G. Gill

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that losses it sustained due to an employee's participation in a Ponzi scheme constituted a 'direct financial loss' under its fidelity bond.

The bank had settled multiple third-party claims after victims transferred funds to the bank based on fraudulent representations by the bank's employee.

The court held that the bank received the funds subject to a constructive trust, and suffered a direct financial loss when those funds were credited to unrestricted accounts controlled by the fraudster.

The court found this narrow issue of policy interpretation appropriate for partial summary judgment and granted the declaration.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown called five witnesses including two paramedics who observed erratic driving, the arresting officer, a second officer, and a breath technician.

The defendant conceded the over 80 charge but contested the impaired driving charge.

The court found both charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on cumulative evidence including observations of erratic driving, near-accident involvement, physical signs of impairment, and breath test results.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in trial.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and over 80 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months from charge to anticipated end of trial in provincial court.

The overall delay was calculated at 18 months and 21 days, but after deducting approximately 3 months and 8 days of defence delay, the net delay was 15 months and 13 days, falling below the ceiling.

The court found the defence had not demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case had not taken markedly longer than reasonably required.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants, a consortium of insurers, brought a motion to clarify TD Bank's discovery obligations regarding documents subject to solicitor-client, litigation, and settlement/mediation privilege.

TD Bank was seeking indemnity under fidelity policies for amounts paid to settle 19 underlying lawsuits related to a Ponzi scheme.

The court ruled that TD Bank had not implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege through its pleadings.

It also found that litigation privilege for documents created for the underlying litigation was not lost upon settlement, given the close connection to the current coverage dispute.

However, the court determined that TD Bank could not assert settlement privilege over documents related to the underlying settlements, as these were crucial for the insurers to assess the reasonableness and allocation of damages for coverage purposes.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded a violation of section 10(b) rights, acknowledging that special circumstances existed requiring the police to ensure the accused understood his legal rights in a meaningful way.

The central issue was whether the breath sample evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused's limited English proficiency and sincere request for a Punjabi language interpreter were not adequately addressed, resulting in a failure to provide meaningful consultation with counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed the charge.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to produce three categories of documents in its affidavit of documents.

The plaintiff argued that it was prohibited from producing these documents by United States regulatory and privacy laws, as well as US court protective orders.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the foreign laws and orders were entitled to comity.

The court held that the plaintiff should not be compelled to violate foreign laws and directed the defendants to seek production or consent directly from the relevant US authorities or courts, with the plaintiff's reasonable cooperation.