Emily Schatzker

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking various forms of relief, including advance legal costs, payment of living expenses, reimbursement of social services, waiver of Rules of Civil Procedure, ongoing accommodation, anonymization of proceedings, driver's license renewal, and a court investigation into systemic racism.

The court dismissed all aspects of the plaintiff's motion, finding that the claims for advance payments did not meet the Law v. Canada test for discrimination under the Charter, and the request for advance legal costs did not meet the British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band three-part test for interim costs in exceptional cases, particularly as contingent fee arrangements are available in personal injury litigation.

The applicant sought reconsideration of a Tribunal decision finding that his injuries from a motor vehicle accident fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) and denying payment for psychological and chiropractic treatment plans.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred by failing to consider his pre-existing back condition and by improperly weighing conflicting psychological evidence.

The adjudicator dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding no significant errors of law or fact.

The adjudicator noted there was insufficient evidence that the pre-existing condition prevented maximal recovery within the MIG limits, and found no error in the Tribunal's weighing of the expert psychological reports.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for physical and psychological injuries.

The insurer denied the claims on the basis that the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant failed to meet the burden of proving that his physical or psychological injuries fell outside the MIG.

The Tribunal noted that the applicant's own treating physicians did not recommend chiropractic treatment and that his psychological complaints did not warrant treatment outside the MIG.

As the $3,500 limit for minor injuries had been exhausted, the disputed treatment plans were not payable.

The application was dismissed.

Mr. Gandhi sued Zev Investments Limited for injuries sustained after slipping on a liquid in his apartment building's stairwell.

Zev brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issue for trial existed, as Mr. Gandhi's theories about the hazard were inconsistent and refuted by their evidence.

Mr. Gandhi maintained he slipped on paint or paint oil spilled by Zev's contractor and argued Zev failed to maintain a proper inspection system.

The court dismissed Zev's motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the cause of the fall, Zev's vicarious liability, and the adequacy of its maintenance system, concluding that a summary judgment process would not be proportionate or efficient given the need for extensive witness testimony.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer denied the claims on the basis that the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant failed to meet the burden of proving that his physical or psychological injuries fell outside the MIG.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the respondent's psychological assessor and the applicant's treating family physician over the applicant's psychological expert.

As the injuries were predominantly minor, the application for disputed treatment plans, interest, and a special award was dismissed.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought statutory accident benefits from the insurer, claiming she suffered a catastrophic impairment due to a combination of physical injuries and severe psychological disorders (depression, PTSD, and chronic pain).

The arbitrator found that the applicant's combined physical and psychological impairments met the 55% whole person impairment threshold, qualifying her for catastrophic impairment status.

The arbitrator also found the applicant suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life, entitling her to ongoing non-earner benefits.

Claims for a specialized hospital bed and certain rehabilitation expenses were granted, while claims for massage therapy, travel time, and a special award were denied.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

After failing to make documentary production and his representative removing himself from the record, the applicant failed to attend the arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator found the applicant had abandoned his application and dismissed the claims in their entirety.

The applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's expenses fixed at $1,000.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

After failing to resolve disputes through mediation, the applicant applied for arbitration.

The applicant failed to make required documentary production, his representative was removed from the record, and he failed to attend the arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator found the applicant had abandoned his application and dismissed the claims in their entirety.

The applicant was ordered to pay $1,000 in expenses to the insurer.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence action arising from a tractor rollover that injured the plaintiff while performing landscaping work on a cottage property.

The property owner argued she met her duties under the Occupiers’ Liability Act by relying on an independent contractor, while another defendant denied any supervisory relationship with the plaintiff or responsibility for the tractor’s use.

The court held that numerous material facts were in dispute, including the relationships among the parties, supervision of the work, and instructions provided regarding the tractor.

The evidence raised significant credibility issues and complex questions regarding occupiers’ liability, negligence, and duty of care.

Applying the principles in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court concluded that the matter could not be fairly resolved on summary judgment and required a full trial.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits from the insurer.

After mediation failed, the applicant applied for arbitration.

The applicant's representative sought to be removed from the record due to a loss of contact and instructions from the applicant.

The applicant failed to attend the pre-hearing and the arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator granted the representative's motion to be removed from the record and dismissed the arbitration due to the applicant's failure to participate and present evidence.

The applicant was ordered to pay the insurer $500 in expenses.

On a summary judgment motion in a negligence action arising from two motor vehicle collisions and an alleged commercial host claim, the moving defendant sought dismissal of a co-defendant's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity after the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their direct claim against it.

The court rejected a technical argument that no valid crossclaim existed, holding that the insurer added under s. 258(14) of the Insurance Act had introduced the insured defendant's crossclaim into the main action.

Applying the Hryniak framework and Rule 20, the court held there was a genuine issue requiring a trial because the intoxicated driver's inconsistent but live evidence about alcohol service at the restaurant had to be weighed.

The court also declined to use enhanced summary judgment fact-finding powers or order a mini-trial, finding that doing so would not fairly and proportionately resolve the litigation as a whole.

The respondent was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident in the United States Virgin Islands.

She applied to her insurer for statutory accident benefits and underinsurance coverage.

The insurer brought an application to deny coverage, arguing the accident occurred outside the territorial limits of the Insurance Act and the policy, which cover the 'United States of America'.

The court found the term ambiguous and applied the doctrine of contra proferentem, concluding that the term includes the United States Virgin Islands for the purposes of coverage.

The insurer's application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that on the undisputed facts, the respondent was entitled to summary judgment based on the authority of Finlayson v. GMAC Leaseco Ltd.