Gregory W. Bowden

The plaintiff judgment creditor brought a motion for an order for the judicial sale of the self-represented defendant judgment debtor's property under Rule 54.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant, a former lawyer with experience in mortgage enforcement, consented to the motion, agreeing that a judicial sale yields a better financial outcome and provides a cleaner process than a sheriff's auction.

The court granted the motion on consent, ordering a reference for a judicial sale and fixing costs at $500.

The applicant bank sought to enforce a default judgment by applying for a reference and judicial sale of the respondent's real property under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than proceeding with a standard sheriff's sale under the Execution Act.

The applicant argued that judicial sales are generally superior and more cost-effective, relying on an affidavit from its counsel's partner.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming its previous decision in Wong that a sheriff's sale is the statutorily prescribed method for enforcing a writ of seizure and sale against real property, and a judicial sale should only be ordered in special circumstances, which were not present here.

Following a motion regarding undertakings and refusals where the RBC defendants were largely successful, they sought substantial indemnity costs of $10,350 due to the plaintiff's uncooperative conduct and delays.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the conduct did not reach the required threshold of abusive or reprehensible behaviour.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed at $7,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the plaintiff.

In an action for malicious prosecution and negligence arising from fraud charges, the RBC defendants sought an order requiring the plaintiff's estate trustee to reattend personally to answer questions previously refused on discovery.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the defendants improperly contacted the court and that written answers would suffice.

The court found the defendants' communication was proper and ordered the estate trustee to reattend at his own expense, as follow-up questions would be necessary and a personal attendance would be more efficient than written answers.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery in an action for malicious prosecution and negligence arising from a failed business loan application and subsequent fraud charges.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer questions regarding the estate trustee's previous business dealings, prior fraud conviction, and the factual basis for the malicious prosecution claim.

The court also ordered the defendants to answer specific questions regarding the information provided to the RCMP, while upholding refusals for questions that were argumentative, irrelevant, or already answered.

The defendants were largely successful on the motion.

The Royal Bank of Canada sought to set aside a property transfer from the defendant debtor to his wife as a fraudulent conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and Assignments and Preferences Act.

The defendants were noted in default, deeming the factual allegations of fraudulent intent admitted.

The court found the transfer suspicious due to its timing (after the plaintiff's claim was served) and the close relationship between the transferor and transferee, consistent with "badges of fraud." The court declared the conveyance null and void, restoring joint title, but declined to award additional damages due to lack of specific proof.

The plaintiff alleged it was defrauded into depositing funds into a TD Bank account and commenced an action against the bank and a 'John Doe' defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order requiring the bank to disclose the identity of the account holder to advance the litigation.

The court granted the motion, finding that the disclosure was in the interests of justice and could be ordered by analogy to the discovery rules under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the sale of a vending machine business.

The plaintiff had obtained an order for substituted service but failed to serve the complete statement of claim on the defendant.

Despite the defendant notifying the plaintiff's counsel of the incomplete service and requesting the full claim to file a defence, the plaintiff's counsel proceeded to note the defendant in default and obtained a default judgment.

The court applied the five-part test from Mountain View Farms and found that the motion was brought promptly, there was a plausible excuse for the default, the defendant had an arguable defence on the merits, the balance of prejudice favoured the defendant, and upholding the judgment would negatively affect the integrity of the administration of justice.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was granted.

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendants following a default on a car loan agreement.

The plaintiff sought an order directing a reference to determine issues relating to the judicial sale of the defendants' property, rather than proceeding with a sheriff's sale.

The defendants opposed the motion, seeking an adjournment and a stay of the judgment, but had not moved to set aside the default judgment.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for a reference, finding a judicial sale advantageous, but stayed enforcement for 60 days to allow the defendants a final opportunity to move to set aside the default judgment.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's litigation guardian, arguing he was in a conflict of interest as an unsatisfied judgment creditor of the plaintiff.

The court found that the litigation guardian lacked the required indifference to the outcome of the litigation due to his status as a judgment creditor.

The motion was granted, the litigation guardian was removed, and the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed in his place.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) brought a motion to remove Murray Maltz as counsel for the defendants Bouzios and Nikolaidis, alleging that Maltz would be a necessary witness at trial due to funds from alleged frauds passing through his trust account.

RBC sought Maltz's evidence to trace the funds.

The court applied the test for removing counsel who may be a witness, considering factors such as the stage of proceedings, likelihood of the lawyer being called, good faith of the moving party, significance of evidence, and impact on choice of counsel.

The court found that the information sought could likely be obtained through documentary disclosure and examinations for discovery, making Maltz's testimony at trial not necessarily required.

The motion was dismissed as premature, upholding the defendants' right to chosen counsel.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought partial summary judgment against Yorktown Motors and Nisan Paranthaman.

RBC had financed Paranthaman's purchase of a Mercedes-Benz from Yorktown, which was later discovered to be "re-VINned" and potentially stolen.

RBC's claim against Paranthaman was to be dismissed, but it sought judgment against Yorktown based on the Loan Program Dealer Agreement (LPDA), arguing Yorktown breached representations and warranties, making it liable regardless of fault.

Yorktown disputed RBC's interpretation of the LPDA and argued that granting partial summary judgment would be inappropriate given the ongoing multi-party litigation involving crossclaims and third-party claims against other auto dealers, an individual, and the Crown, which could lead to inconsistent findings.

The court dismissed RBC's motion for summary judgment, finding it premature due to insufficient evidence establishing the vehicle was stolen and the significant risk of inconsistent factual findings at a subsequent trial.

The appellant finance company appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent repair shop $15,594 for unjust enrichment.

The respondent had repaired a vehicle financed by the appellant but lost its statutory lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act (RSLA) after failing to commence an action within the prescribed 90-day period.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the RSLA does not constitute a complete code of remedies and that the loss of a statutory lien does not preclude a repairer from pursuing an equitable claim for unjust enrichment.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced a proceeding seeking over $170 million in damages against the defendants.

The court dismissed the proceeding in writing pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the 19-page pleading was void of any known cause of action, sought relief outside the court's jurisdiction, and was laced with conjecture and speculation, rendering it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced an action seeking over $1.5 billion in damages against the defendants.

The court dismissed the proceeding in writing pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the 17-page pleading was void of any known cause of action, sought relief outside the court's jurisdiction, and was laced with conjecture and speculation, rendering it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant brought a motion to perfect its appeal from a Small Claims Court decision without filing a certificate of judgment, to extend the time to perfect, and to file an amended notice of appeal.

The appellant argued that a certificate of judgment was required under Rule 61.10(1)(c) but was difficult to obtain.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the signed reasons for decision were sufficient to perfect the appeal, and allowed the amended notice of appeal.

No costs were awarded as the appellant could have been more diligent in obtaining the certificate or seeking advice from the Registrar.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant auto collision company for the value of a financed truck.

The individual defendant had financed the truck through the plaintiff but gave it to the corporate defendant to convert into a tow truck and use in its fleet.

The corporate defendant claimed a lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act for conversion, repair, and storage costs, and subsequently transferred ownership to itself.

The court found the corporate defendant failed to comply with the Act, had no valid lien, and wrongfully converted the vehicle, awarding the plaintiff damages based on the truck's appraised value.

The plaintiff, Nissan Canada Finance, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for amounts outstanding on a vehicle lease.

The defendants leased a vehicle which immediately went into arrears and was later involved in an accident and sold at auction.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues for trial, including the amount owing, whether the plaintiff had to pursue insurance, and the vehicle's sale price.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, as the amounts were readily ascertainable from the contract and the plaintiff had no obligation to pursue the defendants' insurer.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

Following a trial, the successful plaintiff sought costs.

The parties had agreed at trial that $23,000 on a partial indemnity basis would be paid to the successful party.

The court found no need for reaffirmation of the agreement and, applying the factors in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Boucher, awarded the agreed-upon amount of $23,000 to the plaintiff.

On a written Rule 2.1 review, the court dismissed an action arising from power of sale proceedings, the subsequent sale of a property, and allegations that multiple defendants colluded to deprive the plaintiff of property and belongings.

The court held the plaintiff lacked standing because the property had been owned by a dissolved corporation, found no pleaded cause of action against the various defendants, and accepted that the claims were also abuse of process and statute-barred on their face.

The court further relied on overlap with an earlier Brampton action concerning the same underlying property dispute.

The entire action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.