Harriet E. Sachs

The appellant sought to appeal a decision dismissing her claim against multiple respondents as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.01(3), considered dismissing the appeal on the same grounds.

The appellant's claim was for an amount exceeding the Divisional Court's jurisdiction, and she had been advised of this lack of jurisdiction but continued to pursue the appeal in the wrong forum.

The court found the appeal to be an abuse of process and dismissed it without an order as to costs.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review regarding his employment with the Ontario Provincial Police.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as an abuse of process, finding that the applicant was attempting to resurrect claims that had been fully resolved by a prior Memorandum of Settlement.

The settlement included a comprehensive release and a complete bar to any further proceedings, including judicial review.

The appellant employee was placed on a temporary unpaid layoff and later claimed constructive dismissal.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the employer, finding the employee had acquiesced to the layoff.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the order, holding that the motion judge erred in law by finding acquiescence without first analyzing the terms of the employment contract to determine if the employer had the right to lay off the employee, as required by the Supreme Court's two-step test in Potter.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary a final child support order.

He argued he had ineffective legal representation, that his adult daughter was no longer a child of the marriage, and that his medical condition prevented him from working.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of ineffective counsel, no palpable and overriding error in the finding that the daughter remained dependent while completing high school courses, and that the appellant had failed to provide sufficient medical evidence of his inability to work despite prior court orders.

The Law Society appealed a decision of the Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal ordering a new hearing and disclosure of files belonging to other lawyers involved in the real estate transactions at issue.

The Law Society argued that s. 49.12 of the Law Society Act prohibited disclosure, the files were irrelevant, and the respondent should have used an O'Connor application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 49.12 is a confidentiality provision with an exception for conduct proceedings, not a statutory privilege.

The court held that the files were potentially relevant under the Stinchcombe disclosure regime and that the Law Society's investigating and prosecuting arms are not separate entities for disclosure purposes.

The Law Society appealed a decision of the Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal ordering a new hearing due to a lack of disclosure.

The respondent lawyer, facing professional misconduct allegations related to real estate fraud, sought disclosure of the files of other lawyers involved in the transactions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 49.12 of the Law Society Act does not create a statutory privilege barring disclosure, but rather a confidentiality rule with exceptions for conduct proceedings.

The Court affirmed that the Stinchcombe disclosure regime applies, requiring the Law Society to disclose potentially relevant material from other lawyers' files, subject to resolving any solicitor-client privilege claims.

The Regional Municipality of Halton appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision that overturned its new development charges by-law.

The new by-law eliminated distinctions between unit sizes, which the Board found resulted in smaller units unfairly subsidizing larger ones.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board reasonably applied the Development Charges Act and had sufficient evidence to find cross-subsidization.

The Board's decision to reinstate the former by-law's categories was a reasonable exercise of its remedial authority.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory order made at a Small Claims Court settlement conference in a medical negligence action.

The order required the applicant to produce expert reports and directed third-party hospitals and doctors to produce the applicant's medical records.

The Divisional Court held that the Small Claims Court judge had jurisdiction to order the production of expert reports under the Rules of the Small Claims Court.

However, the court concluded that the Small Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to order third-party production of documents.

The application was allowed in part, and the third-party production order was set aside.

The respondent subcontractor obtained default judgment against the general contractor for unpaid work and subsequently sued the appellant owners for breach of statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against the owners and their directors.

On appeal, the respondent conceded the motion judge erred in finding a subcontractor could be a beneficiary of the owner's trust under s. 7(1).

The respondent alternatively argued the owners were liable under s. 13 for having 'effective control' of the general contractor by paying its invoices.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, holding that merely paying invoices does not constitute effective control of a corporation's relevant activities.

The appeal was allowed and the claim against the owners dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel regarding a costs award made by a Hearing Panel that had recused itself.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court dismissed most of the appellant's arguments, finding the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded that both parties were at fault for failing to raise a conflict of interest issue earlier, and that success was divided on a bias motion.

However, the Court reduced the costs awarded to the Law Society for a motion to exclude evidence by 50%, as the parties agreed the motion took less time than the Appeal Panel had estimated.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board review order requiring them to pay the respondent tenant $9,439.13 for a bad faith eviction.

The appellants argued the Board failed to articulate the legal test for bad faith and lacked an evidentiary record.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion of bad faith was a factual finding or a finding of mixed fact and law, which is not reviewable under section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, as appeals are restricted to questions of law.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his appeal of a Master's order that had stayed his action pending payment of numerous outstanding costs orders.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the moving party failed to meet the strict two-part test under Rule 62.02(4).

Specifically, there was no conflicting decision of another judge or court, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and the proposed appeal did not involve matters of such importance that leave should be granted.

The defendant/moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion for costs.

The motion judge had found that the costs issue was already determined by a prior Master's decision, which was upheld on appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the moving party failed to meet the test under Rule 62.02(4) as there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, no conflicting decisions, and the issues did not extend beyond the immediate parties.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy, which permits Aboriginal people to hunt and fish for food, social, and ceremonial purposes, within the 1923 Williams Treaties boundaries.

The Minister brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application of the policy was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is immune from judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The court also held that the policy did not violate the applicants' equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, as it constituted an ameliorative program under section 15(2).

The landlord and tenant, who are siblings, entered into a residential tenancy agreement that granted the tenant the right to occupy the basement for her lifetime.

The landlord applied to terminate the tenancy for his daughter's use.

The Landlord and Tenant Board granted the application, finding the life tenancy provision illogical and contrary to the Residential Tenancies Act.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable.

The Court held that the parties clearly intended a life tenancy, and such an agreement does not violate the Act, as the landlord's statutory termination rights can still be exercised upon the tenant's death.

The appeal was allowed.

The applicant, a tenant of the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), sought judicial review of a decision removing his rent-geared-to-income subsidy.

The subsidy was removed after the applicant failed to provide requested corporate financial information and bank statements for his legal professional corporation.

The applicant argued that the TCHC breached procedural fairness and failed to accommodate his disabilities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the TCHC provided ample opportunity to comply, the process was fair, and there was no evidence that the applicant's disabilities prevented him from providing the required documentation.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an arbitration award between CUPE Local 27 and the Greater Essex County District School Board, arguing the arbitrator erred in interpreting s. 177 of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for the reasons given in a related Stated Case (2016 ONSC 2361), finding the result was the same regardless of whether the standard of review was correctness or reasonableness.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to CUPE Local 27.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

The appellant brought two appeals from the Landlord and Tenant Board and one application for judicial review regarding a Human Rights Tribunal decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals, which raised no questions of law, and lacked jurisdiction to award damages on a judicial review application.

All three proceedings were dismissed.

The Applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Appeals Committee of the Real Estate Council of Ontario, which held that its jurisdiction to award costs under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 was limited by section 17.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court determined that the applicable standard of review was reasonableness, as the Tribunal was interpreting its home statute and a closely connected statute.

The Court found the Tribunal's interpretation reasonable, concluding that because REBBA was enacted after February 14, 2000, and does not expressly state that it prevails over the SPPA, the SPPA's costs restrictions apply.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.