Frederick Scott Turton

The defendant, Jasper Construction Corp., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract.

The plaintiff, N.K.P. Painting Inc., had a subcontract with Jasper Construction Ltd., but alleged Jasper Construction Corp. was also liable as an undisclosed principal, alter ego, assignee, or by novation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual issues regarding Jasper Construction Corp.'s liability were inextricably intertwined with the overall action against Jasper Construction Ltd. Granting partial summary judgment would not advance the goals of timeliness, affordability, and proportionality, and risked duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings, especially given that both defendants shared counsel and key personnel.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to enforce a foreign arbitration award.

The defendant raised multiple genuine issues requiring trial, including the validity of the arbitration, set-off, scope of arbitration, and identity of the contracting party.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the cautions against partial summary judgment articulated in Hryniak and Butera, noting the risk of inconsistent findings, delay, increased costs, and wasted judicial resources, as the motion would not dispose of the entire action and many issues would remain for trial.

Danforth (London) Ltd. ("Danforth") sued the City of London ("City") for $53 million in damages, alleging negligence and failure to act fairly and in good faith regarding a proposed development and rapid transit (RT) routing.

Danforth's related company had applied for a zoning by-law amendment in 2015, but withdrew it after City staff requested significant street dedications for a then-proposed RT route.

In 2017, the City approved a different RT route that did not require these dedications.

Danforth claimed that an earlier routing decision would have allowed its development to proceed.

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing no duty of care was owed in negligence and that Danforth could not complain about the exercise of discretionary power as the application was withdrawn before a council decision.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the City's RT routing decisions and the pre-approval process were "core policy" decisions, immune from negligence claims, and that no private law duty of care was owed.

The claim of unfairness or bad faith also failed because no final decision was made by City council, and there was no evidence of bad faith in staff's earlier requests.

The court also noted statutory protection under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The applicant, a funding organization, sought possession of fitness equipment leased to various numbered companies operating out of premises owned by the respondent landlord.

The leases were in default.

The respondent challenged the applicant's status, arguing the leases were not properly assigned from the original lessor.

The court found the assignment was valid and the applicant had the right to possession under the leases, the General Security Agreements, and the Personal Property Security Act.

The court granted the application, ordering the respondent to cease impeding the applicant's access to the equipment.

The appellants sought to challenge legal accounts rendered by the respondent law firm to their creditor, Sun Life, in connection with enforcement of a secured loan.

The appellants had signed three successive release agreements that purported to preclude assessment of the accounts.

The motion judge held that the releases were effective to bar assessment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but on different grounds.

While expressing concerns about the motion judge's reasoning regarding the Solicitors Act, the appellate court held that the appellants failed to establish special circumstances required under section 11 of the Solicitors Act to justify assessment of accounts already paid by a third party.

The applicant lawyer successfully moved to oppose confirmation of an Assessment Officer's ruling regarding unpaid legal accounts, while the respondents' motion to oppose was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs of $21,109.76 for the two motions, including a portion on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' late adjournment request.

The court found no conduct justifying an elevated scale of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Emphasizing proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the respondents to the applicant at $15,448.46 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant lawyer and respondent clients both brought motions to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision regarding unpaid legal accounts.

The clients argued the Assessment Officer made numerous errors, including reversing the onus of proof, misapprehending evidence, and improperly relying on business records for a law clerk who did not testify.

The court dismissed the clients' motion, finding that the Assessment Officer properly applied the burden of proof, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and correctly admitted the dockets as business records.

The lawyer's motion was granted solely to remit the issue of costs back to the Assessment Officer, as the parties had not been given an opportunity to make submissions regarding a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The defendant, a dissolved corporation, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a Russian corporation with no assets in Ontario.

The court applied the two-step analysis under Rule 56.01 and found the defendant met the initial burden.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that an order for security would be unjust, as the merits of the complex case were deemed neutral and the defendant's dissolved status did not preclude the order.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to post $25,000 in installments up to the pending summary judgment motion.

The appellant WMJO Limited appealed a trial judgment finding it liable to contribute on a pro rata basis to the expenses incurred by the respondent Middlesex Condominium Corporation 229 to maintain and operate a sanitary sewer pumping station.

The trial judge found WMJO liable based on unjust enrichment and contract principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that WMJO was enriched by connecting to the existing pumping station without bearing operating or management costs, while MCC 229 suffered corresponding deprivation.

The court rejected WMJO's argument that positive covenants running with land and statutory obligations provided a juristic reason to deny recovery.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01(b) to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, specifically challenging allegations of intentional interference, nuisance, and conspiracy against individual directors and the building manager.

The court, applying a low threshold for pleading a cause of action, found that the plaintiff's claim sufficiently pleaded the necessary facts for all three torts against the individual defendants, including their personal liability for tortious conduct.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding the individual appellant personally liable on a credit application guarantee.

The appellants argued that trial fairness was compromised by the Deputy Judge's excessive intervention and cross-examination of witnesses.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the Deputy Judge crossed the line of permissible intervention by extensively cross-examining the appellants' witnesses and acting as a participant in the trial.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

Following a successful appeal from a Small Claims Court decision, the appellant sought costs for both the appeal and the trial below.

The court awarded the appellant $2,500 for the trial, declining to interfere with the quantum determined by the trial judge, but reversing the entitlement.

For the appeal, the court applied the principles from Boucher and Rule 57.01, awarding $2,500 plus HST for fees and $1,071.69 for disbursements, for a total costs award of $6,396.69.

The appellant, N.K.P. Painting Inc., successfully appealed a Small Claims Court decision, resulting in a judgment of $23,893.74 plus prejudgment interest.

This ruling addresses the costs of both the original trial and the appeal.

The court upheld the Deputy Judge's cost award for the trial but reversed the party in whose favour it was made.

For the appeal, considering the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principles from Boucher, the court fixed costs at $2,500.00 plus HST for fees and $1,071.69 for disbursements.

The appellant subcontractor appealed the dismissal of its unjust enrichment claim against the respondent condominium corporation.

The general contractor went bankrupt, leaving the subcontractor unpaid.

The condominium corporation retained the statutory holdback but did not pay the subcontractor, who had not registered a lien.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the contract between the owner and general contractor was a juristic reason to deny the claim.

The court held the owner was unjustly enriched by retaining the holdback and awarded the subcontractor the holdback amount.

The appellant, a painting subcontractor, appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its unjust enrichment claim against a condominium corporation.

The subcontractor had not been paid by the bankrupt general contractor and had not registered a construction lien.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by concluding that a contract between the owner and general contractor constituted a juristic reason to deny recovery to the subcontractor.

The appellate court clarified that a contract only serves as a juristic reason if the claimant is a party to it.

It found that the condominium corporation was unjustly enriched by retaining the statutory holdback funds after receiving the full benefit of the work without full payment, and that denying recovery would result in a windfall.

The appeal was allowed, and judgment was entered for the appellant for the amount of the holdback.

A trucking company sought repayment of customer payments retained by a factoring company after the parties terminated their factoring agreement.

The defendant alleged the funds were applied to a $50,000 oral consulting agreement and outstanding contractual fees.

The court rejected that evidence as inconsistent with the documentary record and drew adverse inferences from missing accounting records.

Finding no juristic reason for the defendant to retain the funds, the court held the retention constituted unjust enrichment and ordered repayment.

A condominium corporation operating a private sewage pumping station sought a declaration that neighbouring townhouse developments connected to the system were required to contribute to operating and maintenance costs.

The original joint use and maintenance agreement contained positive covenants that did not run with the land, preventing direct contractual enforcement against subsequent owners.

The court held that although the covenant could not bind successors in title, the unit owner defendant had knowingly received and benefited from sewage services for years while making intermittent payments.

Applying principles of implied contract and unjust enrichment, the court found the defendant had been enriched, the plaintiff suffered corresponding deprivation, and there was no juristic reason for the enrichment.

The court declared that the unit owner defendant must pay a pro rata share of the sewage system’s operating and maintenance costs.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claim against the respondent.

The corporate appellant's claim was struck because its corporate charter had been revoked when the action was commenced, making it a nullity, and the limitation period expired before it was revived.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the individual appellants' claims, finding that the motion judge erred by striking the entire action based on an improper post-hearing communication from the respondent's counsel without giving the appellants an opportunity to make submissions.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering payment of an outstanding debt to the respondent for labour, materials, and services.

The central trial issue concerned whether a partial payment had been made within the limitation period, thereby preventing the claim from being statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the deputy judge’s extensive interventions during the trial compromised trial fairness and created an appearance of bias, particularly during the examination of the defendant and credibility findings.

The court reviewed the trial transcript and concluded that the nature and tone of the interventions crossed the line from permissible clarification into improper participation.

The trial judge’s questioning formed the basis of adverse credibility findings and created the appearance that conclusions had been reached before all evidence was heard.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered before a different deputy judge.

The respondent purchased a hobby farm from the appellant.

The appellant failed to disclose an underground waterline supplying water to his adjacent property and other neighbours, and instead provided a statutory declaration on closing stating he was unaware of any adverse claims.

The respondent discovered the waterline later, causing business interruption.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for negligent misrepresentation and awarded damages.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding negligent misrepresentation despite an entire agreement clause, and in calculating damages.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction, arguing the appeal of a $25,500 damages award belonged in the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction because 'final order' in the Courts of Justice Act refers to the whole order, not just the appealed portion.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on negligent misrepresentation and damages.