James Brown

The applicant, an Ontario resident, was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident in Quebec.

She elected to receive benefits under the Quebec no-fault scheme pursuant to s. 57(1)(b) of the SABS.

A dispute arose over whether the hourly rates paid to service providers should be governed by the Ontario or Quebec fee guidelines.

The applicant argued that the rates were procedural and should be governed by Ontario law, while the respondent insurer argued they were substantive and governed by Quebec law.

The Tribunal held that under s. 57(1)(b), the applicant is deemed to be a resident of Quebec for the purpose of calculating benefits, and therefore the Quebec fee guidelines apply.

Following an arbitration decision regarding statutory accident benefits where the applicant achieved a greater degree of success, the applicant sought expenses.

The arbitrator considered the criteria under the Insurance Act and the Dispute Resolution Practice Code, noting the insurer's failure to respond to settlement offers and refusal to engage in settlement discussions.

The arbitrator awarded the applicant expenses fixed at $12,037.37, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The insurer appealed an Arbitrator's decision awarding the insured income replacement benefits and medical benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the Arbitrator failed to apply the 'but for' test for causation, misapprehended evidence, and awarded costs for treatment plans he found unreasonable.

The Director's Delegate dismissed most of the appeal, finding the Arbitrator properly applied the causation test and assessed credibility.

However, the appeal was partially allowed regarding specific treatment plans where the Arbitrator made findings of fact unsupported by evidence.

The insured's cross-appeal for the cost of two surgeries in Florida was dismissed because the treatment plans were not signed by a regulated health professional in Ontario and were submitted after the surgeries had already occurred.

The applicants (Suncor/Auger) brought a motion to compel the third party (EllisDon) to properly answer discovery undertakings related to electronic documents from its "EdgeBuilder System" database.

EllisDon had produced a portable drive containing 37,899 documents but without unique identifiers or sufficient searchability for efficient litigation.

The court found EllisDon failed to meet e-discovery requirements, emphasizing the need for unique identifiers and co-operation in discovery planning as per the Sedona Canada Principles.

The motion was granted, ordering EllisDon to produce a revised, accessible, and searchable version of the portable drive with unique identifiers and to engage in discovery planning.

No costs were awarded due to the parties' mutual failure to engage in discovery planning earlier.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against a general practitioner and a specialist surgeon following complications from bowel surgery that resulted in a severe necrotizing soft tissue infection.

The plaintiffs alleged the specialist failed to follow up on PET scan results and the general practitioner failed to accurately communicate those results.

The court found that while the specialist breached the standard of care by failing to follow up, the plaintiffs failed to establish causation, as the patient's history of seeking alternative treatments and rejecting medical advice indicated he would not have complied with the recommended treatment plan.

The court found the general practitioner met the standard of care.

The action was dismissed.

Aviva appealed an arbitrator's decision that found the claimant was entitled to a medical benefit of $1,822.04 for an occupational therapy assessment.

Aviva argued the arbitrator misinterpreted the Schedule, failed to provide adequate reasons, improperly refused to qualify its doctor as an expert, and made findings of fact without evidence.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator correctly applied the law, provided sufficient reasons, properly exercised discretion in not qualifying the expert, and made factual findings supported by evidence.

Aviva was ordered to pay $7,500 in costs.

The plaintiff was injured when the hood of her parked vehicle collapsed on her while she was refilling the windshield washer fluid.

She sought a declaration that her injuries were sustained in an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The insurer argued that routine maintenance did not constitute the 'use or operation' of a vehicle.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding that checking and topping up fluid levels is an ordinary and well-known activity to which automobiles are put, thereby satisfying the purpose test for SABS coverage.

The applicant, who suffered a catastrophic impairment in a motor vehicle accident, sought reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying his claim for $4,689.81 in travel expenses for a family trip to Disney World.

The applicant argued the expenses were rehabilitation benefits under s. 16 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule as they facilitated his reintegration into his family.

The Executive Chair denied the request for reconsideration, finding that while the trip allowed the applicant to enjoy family relationships, it did not serve a rehabilitative purpose within the meaning of s. 16(3)(l) of the Schedule.

The applicant, who sustained a catastrophic impairment in a motor vehicle accident, sought reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying his claim for $4,689.81 in travel expenses for a family trip to Disney World.

The applicant argued the expenses were rehabilitation benefits under s. 16 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule as they facilitated his reintegration into his family.

The Executive Chair denied the reconsideration request, finding that while the trip allowed the applicant to enjoy family relationships before his condition worsened, it did not serve a rehabilitative purpose within the meaning of s. 16(3)(l) of the Schedule.

The applicant, who was catastrophically impaired in a motor vehicle accident, sought rehabilitation benefits for expenses incurred during a family trip to Florida, arguing it facilitated his reintegration into his family.

The insurer denied the expenses.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal held that the travel expenses did not fall within the scope of rehabilitation benefits under section 16 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, as they were not activities or measures provided by a professional with a treatment goal, nor modifications or devices to accommodate his needs.

The application was dismissed.

Following a motion regarding third and fourth party claims, the court determined costs.

The third party was unsuccessful in dismissing the defendants' third party claim, and the fourth parties were unsuccessful in striking the third party's fourth party claim.

The court found the third party's position regarding the third party claim to be improper and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendants.

Although the fourth parties were unsuccessful, the court awarded them partial costs due to the third party's misleading conduct in issuing the fourth party claim.

The third party was ordered to pay costs to both the defendants and the fourth parties.

The third party brought a motion to either strike the third party claim against it or, alternatively, for leave to continue the fourth party claim against the fourth parties.

The action was originally commenced under the Construction Lien Act, which requires leave to add third or fourth parties.

Leave was not sought when the claims were issued.

The court found that the third party claim was saved by a previous order and acquiescence.

The court granted leave nunc pro tunc to issue the fourth party claim, finding it appropriate as the claim was issued within the limitation period and the action had practically moved to the ordinary track.

A parenting and child support trial concerning a young child whose parents never cohabited and had a history of significant conflict regarding parenting arrangements.

The applicant sought sole custody and a shared parenting schedule, while the respondent sought sole custody with structured access and table child support.

Applying the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the parties lacked the communication and cooperation necessary for joint custody and that the respondent had historically assumed responsibility for the child’s education, health care, and primary decision‑making.

Concerns regarding the applicant’s stability, credibility, residential instability, and ability to ensure school readiness supported limiting overnight access during the school week.

The respondent was granted sole custody with structured access to the applicant and child support based on the Child Support Guidelines.

In a child protection status review proceeding, the child protection agency brought a summary judgment motion seeking custody of the child to the mother, termination of the supervision order, no access to the father, and a restraining order.

The father opposed and sought a trial and placement of the child with him.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, finding ongoing protection concerns regarding the father including domestic violence history, inability to cooperate with the agency, inconsistent access, problematic interactions with the child, and lack of a viable parenting plan.

The court determined that continued access would undermine the child's stability with the mother and was not in the child’s best interests.

Custody was granted to the mother with no access to the father and a restraining order issued.

In a family law motion, the responding parent sought leave under Rule 11(3) of the Family Law Rules to amend pleadings at the last minute to add a claim for retroactive child support of approximately $19,700.

The amendment was sought after extensive litigation steps, including conferences and preparation for a scheduled motion addressing parenting and support issues.

The court held that the proposed amendment would disadvantage the other party and that the prejudice could not be adequately remedied through costs or an adjournment, particularly given the delay and the impact on pending parenting issues involving children.

The court emphasized the importance of diligent litigation conduct and timely case management in family proceedings.

Leave to amend the pleadings was refused.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement reflected in minutes of settlement.

They argued that a term requiring execution of a release satisfactory to all parties made the settlement conditional, ambiguous, and unenforceable.

The court rejected those submissions, holding that the motion judge found the parties had agreed to the form of release and that finding was not challenged.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondents.

The accused pleaded guilty to nine charges spanning multiple offences including assaults on her children and niece, assault causing bodily harm to an intimate partner, robbery, breach of bail conditions, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused had been in custody for approximately 292 days prior to sentencing.

The court imposed a global sentence of 17 months imprisonment concurrent with 13 months for assault causing bodily harm, with additional concurrent sentences for lesser offences, followed by 24 months probation with strict conditions.

The court applied Gladue principles in moderating the sentence while maintaining denunciation and deterrence.

The insured claimed catastrophic impairment benefits following a motor vehicle accident, relying on a positive Designated Assessment Centre (CAT DAC) finding.

The insurer denied the benefits and sought to challenge the CAT DAC finding in the dispute resolution process.

The arbitrator ruled that the insurer was precluded from doing so, finding that the Court of Appeal's comments in Fernandes regarding remedies at the Commission were obiter.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate rescinded the arbitrator's order, holding that Fernandes is binding and establishes that insurers may challenge a CAT DAC finding within the dispute resolution system.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and determined to have suffered a catastrophic impairment by a Designated Assessment Centre (CAT DAC).

The insurer refused payment of supplemental benefits and sought to challenge the CAT DAC determination as a defence in the arbitration.

The arbitrator held that the insurer is precluded from collaterally attacking the catastrophic determination made by the CAT DAC, as the dispute resolution scheme under the Insurance Act forms a complete code.

The insurer may only challenge the appropriateness of specific benefits claimed as a result of the catastrophic designation.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for enhanced statutory accident benefits, claiming a catastrophic impairment based on Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) scores of 9 or less.

The insurer disputed the scores, relying on a neurologist's opinion that the first responders erred in their assessments because the applicant was combative.

The arbitrator rejected the neurologist's theoretical opinion, preferring the contemporaneous assessments of the trained paramedics and emergency room staff.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant suffered a catastrophic impairment.