Gregory James Elder

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant argued that a period of delay caused by missing video disclosure should not have been attributed to the defence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not reviewing the disclosure until the eve of trial.

The appeal was dismissed as the net delay fell well within the Jordan ceiling.

Mr. Yi Shuai Yang applied for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay of almost 27 months for an "80 plus" charge.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating a net delay of 793 days (26 months).

It found the COVID-19 public health crisis to be a discrete exceptional circumstance, deducting 295 days of delay attributable to it.

This reduced the remaining delay to 498 days (16.5 months), which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

Although the applicant took meaningful steps to expedite, the court found the case did not take "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have given the circumstances.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied, and the trial dates were confirmed.

The accused, Hamidkhan Pathan, was charged with impaired operation and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He conceded impairment and BAC but denied operating the vehicle.

The court assessed the credibility of the Crown's witnesses (a 911 caller and a police officer) and found them credible and reliable.

The accused's testimony was rejected due to intoxication, inconsistencies with external evidence, and illogical claims.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the vehicle as alleged, leading to a conviction.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, impaired operation, and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL following a high-speed chase through residential areas.

The defence brought Charter applications challenging the admissibility of breath test evidence on grounds of violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found a breach of section 8 (right to privacy) regarding cell toilet surveillance and excluded the breath test evidence pursuant to section 24(2).

However, the court convicted the accused on the dangerous operation and impaired operation charges based on the totality of the evidence, including observations of the accused's driving and physical condition.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and robbery, sought a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court agreed that the pandemic was a material change, granting jurisdiction to review the detention order.

However, the court found that the applicant's detention remained necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Despite a strict proposed release plan involving house arrest and electronic monitoring, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the applicant would commit further offences and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit following a traffic stop.

The defence raised multiple Charter breaches including: failure to make an ASD demand "forthwith" failure to administer the ASD test before the accused could obtain legal advice, lack of reasonable grounds for the approved instrument demand due to failure to note the ASD calibration date, privacy breach through cell video surveillance, overholding after testing, and inadequate right to counsel advice.

The court rejected all alleged breaches and found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

Charles Chun appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing a breach of his s. 10(a) Charter rights and an error by the trial judge in declining to exclude evidence under s. 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a standard of deference to the trial judge's factual findings and s. 24(2) analysis, found that the trial judge's characterization of the events leading to the breath demand was reasonable.

Despite a s. 10(a) Charter breach, the trial judge's application of the Grant analysis was upheld, concluding that the breach was not trivial, but police acted in good faith and the impact on the appellant's interests was minimal.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol and dangerous driving following a single-vehicle collision in a rural area on September 17, 2017.

The Crown sought acquittal on the dangerous driving charge due to insufficient evidence regarding how the vehicle entered the ditch.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant was operating the vehicle between 01:30 and 03:00 on September 17, 2017, while having a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The dangerous driving charge was dismissed.