Ian William Bulmer

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and uttering death threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of two witnesses used to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding the fresh evidence would not have affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's findings of credibility regarding himself, his wife, and the grandmother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his designation as a long-term offender, arguing that the predicate offence of obstructing justice could not constitute a 'serious personal injury offence' under section 752 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had sent a threatening letter to a former partner while on bail, leading to convictions for criminal harassment and obstructing justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that obstructing justice meets the definition of a serious personal injury offence because it carries a maximum sentence of ten years or more and, on the facts of this case, the conduct inflicted or was likely to inflict severe psychological damage on the recipient.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a dangerous offender application against the respondent, who pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences against children and child pornography charges.

The trial judge had dismissed the application, holding that the predicate offences were not sufficiently serious to meet the threshold for a dangerous or long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by imposing a seriousness threshold on the circumstances of the predicate offences.

Applying the correct legal framework to the trial judge's factual findings, the Court of Appeal designated the respondent a long-term offender and varied his sentence to time served followed by eight years of community supervision.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a young female and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on previous disclosure and by admitting alleged oath-helping evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lack of a limiting instruction benefited the appellant by not diluting his defence of recent fabrication, and the oath-helping evidence was inconsequential.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the term was within the proper range.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after a trial by jury.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offence of manslaughter and in his instructions on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that intent was a live issue requiring a manslaughter instruction, and that the self-defence instruction improperly reversed the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for historical sexual offences on the basis that the trial judge twice instructed the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt could arise from a lack of evidence.

The court held that this formulation was erroneous under the corrected Supreme Court direction in Lifchus and, in the circumstances, could have misled the jury.

The error was particularly significant because the jury requested a recharge on reasonable doubt, then requested a readback of the complainant's evidence about one incident, and returned verdicts shortly thereafter.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought to withdraw a guilty plea to welfare fraud over $5,000 on the basis that it was not voluntary.

The court held that the plea was entered after significant pressure arising from a pending obstruct justice charge, the prospect of immediate arrest and custody, and comments made by the presiding judge to an emotionally distraught accused caring for an infant.

Applying the governing law on the voluntariness of guilty pleas, the court concluded the plea was not made voluntarily and unequivocally.

The conviction and sentence were set aside and a trial was ordered.