Gregory James Elder

The accused, I.F.L., was charged with sexual assault on his wife.

The complainant testified that the accused, while intoxicated, sexually assaulted her in their guest room, an incident corroborated by her mother.

The defence argued fabrication due to ongoing family law disputes and highlighted inconsistencies and a 13-month delay in reporting.

The court applied the R. v. W.D. framework for credibility, finding the accused's testimony not credible or truthful, and accepting the complainant's and her mother's evidence as credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies and the delayed report.

The court found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a finding of guilt.

The defence objected to a Crown question during cross-examination concerning text messages between the complainant and the accused, arguing non-disclosure, prior Crown indication not to adduce the texts, and case splitting.

The Crown contended the texts were known to the defence and became relevant to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication after the accused's testimony.

The court ruled that the Crown had not split its case, as the evidence was not admissible in chief but became relevant to address the specific nature of the defence, which was an outright denial.

The defence's objection was dismissed, allowing the Crown to question the accused about the text messages.

The young person, C.Z., pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing two deaths and one bodily harm.

The court considered the principles of youth sentencing under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, including the young person's diminished moral blameworthiness, high degree of responsibility, and numerous mitigating factors such as excellent prospects and genuine remorse.

The court determined that a non-custodial sentence would not meet the purposes and principles of youth sentencing, particularly the need for denunciation and meaningful consequences proportionate to the grave harm caused.

A custodial sentence was deemed necessary.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The accused brought a multi-pronged Charter application seeking the exclusion of statements, medical records, blood samples, and other evidence, alleging violations of his ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the accused's ss. 10(a) and 10(b) rights were briefly violated during the initial detention prior to his arrest, and that his s. 10(b) rights were later violated when police failed to pass on a lawyer's contact information provided by his family.

However, the court held that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, and that the search warrants and production order for his blood samples and medical records were validly issued.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence obtained during the brief period between the initial detention and the arrest, but admitted the balance of the evidence, finding that its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant argued that a period of delay caused by missing video disclosure should not have been attributed to the defence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not reviewing the disclosure until the eve of trial.

The appeal was dismissed as the net delay fell well within the Jordan ceiling.

Mr. Yi Shuai Yang applied for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay of almost 27 months for an "80 plus" charge.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating a net delay of 793 days (26 months).

It found the COVID-19 public health crisis to be a discrete exceptional circumstance, deducting 295 days of delay attributable to it.

This reduced the remaining delay to 498 days (16.5 months), which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

Although the applicant took meaningful steps to expedite, the court found the case did not take "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have given the circumstances.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied, and the trial dates were confirmed.

The accused, Hamidkhan Pathan, was charged with impaired operation and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He conceded impairment and BAC but denied operating the vehicle.

The court assessed the credibility of the Crown's witnesses (a 911 caller and a police officer) and found them credible and reliable.

The accused's testimony was rejected due to intoxication, inconsistencies with external evidence, and illogical claims.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the vehicle as alleged, leading to a conviction.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, impaired operation, and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL following a high-speed chase through residential areas.

The defence brought Charter applications challenging the admissibility of breath test evidence on grounds of violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found a breach of section 8 (right to privacy) regarding cell toilet surveillance and excluded the breath test evidence pursuant to section 24(2).

However, the court convicted the accused on the dangerous operation and impaired operation charges based on the totality of the evidence, including observations of the accused's driving and physical condition.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and robbery, sought a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court agreed that the pandemic was a material change, granting jurisdiction to review the detention order.

However, the court found that the applicant's detention remained necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Despite a strict proposed release plan involving house arrest and electronic monitoring, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the applicant would commit further offences and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences.

The applicant appealed the revocation of his firearms license following his guilty plea to possession of child pornography.

The Area Firearms Officer revoked the license based on the applicant's conviction, his admission of a long-standing sexual interest in children that he could not control, and public safety concerns reflected in the sentencing court's imposition of custody, probation, and a section 161 order with extensive restrictions.

The applicant argued that the revocation was based on an automatic policy rather than individualized assessment and that he had been a responsible firearms owner in full compliance with all regulations.

The court upheld the revocation, finding that the AFO conducted an individualized assessment applying the proper criteria under the Firearms Act and that the decision was objectively reasonable.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol following a collision investigation in the early morning hours of December 20, 2017.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer breath test results, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10.

The trial judge found that the defendant's section 10(b) rights to counsel were breached because the arresting officer failed to provide the rights to counsel in a language the defendant could understand, particularly the right to counsel of choice.

Although the defendant had some English proficiency, he clearly experienced significant difficulty understanding the informational component of his rights.

The officer was aware of the language barrier but did not take adequate steps to address it, such as using available translation services.

The trial judge noted the contrast with the breath technician, who proactively arranged for interpretation services.

The trial judge also found it significant that the defendant twice requested to speak to his brother, which the officers did not follow up on, potentially indicating an attempt to exercise his right to counsel.

Applying the test from R. v. Grant, the trial judge excluded the breath test results and the defendant's utterances to the breath technician, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit following a traffic stop.

The defence raised multiple Charter breaches including: failure to make an ASD demand "forthwith" failure to administer the ASD test before the accused could obtain legal advice, lack of reasonable grounds for the approved instrument demand due to failure to note the ASD calibration date, privacy breach through cell video surveillance, overholding after testing, and inadequate right to counsel advice.

The court rejected all alleged breaches and found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

Charles Chun appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing a breach of his s. 10(a) Charter rights and an error by the trial judge in declining to exclude evidence under s. 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a standard of deference to the trial judge's factual findings and s. 24(2) analysis, found that the trial judge's characterization of the events leading to the breath demand was reasonable.

Despite a s. 10(a) Charter breach, the trial judge's application of the Grant analysis was upheld, concluding that the breach was not trivial, but police acted in good faith and the impact on the appellant's interests was minimal.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction.

The defendant was stopped for speeding and subsequently investigated for drinking and driving.

He failed a roadside screening test and later provided breath samples over the legal limit.

At trial, the defendant sought to exclude the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) rights due to a delay in administering the roadside test and police allegedly steering him to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding no breaches, and entered a finding of guilt for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol and dangerous driving following a single-vehicle collision in a rural area on September 17, 2017.

The Crown sought acquittal on the dangerous driving charge due to insufficient evidence regarding how the vehicle entered the ditch.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant was operating the vehicle between 01:30 and 03:00 on September 17, 2017, while having a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The dangerous driving charge was dismissed.