Gregory W. Bowden

An interpleader motion sought a declaration that a property transferred into the son’s name was held in trust for the mother and therefore not exigible by the son’s judgment creditors.

The responding bank argued the declaration of trust lacked evidentiary support and questioned its authenticity.

The court found the record contained deficiencies but also some evidence suggesting a possible trust, raising credibility issues unsuitable for determination on the motion record.

As a result, the motion for declaratory relief was dismissed and a trial of an issue was directed to determine beneficial ownership and the priority of competing writs of execution.

The plaintiff bank brought a Rule 20 motion for summary judgment against a borrower and guarantor for outstanding balances on several credit facilities, including personal and business loans.

The responding party admitted liability for certain personal loans but asserted that she had resigned as director of the borrowing company and had notified the bank that she would no longer be responsible for corporate debts.

She argued the bank accepted this notice and was estopped from enforcing the loans.

The court found significant conflicting evidence regarding whether notice was provided, whether the bank accepted any release of liability, and the meaning of various correspondence and alleged discussions between the parties.

Because credibility issues and material facts were in dispute, the court held that a full appreciation of the evidence required viva voce testimony and could not be achieved on a summary judgment motion.

A defendant sought costs following the discontinuance of an action commenced in a different county that duplicated relief already pursued in an existing representative proceeding.

The court considered Rule 23.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the “justified action test” applicable to discontinued actions.

It held the plaintiff had no justification for commencing the second action because it duplicated claims already being advanced in an ongoing Toronto proceeding.

The court characterized the conduct as violating the rule against multiplicity of proceedings and as litigation behaviour warranting sanction.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendant despite the absence of formal service of the statement of claim.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment holding him personally liable for a $24,824.50 balance on a corporate credit card.

He argued that the absence of a signed credit card agreement precluded personal liability, and that the trial judge erred by allowing the respondent to reopen its case to call him as a witness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that circumstantial evidence of the appellant activating and using the card was sufficient to establish liability under the terms of the agreement.

The court also held that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in allowing the respondent to reopen its case and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

In a supplementary endorsement, the Court of Appeal clarified its previous decision which allowed the appellant's appeal from a trial judge's decision to grant a non-suit in a slander action.

The Court explicitly ordered a new trial before a new jury, noting that this was implicit in its original reasons but was being stated to remove any doubt.

The applicants sought a representation order under Rule 10.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure permitting them to represent 416 claimants who had used payroll processing services and alleged that trust funds were misapplied by a bank.

The underlying dispute concerned funds withdrawn from employers’ accounts for payroll and tax remittances that were deposited into mixed trust accounts and partially applied to reduce the payroll processor’s indebtedness to the bank or transferred to a related entity.

The bank opposed the representation order, arguing that two separate transactions created distinct issues among claimants.

The court held that common issues existed because liability for the alleged breaches of trust would affect all claimants collectively and distribution of any recovery would be shared.

A representation order was granted and a related unopposed motion concerning distribution of funds held by a government agency was also authorized.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision to grant the respondents' motion for non-suit and dismiss his action for slander.

The trial judge had concluded that the words allegedly uttered by the bank's employees were not reasonably capable of carrying a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by withdrawing the case from the jury, as the statements were reasonably capable of implying that the appellant was attempting to access his mother's funds fraudulently.

The appeal was allowed with costs.

The applicant bank paid funds into court following the demise of a payroll processing company.

The company had mistakenly overpaid the Canada Revenue Agency, leading to a shortfall in its mixed trust accounts.

The court had to determine whether the remaining interpleaded funds should be distributed to claimants on a pro rata basis or by tracing specific funds to specific claimants.

The court held that the funds were held in a mixed trust account and, applying the pari passu ex post facto pro rata approach, ordered the funds to be distributed pro rata among all claimants.

The court provided directions in an interpleader proceeding concerning funds paid into court following the cessation of payroll services operations by a corporate respondent.

Approximately $2.39 million held in a payroll account had been paid into court, and an advisor was appointed to administer claims by numerous clients asserting entitlement to the funds.

The advisor reported that a portion of the fund could be traced to specific claimants while the remainder was co‑mingled and proposed a distribution allocating traceable funds to identified clients and the balance pro rata.

The court directed further reporting, service of materials to claimants, and procedures for claimants to file notices of appearance and submissions regarding the proposed distribution.

A further hearing was scheduled to determine whether the proposed distribution or an alternative should be approved.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision granting a non-suit motion and dismissing his slander action.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Because the appellant failed to set out the amount of his claim in the statement of claim as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court could not determine if the claim fell within its $50,000 monetary jurisdiction.

Consequently, the court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that she signed a $50,000 guarantee in favour of the respondent bank.

The appellant argued that her signature was forged by her common-law husband in collusion with bank employees, and alleged transcript deficiencies, a missing exhibit, and trial judge bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the appellant's allegations and concluding that the trial judge's finding was supported by the evidence, including expert testimony.

The plaintiff bank demanded payment of an outstanding loan and obtained an ex parte order under Rule 20.01(2) to serve a summary judgment motion with its statement of claim.

The defendants sought an adjournment, which the Master refused, granting summary judgment.

On appeal, the defendants argued that Rule 20.01(1) precludes hearing a summary judgment motion before a statement of defence is filed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 20.01(2) allows for an accelerated return of the motion where special urgency is shown, requiring the defendant to expeditiously file a defence and respond.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the counterclaim was in substance an action for damages for being sued and therefore did not disclose a valid cause of action.