G.D. Finlayson

The appellant, a young person, sought leave to appeal and appealed a summary conviction appeal decision upholding the constitutionality of the Criminal Code offence of being an occupant of a motor vehicle known to have been taken without the owner's consent.

The court held that the provision did not create liability for morally blameless conduct because the Crown must prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

It further held that the summary conviction appeal court erred in treating s. 794(2) as applicable to the defence in s. 335(1.1), since that provision concerns exceptions and qualifications, not ordinary defences, which at most impose an evidentiary burden.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was dismissed, and the matter was remitted to Youth Court for trial.

The appellants challenged an order refusing relief from a default judgment and raised issues concerning notice of a sale and prior proceedings, as well as the interpretation of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act.

The court held that the motion judge reasonably found one appellant had not moved promptly enough to set aside the default judgment.

It also upheld the factual finding that the other appellant had notice of both the sale and earlier proceedings.

The statutory interpretation argument was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for aggravated assault arising from a violent neighbour dispute involving an iron bar.

The main issue was whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the trial judge charged the jury under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code, the evidence also required an instruction under s. 34(2) because the appellant's version raised a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm.

The court further held that the jury should have been told that a mistaken belief about the degree of danger could still support the defence if based on reasonable grounds.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code DNA warrant provisions authorizing seizure of bodily substances for forensic analysis.

The Court of Appeal held that the challenge was properly resolved under s. 8 of the Charter, and that if the regime satisfied s. 8 scrutiny it could not be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 on the self-incrimination theory advanced.

The court found the statutory scheme contained substantial judicial and privacy safeguards, upheld the ex parte warrant structure, and rejected the lower court's attempt to read in a notice requirement.

Fresh evidence concerning updated DNA technology undermined the basis for striking down the hair-sample provision, which was reinstated.

The cross-appeal was dismissed and the declaratory application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari seeking to quash a committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The court held that the committing judge correctly instructed himself on the limited function of a preliminary inquiry judge under governing Supreme Court authorities.

Relying on authorities confirming that a preliminary inquiry judge is not to assess witness credibility, the court found no jurisdictional error.

The appeal was dismissed.