Ann Christian-Brown

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against Ontario, Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, and individual hospital administrators, alleging systemic negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations related to the use of seclusion and restraints at a maximum-security psychiatric hospital.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that while some patients may have individual claims for culpable seclusion, there was no basis in fact for systemic wrongdoing.

The court concluded that the claims lacked commonality, as the use of restraints required highly individualized clinical assessments, and that a joinder action, rather than a class proceeding, was the preferable procedure.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a class action regarding alleged systemic abuse at a psychiatric facility from Toronto to Barrie.

The court applied a holistic approach to the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While Barrie had proximity to the facility and witnesses, the Regional Senior Justice noted that due to courtroom availability and backlog, a trial in Barrie might ultimately be moved elsewhere in the Central East Region.

The court concluded that Toronto's judicial resources and specialized class action judges would better ensure a just and expeditious determination.

The motion to transfer was dismissed.

Following a 71-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded nearly $10 million in damages, the plaintiffs sought costs of approximately $8.5 million on a substantial indemnity basis or $5.3 million on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that substantial indemnity costs were unwarranted and that the partial indemnity claim included costs for interlocutory matters already decided.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the defendants to justify an elevated scale of costs.

Applying the partial indemnity scale and deducting amounts attributable to prior interlocutory motions, the court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $4,900,000 all-inclusive.

This is the damages phase of a multi-party action brought by 28 former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre.

In the liability phase, the defendants (two psychiatrists and the Crown) were found liable for breach of fiduciary duty and battery for subjecting the plaintiffs to experimental and harmful psychiatric programs (DDT, Capsule, and MAPP) between the 1960s and 1980s.

The court assessed general, punitive, and income loss damages on an individual basis.

General damages were awarded to all plaintiffs, ranging from nominal amounts to over $2 million for the most severely impacted.

Punitive damages were awarded in cases involving particularly egregious conduct, such as the treatment of underage patients or the administration of alcohol to known alcoholics.

Income loss claims were largely limited or barred by the ex turpi causa doctrine, which prevented recovery for periods the plaintiffs spent lawfully incarcerated or institutionalized for subsequent criminal offenses.

During a trial, the plaintiffs brought a motion to qualify a forensic accountant to give expert evidence on the quantification of income loss and to respond to the defendants' experts' use of the HALS/PALS statistical approach.

The defendants argued the accountant was not qualified to comment on the HALS/PALS approach.

The court held that while the accountant lacked medical or vocational expertise to apply the HALS/PALS data, his experience in valuation methodology qualified him to opine on the comparative merits of individualized versus statistical approaches to discount rates.

The expert was qualified to give opinion evidence on accounting issues and valuation methodology.

During the damages phase of a trial concerning institutional abuse, the defendants moved to exclude the expert testimony of the plaintiff's treating psychologist, arguing her long-term therapeutic relationship compromised her objectivity.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the expert's changing opinions over time were reasonably explained by her subsequent review of the plaintiff's clinical records from the institution, rather than an assumption of an advocacy role.

The court held that the expert maintained the requisite independence and objectivity to assist the court.

During the damages phase of a trial concerning historical abuses at the Oak Ridge Social Therapy Unit, the defendants moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' expert reply report authored by Dr. Roy O'Shaughnessy.

The defendants argued the impugned paragraphs raised irrelevant issues or issues already addressed in the liability phase.

The court granted the motion in part, striking paragraphs that opined on alternative treatments or whether the plaintiffs should have been at Oak Ridge, as these fell outside the scope of the damages inquiry.

Paragraphs addressing the impact of the programs on the plaintiffs' institutionalization and employment trajectories were deemed admissible.

The defendants requested the court to issue a formal judgment following the liability phase of a bifurcated trial to establish res judicata for the upcoming damages phase.

The plaintiffs consented to the form of the draft judgment but argued it was unnecessary at this stage.

The court declined to issue the formal judgment, finding that the trial is a single proceeding and a comprehensive judgment should be issued after the damages phase is completed, though the liability findings remain binding.

In the second phase (damages) of a bifurcated trial concerning institutional abuse at the Oak Ridge mental health facility, the defendants moved to exclude three expert reports tendered by the plaintiffs.

The court found that the reports of the two psychiatrists and one psychologist improperly repeated and elaborated on causation evidence that had already been adjudicated in the first phase of the trial.

The court ruled the reports inadmissible under the Mohan test as they were unnecessary and prejudicial, but granted the plaintiffs leave to submit revised reports focused strictly on the quantification of damages and economic loss.

The plaintiffs, former involuntary patients at the maximum-security Oak Ridge division of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, brought an action against two doctors and the provincial Crown.

They alleged they were subjected to abusive and experimental psychiatric programs, including hallucinogenic drugs, solitary confinement, and harsh disciplinary regimes, without informed consent.

The court found that the doctors breached their fiduciary duties and committed assault and battery.

The court also found the Crown directly and vicariously liable for these breaches and torts, rejecting the Crown's arguments of statutory immunity, limitation periods, and laches.

The trial was bifurcated, with this decision addressing liability and causation, leaving damages to be quantified later.

During a trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude a new reply report by the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Bradford.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the report to address six questions they claimed arose unexpectedly from the defendants' experts' testimony.

The court reviewed the principles governing late-filed expert reports, noting they are only admissible to address new, unanticipated matters raised by the defence.

The court analyzed each of the six questions and found that only one (Question 4, regarding the difference between segregation in a hospital versus a prison setting) addressed a genuinely new opinion.

The motion to exclude was partially granted, with only Question 4 of the reply report admitted.

In a voir dire during a trial, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, arguing that a previously undisclosed 2002 draft report demonstrated a lack of independence.

The plaintiffs alleged that the expert's subsequent 2003 and 2019 reports were substantively altered to align with the defendants' legal position.

The court held that while the differences between the reports raised a suspicion sufficient to lift any litigation privilege over the draft report, they did not warrant disqualifying the expert at the threshold stage.

The expert was qualified to testify, with the draft report permitted to be used for cross-examination, and the ultimate assessment of his credibility and independence reserved for the trial judgment.

In a voir dire during a trial regarding historical programs at a psychiatric facility, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Turrall.

The plaintiffs argued he lacked credibility because substantial portions of his report on the standard of care were copied verbatim from another expert's memo.

The court found the standard of care portion of the report unnecessary and excluded it, but qualified the expert to testify on causation issues regarding specific plaintiffs, as that portion of his report was based on his own review of medical records.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Vernon Quinsey, arguing he lacked the requisite independence and objectivity.

Dr. Quinsey was previously employed as a staff psychologist and Director of Research at the very psychiatric facility whose programs were being challenged as unethical human experimentation.

The court found that Dr. Quinsey's integral role in evaluating the contentious programs during the relevant period created a serious doubt as to his objectivity.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of his evidence outweighed its probative value, and disqualified him from testifying as an expert, though permitting him to testify as a fact witness.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to admit three sur-reply expert reports.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the reports were unnecessary, prejudicial, and served late.

The court admitted two of the reports, finding them to be narrowly tailored responses to specific criticisms raised by the plaintiffs' experts.

However, the court excluded the third report, finding it to be an advocacy piece that improperly introduced new evidence and amounted to case-splitting.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude video footage of an interview between a deceased plaintiff and a documentary filmmaker.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the unsworn footage to demonstrate the deceased plaintiff's sincerity and counter credibility attacks in the defendants' expert reports.

The court held that the video footage did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay, noting that the best available evidence was the deceased plaintiff's sworn examination for discovery transcript and affidavit.

The motion to exclude the evidence was granted.

In a negligence action arising from a fatal swing‑stage collapse during construction, a defendant moved to compel answers to numerous refusals given by the Ministry of Labour’s representative during discovery.

The Ministry argued that questions relating to inspector training, experience, workload, and inspection decisions were irrelevant because they concerned non‑justiciable core policy decisions involving allocation of governmental resources.

The court held that it was premature on a refusals motion to determine whether the inspection decisions were policy or operational, and that the pleadings alleged negligent inspection and failure to enforce safety obligations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

As a result, questions concerning the inspector’s qualifications, workload, sector plans, internal guidelines, prior incidents, and certain post‑incident changes were relevant and proportionate.

Most refusals were ordered answered, some were dismissed, and costs were awarded to the moving defendant.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking a court‑ordered state-funded counsel after being denied Legal Aid.

The Crown conceded the accused had been refused Legal Aid and lacked the financial means to retain counsel, leaving only the issue of whether her right to a fair trial would be materially compromised without representation.

The accused faced charges of mischief and criminal harassment and argued the harassment charge was legally complex.

The court held the anticipated four‑hour trial was not lengthy or complex and that the accused could effectively represent herself with guidance from the court.

The application for court‑appointed counsel was dismissed.