E.M. Morgan

A case conference was held in a class action proceeding to address procedural matters.

The court approved the agreed-upon Notice Plan for the Notice of Certification.

Additionally, the court set a timetable for the plaintiff's upcoming summary judgment motion, granting the defendants until June 15, 2020, to serve their responding materials due to the complexity of the damages calculation and multijurisdictional analysis required.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's Rule 21 motion, the successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, arguing the motion was ill-conceived.

The court held that while the motion was premised on an erroneous view of the law, the plaintiff's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The court awarded the defendants costs on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $9,500.

During a trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude a new reply report by the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Bradford.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the report to address six questions they claimed arose unexpectedly from the defendants' experts' testimony.

The court reviewed the principles governing late-filed expert reports, noting they are only admissible to address new, unanticipated matters raised by the defence.

The court analyzed each of the six questions and found that only one (Question 4, regarding the difference between segregation in a hospital versus a prison setting) addressed a genuinely new opinion.

The motion to exclude was partially granted, with only Question 4 of the reply report admitted.

The defendant brought a motion for leave under Rule 48.04 to seek leave to amend its statement of defence under Rule 26.02(c), as the action had already been set down for trial.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the delay in seeking the amendments was inordinate and presumed prejudice.

The court held that the mandatory language of Rule 26.01 governed, requiring amendments to be allowed unless there is non-compensable prejudice.

Finding no prejudice that could not be compensated in costs, the court granted the defendant leave to bring the motion and leave to amend the pleading.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against the defendants regarding the alleged misclassification of non-managerial sales representatives as independent contractors rather than employees.

The parties consented to certification but disputed whether the class should be divided into two subclasses (lead generators and appointment bookers) and whether a second representative plaintiff was required.

The court certified the class action, divided the class into two subclasses for efficiency, and held that the single plaintiff could represent both subclasses as there was no actual conflict of interest.

The plaintiff and remaining defendants in a price-fixing class action sought to certify the action on consent, approve class counsel fees, and dismiss the action.

The class members had previously been compensated through a settlement with other defendants.

The court found no prejudice to the class, certified the action, approved class counsel fees of $239,895.26 from trust funds, and dismissed the action without costs.

The defendants, CBC and Trent University, brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' $210 million defamation and negligence action.

The action arose from a Marketplace report alleging the plaintiffs' chicken sandwiches contained only 50% chicken based on DNA tests conducted by Trent University.

The court granted CBC's motion, finding that while the defamation claim had substantial merit, CBC had a valid defence of responsible communication and the public interest in protecting investigative journalism outweighed the plaintiffs' private harm.

The court dismissed Trent University's motion, holding that the negligence claim regarding faulty laboratory testing did not arise from an expression relating to a matter of public interest and was therefore not subject to dismissal under the anti-SLAPP provisions.

The plaintiffs brought a motion on consent to certify a class action against the defendant technology company for settlement purposes.

The action alleges that the defendant intentionally invaded the privacy of Android phone users in Canada by accessing and collecting their location history without consent, constituting an intrusion upon seclusion.

The court found that the requirements under section 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met, noting the identifiable class, common issues, and adequacy of the representative plaintiffs.

The court certified the action for settlement purposes and approved the notice of settlement hearing.

The moving party, a car dealer, sought to set aside an interlocutory injunction preventing the transfer of a $1.5 million Ford GT 'super car'.

The plaintiffs alleged the moving party participated in a civil conspiracy to circumvent a 24-month restriction on the vehicle's resale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no new facts or unforeseen change in circumstances since the injunction was granted, and held that the conspiracy claim raised triable issues inappropriate for determination on a motion to set aside an injunction.

The offender was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years.

He spent over three and a half years in pre-sentence custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre, enduring exceptionally harsh conditions including 491 days of lockdowns.

The court dismissed a request for a Charter stay of proceedings but granted significant enhanced credit for the oppressive pre-sentence custody conditions under the Duncan framework.

The offender was sentenced to 7.5 years plus one day, with 7.5 years of pre-sentence credit applied, leaving one day to serve followed by two years of probation.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) seeking an order for the payment of a volume bonus commission prior to trial in a wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff sought leave to introduce extensive affidavit evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the interpretation of the employment agreement in light of alleged code of conduct breaches raised a question of mixed fact and law, not a pure question of law.

The court noted the motion was effectively an improper attempt to bypass the procedural requirements of a Rule 20 summary judgment motion, including mandatory attendance at Civil Practice Court, and warned against the risks of partial summary judgment.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's class action on summary judgment, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the Class Proceedings Fund argued for a 30% reduction on the basis that the litigation was brought in the public interest.

The court rejected both arguments, finding that the defendants' discounted fee arrangement and the breach of trust pleading did not justify an elevated costs scale, and that the pension calculation dispute was a private financial matter rather than public interest litigation.

The court exercised its discretion to award the defendants partial indemnity costs fixed at $200,000 for fees plus disbursements.

In a voir dire during a trial, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, arguing that a previously undisclosed 2002 draft report demonstrated a lack of independence.

The plaintiffs alleged that the expert's subsequent 2003 and 2019 reports were substantively altered to align with the defendants' legal position.

The court held that while the differences between the reports raised a suspicion sufficient to lift any litigation privilege over the draft report, they did not warrant disqualifying the expert at the threshold stage.

The expert was qualified to testify, with the draft report permitted to be used for cross-examination, and the ultimate assessment of his credibility and independence reserved for the trial judgment.

In a voir dire during a trial regarding historical programs at a psychiatric facility, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Turrall.

The plaintiffs argued he lacked credibility because substantial portions of his report on the standard of care were copied verbatim from another expert's memo.

The court found the standard of care portion of the report unnecessary and excluded it, but qualified the expert to testify on causation issues regarding specific plaintiffs, as that portion of his report was based on his own review of medical records.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement to correct two points from its previous reasons for judgment granting certification and summary judgment dismissing the action.

On consent of the parties, the court revised the class definition regarding the defined benefit indexation payment increase from the pension plan.

The court also clarified that only the employer, and not the other defendants, owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in the administration of the plan.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Vernon Quinsey, arguing he lacked the requisite independence and objectivity.

Dr. Quinsey was previously employed as a staff psychologist and Director of Research at the very psychiatric facility whose programs were being challenged as unethical human experimentation.

The court found that Dr. Quinsey's integral role in evaluating the contentious programs during the relevant period created a serious doubt as to his objectivity.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of his evidence outweighed its probative value, and disqualified him from testifying as an expert, though permitting him to testify as a fact witness.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to admit three sur-reply expert reports.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the reports were unnecessary, prejudicial, and served late.

The court admitted two of the reports, finding them to be narrowly tailored responses to specific criticisms raised by the plaintiffs' experts.

However, the court excluded the third report, finding it to be an advocacy piece that improperly introduced new evidence and amounted to case-splitting.

The plaintiff employee sued for wrongful dismissal after being terminated without cause.

He argued that an illegal 'Termination for Cause' clause in his employment agreement rendered the entire termination provision, including the 'Termination of Employment with Notice' clause, void and unenforceable.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the 'Termination of Employment with Notice' clause was a stand-alone provision that complied with the Employment Standards Act and was enforceable on its own terms.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, the defendant's cross-motion was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff buyer failed to close a real estate transaction due to an inability to secure financing.

The plaintiff attempted to renegotiate the purchase price and deposit, which the defendant sellers rejected.

The defendants subsequently sold the property to another buyer for $5,000 less and moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action and release the $65,000 deposit to them.

The court granted the motion, finding no bad faith, no failure to mitigate, and no grounds for relief from forfeiture, as the deposit was reasonable and there was no unconscionability.

The plaintiff and third party moved for contempt of court against the defendants for failing to remove a dock as ordered in a previous trial judgment.

The court heard evidence from a Ministry of Natural Resources official regarding the defendants' efforts to obtain the necessary work permits for the removal.

The court found that the defendants were making genuine efforts to comply with the judgment and navigate the regulatory requirements, and therefore dismissed the contempt motion, ordering the defendants to continue using best efforts to remedy the nuisance.