H.S. Arrell

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role as a secondary participant in a fatal shooting.

The Crown sought 16-18 years, while the defence sought 13-14 years.

The court determined the appropriate sentence was 15 years.

The court awarded 10 years of standard pre-sentence credit (1.5 to 1) plus an additional 6 months of enhanced credit due to harsh pre-trial custody conditions, including frequent lockdowns and COVID-19 impacts, leaving 4.5 years to be served.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder after fatally stabbing an unarmed victim in the chest with a combat knife outside a nightclub.

The Crown sought 14 years of parole ineligibility, while amicus for the self-represented offender sought the minimum 10 years, which was also recommended by the majority of the jury.

The court considered the offender's minimal criminal record, positive employment history, and expressions of remorse, balancing these against the gravity of bringing a hidden combat knife to a social gathering.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at the minimum 10 years.

The applicant was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury.

Following the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan regarding the prospective application of the abolition of peremptory challenges, the applicant brought a motion for a mistrial, arguing the jury was improperly constituted.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, holding that it was functus officio as the jury had already rendered its verdict and been discharged.

The court concluded that the case did not fall into the recognized exceptions allowing post-verdict changes, and the applicant's proper remedy was to appeal.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for the production of emails protected by solicitor-client privilege, the parties submitted written arguments on costs.

The defendant sought $16,190 on an actual indemnity basis, noting an unaccepted offer to settle the motion for $5,775.

The court applied the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, awarding the successful defendant $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Scopelliti application to adduce evidence of the deceased's reputation for violence and habit of keeping a hatchet.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the evidence was unreliable and speculative.

The court reviewed the proposed evidence from five witnesses, the deceased's criminal record, and two police occurrence reports.

Applying the test for relevancy, the court admitted the majority of the evidence, finding it probative of the deceased's aggressive temperament and relevant to the accused's anticipated claims of self-defence and provocation, while excluding certain hearsay and highly dated reports.

The Crown brought an application to admit utterances made by the deceased shortly before his death as exceptions to the hearsay rule.

The deceased, who had been severely stabbed, uttered words including 'gun' and 'cousin' to first responders and on a 911 call.

The court found that the deceased had a settled and hopeless expectation of death given the severity of his injuries, satisfying the test for a dying declaration.

Alternatively, the court held the utterances were admissible as spontaneous statements made under the stress of a dramatic event, with no possibility of concoction.

The evidence was ruled admissible.

The applicant's lawyer brought an emergency ex parte application to enjoin a hospital from withdrawing life support from a patient.

The court initially granted the order but rescinded it the next day after the hospital and treating physician provided evidence that the patient was brain dead and the family had consented to withdrawing support.

The hospital and physician sought costs personally against the applicant's lawyer.

The court found the lawyer brought the application without instructions, submitted misleading material, and caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily.

The court ordered the lawyer to personally pay $15,000 in costs to the respondents.

The parties settled a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident six days before trial for $775,000 plus costs.

The plaintiff sought partial and substantial indemnity costs totalling approximately $246,000 in fees and $157,500 in disbursements.

The defendant argued the amounts were excessive.

The court reviewed the claimed fees and disbursements, noting some duplication and excessive preparation time.

Applying the principle of reasonableness, the court fixed the plaintiff's fees at $170,000 plus HST and disbursements at $98,800 inclusive of HST.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiffs' claims against three individual defendants for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and to strike the entire claim as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs claimed over $3.8 million in damages arising from a 70-day delay in refinancing their mortgage, alleging the defendants fraudulently registered a charge on their property after a bankruptcy proposal.

The court dismissed the majority of the motion, finding that the pleadings sufficiently alleged personal liability for fraud and negligence against the individual defendants.

However, the court struck redundant claims under the Business Practises Act and cautioned the plaintiffs about the high threshold for proving fraud and the risk of costs.

The defendants previously brought an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' $27 million defamation action regarding a publication about contraband tobacco.

The plaintiffs, as the successful responding parties, sought costs for the motion.

The court considered the presumption under section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which states that a successful responding party is not entitled to costs unless appropriate in the circumstances.

Finding that the motion was not frivolous, involved matters of public interest, and lacked inappropriate behaviour by the defendants, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption.

No costs were awarded.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' $27 million defamation action as a SLAPP suit.

The plaintiffs, who own a large tobacco manufacturing company, sued over a magazine publication alleging they smuggled contraband tobacco and were associated with organized crime.

The court found the publication related to a matter of public interest but concluded the plaintiffs' claim had substantial merit and the defendants failed to establish valid defences of justification, responsible communication, qualified privilege, or fair comment.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The Crown brought an application to determine the voluntariness of a video-recorded statement given by the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder.

The defence conceded that earlier statements made during a 911 call and to transporting officers were voluntary, but argued the video statement was obtained through oppression and an improper promise of psychiatric help.

The court applied the confessions rule from Oickle and found that the accused had an operating mind, understood his rights, and was not subjected to utterly intolerable conditions or inducements.

The court concluded the statement was voluntary and ruled it admissible.

The accused was charged with second degree murder following the shooting death of his wife in their home.

The accused claimed that unknown female intruders broke in, pistol-whipped him, and shot his wife.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue on the accused's hands, his DNA on the murder weapon and ammunition, and the lack of physical evidence supporting a home invasion or struggle.

The court rejected the accused's exculpatory statements as unbelievable and found the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused shot his wife.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The applicant retailer sought a temporary stay of a six‑month prohibition order issued under the Smoke Free Ontario Act preventing the sale of tobacco products following two convictions for selling tobacco to minors.

The motion was brought pending appeals and an intended judicial review raising issues of procedural fairness, constitutional validity, and Charter rights.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test for interlocutory relief, the court held that no serious issue to be tried was established because the prohibition was mandatory once two convictions occurred and involved no discretionary decision subject to review.

The court further found that the alleged financial losses were purely monetary and did not constitute irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the public interest in protecting minors from tobacco access.