended central evidence regarding the distance between the vehicles.

Concluding that the evidence could not support a conviction, the Court of Appeal entered an acquittal.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on a repeat drinking and driving offender with a lengthy criminal record.

The trial judge had found exceptional circumstances based on the respondent's remarkable rehabilitative strides and four years of sobriety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision not to incarcerate the respondent, though it clarified that general deterrence applies equally to hardened alcoholics and cautioned against automatically equating residential treatment with pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge erroneously relied on inadmissible hearsay to find that a vehicle was owned by a person known to the appellant.

The Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal agreed, granted leave to appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm against his wife.

At trial, the wife recanted her initial statements to police, testifying that her injuries were caused by an accidental fall.

The trial judge admitted her prior statements to police for their truth under the K.G.B. exception to the hearsay rule, but provided minimal reasons for finding the statements reliable despite the absence of an oath or video recording.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons for admitting the hearsay evidence, particularly given the contradictory evidence regarding the circumstances under which the statements were made.